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Abstract 
 
Recent works in philosophy of mind and the cognitive sciences draw an 
“unconventional” picture of cognitive processes and of the mind. Instead of 
conceiving of cognition as a process that takes place within the boundaries of 
the skull and the skin, some contemporary theories claim that cognition is a 
situated process that encompasses the human agent’s boundaries. In particular, 
the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH) and the Enactive approach to cognition 
claim that embodied action is constitutive of cognitive processes, and thus of 
the mind.  
Although both theories give an “extended” or “extensive” picture of 
cognition and of the mind, they disagree on the epistemic value of internal 
representations. The EMH claims that we need to posit internal action-
oriented representations (AORs). AORs would account for action-selection, 
action-control, and for the prediction of incoming perceptual information.  
The enactive approach to cognition argues against AORs. The concept of 
AOR does not fulfill the representational conditions necessary to talk about 
representations properly. Furthermore, AORs are expressive of an internalistic 
prejudice, which makes the EMH weak.  
Moreover, a semiotic analysis of AORs shows that these items called 
“representations” are not active at all. Therefore, the epistemic posit of AOR 
plays no interesting job in the project of extending the mind in virtue of a 
reassessment of the concept of representation aimed at making it embodied 
and active.  
Therefore I claim that the concept of AOR has to be rejected. Action-
control, action-selection, and the anticipation of aspects of action-perception 
loops can be explained in a more enactive way. Embodied action in a field of 
affordances explains how agents respond selectively to environmental features 
and how action-perception loops are anticipated by the “affective agent”.  
Furthermore, the enactive approach to cognition - especially if coupled with 
a semiotic description of cognitive niches and with some insights from the 
affective sciences (e.g. appraisal of core relational themes) - gives an explanation  
of action that, in contrast to the EMH, is actually able to “extend the mind”.  
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Riassunto  
 
Alcune ricerche contemporanee in filosofia della mente e scienze cognitive 
dipingono un’immagine della mente non convenzionale. Invece di concepire i 
processi cognitivi come qualcosa che accade nella testa, esse sostengono che la 
cognizione è un processo situato, che oltrepassa i confini dell’agente cognitivo 
umano. 
In particolare, l’Ipotesi della “Mente Estesa” e l’approccio enattivo alla 
cognizione sostengono che le azioni dei soggetti incarnati costituiscono i 
processi cognitivi, quindi anche la mente. 
Nonostante entrambe le teorie descrivano la mente e la cognizione come 
“estese”, c’è disaccordo circa il valore epistemico della nozione di 
rappresentazione interna. L’Ipotesi della “Mente Estesa” sostiene che la nostra 
teoria debba postulare rappresentazioni interne orientate all’azione. Queste  
spiegherebbero come il sistema cognitivo seleziona l’azione da performare e la 
controlla, e come  esso anticipa l’informazione fornita dalla percezione. 
L’approccio enattivo alla cognizione argomenta contro le rappresentazioni 
interne orientate all’azione. Il concetto di rappresentazione orientata all’azione 
non rispetta i criteri secondo i quali si può parlare appropriatamente di 
rappresentazione. Inoltre, il concetto di rappresentazione orientata all’azione 
nasconde un pregiudizio internalista, che fa dell’Ipotesi della “Mente Estesa” 
una proposta debole.  
In aggiunta, considerazioni di natura semiotica sul concetto di 
rappresentazione orientata all’azione dimostrano che queste rappresentazioni 
non sono davvero concepite come processi attivi. Quindi il concetto di 
rappresentazione interna orientata all’azione non sembra essere utile nel 
progetto filosofico di una “Mente Estesa”, basato su una rielaborazione della 
nozione di rappresentazione in termini incarnati e attivi.  
Sostengo allora che il concetto di rappresentazione orientata all’azione 
debba essere abbandonato. Il controllo e la selezione dell’azione, così come gli 
aspetti anticipatori di processi cognitivi basati sulla circolarità di azione e 
percezione, possono essere spiegati facendo riferimento alla letteratura 
sull’approccio enattivo alla cognizione. L’azione del soggetto incarnato, 
performata in un ambiente fatto di affordance, spiega sia come il soggetto 
risponde agli stimoli ambientali in maniera selettiva, sia come i processi 
cognitivi basati sulla circolarità di azione e percezione sono anticipati da un 
soggetto emotivamente tonalizzato.  
Inoltre, l’approccio enattivo alla cognizione -specialmente se integrato con 
una descrizione semiotica delle nicchie cognitive e con alcuni concetti delle 
scienze dell’affettività, come quello di valutazione delle emozioni di base- 
fornisce una spiegazione dell’azione che, contrariamente all’Ipotesi della 
“Mente Estesa”, è davvero in grado di “estendere la mente”.  
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Introduction and plan of the work 
 
For the past twenty-five years, research in cognitive sciences have promoted 
a paradigm shift. First-wave cognitive science, sometimes called “Cartesian 
Cognitive Science” (Anderson 2003; Rowlands 2010; Wheeler 2005), 
identified cognition -and then the mind- with sub-personal computations on 
internal representations. The mind was said to stop at the boundaries of our 
skull.  
More recent approaches to cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind 
known as 4Es (Embedded, Embodied, Extended, Enactive Cognition) 
question this claim. On the one hand, those theories claim that this classical 
paradigm for the study of the mind is not explanatory enough. The 
identification of the mind’s boundaries with an internal representational 
software does not explain what agents do in everyday cognitive practices. 
Usually we perform cognitive practices in a given environment, and we do so 
by means of our bodies and of the exploitation of environmental resources. 
Therefore, to account for human agents’ cognitive experience, cognitive 
sciences and philosophy of mind should take into account seriously the 
cognitive role of our bodies and of the environment we interact with and we act 
in. On the other hand, part of the contemporary research in cognitive sciences 
notices that the problem of classical theories consists in the use of the “wrong” 
notion of representation. Classical cognitive scientists’ a-modal and 
proposition-like representations do not account for embodied and situated 
aspects of cognitive processes. Therefore, in order to be explicative, cognitive 
theories should rethink of the epistemic posit of representation in order to 
anchor it to the agent’s cognitive experience. 
Most part of the contemporary debate in the fields of cognitive sciences and 
the philosophy of mind deals with these two philosophical points: the role of 
representations in cognitive processes, and different ways to account for 
situated embodied action.  
Some theories, such as “Grounded Cognition”, some versions of 
“Embedded Cognition” and the “Extended Mind Hypothesis”, try to explain 
the role of the body, of action, and of externalities in the mind’s processes by 
rethinking of the concept of representation.  
In my work I consider all those approaches to representations, although I 
focus on the representational approach promoted by the Extend Mind 
Hypothesis in particular. Indeed the Extended Mind Hypothesis is extremely 
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interesting in the debate because it explicitly endorses an ontological claim 
about the mind (Clark, Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008; Clark 2016): the mind can 
be realized outside of the skull.  
Given the importance of internal representations in “Cartesian cognitive 
sciences”, and the problems that the notion of representation entails, to 
understand whether the ontological claim of the Extended Mind Hypothesis is 
justified by the theory “at work”, a detailed discussion of the way this theory 
deals with the problem of representation is required. Indeed, the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis tries to extend the mind by explaining external action –which 
is said to extend the mind- through the concept of Action-Oriented 
Representation.  
My research questions are the following ones. Is this action-oriented 
representational proposal able to overcome the internal/external duality 
entailed by classical representational explanations of cognitive processes? Does 
the new concept of representation (i.e. action-oriented representation) 
developed in the Extended Mind literature play any interesting job in the 
philosophical project of an extended mind? 
My working hypothesis is that the concept of action-oriented representation, 
instead of fostering an extended picture of the mind, hides an internalistic 
commitment. Therefore, I try to find other explanations to account for the 
extensive nature of the mind in the Enactive approach to cognition.  
The Enactive approach to cognition claims that a successful explanation of 
the mind -able to account for cognitive processes as taking place in the 
“mindful” interaction between the cognitive agent and her environment- should 
get rid of any kind of internal representation. The explanation should rather 
focus on the very role of embodied action in a subjectively and affectively tuned 
world of affordances.  
 
To develop my discussion about the role of representations in 
contemporary explanations of cognition and the mind, I will structure my work 
in three chapters.  
In Chapter I, I will take into account the way the field of cognitive sciences 
changes over time. I will not offer a detailed excursus about all the theories of 
cognitive sciences and of the different kinds of representations they postulate. 
On the contrary, I will provide a short sum-up of the core ideas of classical 
cognitive sciences, and I will point out the centrality of representations in those 
explanations. Then I will consider different ways to reassess the concept of 
representation. Those proposals have been developed in order to solve the 
problems (i.e. the symbol grounding problem) the classic notion of 
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representation entails. In this discussion, I will focus on Cognitive Linguistics, 
Grounded Cognition, and Embedded Cognition, which I consider to be crucial 
attempts to “give a body” to representations and to account for the adaptive 
function of representational mechanisms. After this discussion, I will consider 
the Enactive approach to cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis.  
This chapter is aimed at providing the theoretical background of the debate 
about representations that will be taken into account in the following chapter, 
and at emphasizing the differences among the theories of the contemporary 
debate of 4Es. In particular, the chapter will provide the conceptual means to 
distinguish the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the Enactive approach to 
cognition, my work deals with in detail. Both theories draw an “extended” or 
“extensive” picture of the mind, but they do that in different ways. 
In Chapter II, those differences will be considered in depth. There I will 
deal with the problem of internal representation: this is one of the crucial points 
the Enactive approach to cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis 
disagree on. In particular, I will examine the concept of action-oriented 
representation. This one is pivotal in the explanation of practical knowledge 
offered by the Extended Mind Hypothesis. On the contrary, it is rejected by 
the Enactive approach to cognition, which shows the problems that this concept 
entails.  
In my discussion about the concept of action-oriented representation I will 
consider the objections the Enactive approach to cognition makes against this 
epistemic posit. Moreover, I will provide more reasons to reject action-oriented 
representations by developing a semiotic analysis of this concept. This exam 
will show that action-oriented representations prevent the Extended Mind 
Hypothesis from giving a strong, “extended” picture of the mind. On the 
contrary, the enactive approach to cognition -especially if it is integrated with a 
semiotic perspective on eco-niches- promotes this explanation of the mind. 
In Chapter III, I will deal with the problem of action-oriented 
representations again, but from another perspective. Indeed, in Chapter II, I 
will consider the very debate about action-oriented representations, postulated 
to account for action-perception loops and for the philosophical problem the 
explanation of those cognitive practices deals with (i.e. the frame problem). In 
Chapter III, I will consider the theory of Predictive Coding and some of the  
reassessments of this approach to cognition and the brain offered by the 
Extended Mind Hypothesis and by the Enactive approach to cognition. This 
chapter is aimed at understanding whether the Extended Mind Hypothesis’ 
version of Predictive Coding (called “Action-Oriented Predictive Processing”) 
is able to give a more successful explanation of action-perception loops than 
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that developed when it talks about action-oriented representations. Therefore, 
my discussion will focus on the concept of representation in the Predictive 
Processing framework, and on the way this approach to anticipatory aspects of 
action-perception loops works on Predictive Coding in order to make it fit with 
the Extended Mind Hypothesis.  
My exam of this philosophical proposal will show that Predictive Processing 
still entails the same problems action-oriented representations-based 
explanations of action-perception loops entail: the theory is not suitable to 
“extend” the mind. Then I will deal with a different explanation of anticipation 
in cognitive processes. I will consider the “enactive version” of Predictive 
Coding, sometimes called “Predictive Engagement”, and I will integrate it with 
some concepts from the affective sciences, in order to make some points of the 
explanation more clear.  
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The Mind and its varieties.  
Alternative Minds in the Cognitive Sciences 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Mind and its varieties  
10 
 
I.1. Introduction. Approaching “4Es”. 
 
In this chapter, I begin to consider “4 Es” (Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, 
Extended) approaches to cognition. This discussion aims to understand the 
philosophical problems those theories seek to solve. Moreover, I consider how 
these approaches to cognition deal with some of the core concepts of the 
contemporary debate (i.e. the role of the body, action and representations in 
cognitive processes) in the cognitive sciences. This discussion is aimed at 
answering the following question: are ‘4Es’ a solid philosophical coalition, or 
the projects pursued under the same umbrella follow philosophical paths that 
are the one at odds with the others?  
To do that, in §I.2, I start my discussion considering the broad picture of “4 
Es” approaches to cognitive sciences. I take into account the way those 
philosophical positions distinguish themselves from traditional cognitive 
sciences, and I describe 4Es’ project as the attempt to go back to the “dirtiness” 
of cognitive experience.  
In §I.3, I prepare the philosophical ground for the discussion that will take 
place in §I.4 and §I.5. In those paragraphs, I take into account Cognitive 
Linguistic and Grounded Cognition, in order to point out that new approaches 
to cognitive sciences born as a response to the “symbol grounding problem”.  
In §I.6, I consider an Embodied approach to cognition which differs from 
those presented in §I.4 and §I.5: “Biological Embodiment” (Gallagher 2011a). 
This passage is useful to develop my discussion for two reasons. First, it marks 
two distinct ways to conceive of Embodiment; second, it lays the foundations 
of one of the most discussed philosophical positions of the debate: the Enactive 
approach to Cognition. This one is examined in §I.7, where I consider some 
of the core ideas of Enactivism, and I try to explain how this approach to 
cognition draws a broad picture of the mind (similar but different from that 
suggested by the Extended Mind Hypothesis) developed in a non-
representational fashion.  
In §I.8, I discuss the philosophical stance known as “Embedded Cognition”, 
in particular by taking into account the problem that I call the “location claim”. 
This paragraph is also useful to distinguish different kinds of claims endorsed 
in the debate (e.g. dependence claim vs. constitution claim; ontic thesis vs. 
ontological thesis), and to draw some distinctions between the Enactive 
approach to cognition and the Extended Mind Hypothesis. 
In §I.9, I take into account the Extended Mind Hypothesis in detail. I 
consider and answer to some objections against this approach to cognition and 
the mind. Moreover, I make the reasons of my critical position towards the 
Chapter I 
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Extended Mind Hypothesis clear; I explain why I think that the hypothesis of 
the Extended Mind, as developed by Clark, is not the best way to think of the 
process of “mind-extension”.  
In conclusion, in §I.10, I discuss some differences and convergences about 
the way theories of the “4Es Cognition” debate consider the role played by the 
body, by action and by representations in cognitive processes. The discussion 
of these points is functional to explain why I claim that “4Es” do not constitute 
a robust philosophical coalition. Moreover, this paragraph is aimed at making 
clear how the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the Enactive approach to 
cognition, even if they point to the same direction (namely they understand the 
mind as dynamic, active and as encompassing the context in which cognitive 
practices take place) cannot be considered to be consistent the one with the 
other. In particular, a fundamental point of tension is considered. The 
Extended Mind Hypothesis, by endorsing the idea of cognitive impartiality (or 
that of complementarity) still gives an important role to internal representations 
in cognitive processes. This point is at odds with the Enactivist project, 
according to which, in order to get rid of any trace of internalism about the 
mind, we should reject internal representations (at least when we take into 
account low level cognitive processes, such as perception and motor 
coordination).  
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  I.2 When we rise. From speculation to the “dirtiness” of 
experience.  
 
An intuitive way to start manipulating the pieces of “4 Es” puzzle is to look 
at the background philosophical assumptions these different philosophical 
stances of the debate share.  
On the one hand, the fact that Embodied, Embedded, Enacted, and 
Extended (“4Es”) approaches to cognition and the mind belong from different 
philosophical traditions - from Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology (e.g. Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch 1991; Noë 2004) to analytic philosophy and AI (e.g. Clark 
2008) – represents a great factor of differentiation. By recalling different 
philosophical traditions, theories within the “4 Es” cognition frame develop 
their argumentations independently the one from the others, also and 
especially disagreeing on some core theoretical points.  
On the other hand, it should be noticed that, despite the great variety that 
characterizes this new field of studies, those theories have been said to 
constitute a “new science of the mind” (Rowlands 2010). They have been 
described as a new and revolutionary approach to the issues of cognition and 
mind that, despite many points of friction, apparently seems to constitute a sort 
of “theoretical coalition”, which rises its voice against what has been the 
mainstream cognitive science for many years.  
This second order look at “4E Cognitive Sciences”, namely the idea that 
they should somehow be considered to be a “theoretical coalition” (at least for 
a provisional analysis), depends on the fact that all these new theories seem to 
break up with what the famous philosopher and historian of cognitive sciences 
Howard Gardner defines “the Mind’s new science” (Gardner 1985), that is 
cognitive science as it was first established in the second half of the previous 
century. Hence, it seems to be the case that the philosophical ground “4 Es” 
share should be individuated in the breaking points with good old-fashioned 
cognitive science, in particular with some ideas that laid the foundations of 
cognitive science as a science, which those new approaches radically 
reconfigure or reject. Therefore, to approach 4Es’ debate, it is worth to take 
into account the core points that determine their departure from classical 
cognitive science.   
 
Early wave cognitive science -whose birth date is commonly individuated 
with the “Symposium of Information Theory” that took place at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1956 (see Miller 2003: 142)- was 
settled as an interdisciplinary research field on cognition that gathered scholars 
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and scientists from philosophy, psychology, computer science, linguistics, 
neuroscience, and anthropology.  
Despite this diversity, scholars of different research fields agreed on some 
fundamental assumptions (Gardner 1985: 38-49; Fusaroli, Paolucci 2011), 
which can be considered to be the pillars of the cognitivist epistemological (and 
methodological) paradigm. These fundamental assumptions can be summed-
up in four points: i) representations, ii) computers, iii) de-emphasis on affect, 
context, culture and history, iv) belief in interdisciplinary studies, and 
rootedness in classical philosophical problems. 
 
i) Representations.  
Reacting to the behaviorist psychological paradigm, according to which we 
should study human intelligent capacities exclusively by considering the 
behavior that the agents display, first wave cognitive scientists adopt 
representations as fundamental epistemic posits. 
It can be said that this conceptual move, rather than being motivated by an 
empirical necessity or by empirical studies, strictly depends on philosophical 
reasons, in particular on argumentative reasons. Indeed, this compelling 
necessity to think of mental representations as core features of “the new science 
of the mind” is an outcome of the criticism towards the argumentative structure 
of the behaviorists’ theory1, which is said to be unclear, vague and inconsistent. 
Behaviorism seems to entail a collapse of the explanaundum on the explanans, 
namely a circular argumentation that causes the inexplicability of the 
phenomena taken into account. When behaviorists try to explain intelligent 
behavior through the concept of behavior itself (described as a set of inputs and 
outputs data recordings), they end up with a misleading overlapping of causes 
and effects, which makes their causal explanation unsuccessful.  
Then, it seems that epistemic entities such as mental symbols, compositional 
and syntactical rules, mental images, and so on are introduced within the 
cognitivists’ explanatory framework for the sake of good argumentation, at first.  
According to cognitivists, the postulation of this intermediate 
representational level between sensory stimuli (inputs) and behavior/actions 
(outputs) is an interesting and successful means to get rid of the circularity the 
behaviorists’ explanation entails. Explaining cognitive functions by making use 
of representational concepts, a locus for cognition, different from that one 
individuated by behaviorists, is found.  
                                                          
1 For accurate and detailed objections against the behaviorist explanatory paradigm see 
Chomsky’s “Review of B. F. Skinner’s Verbal Behavior” (Chomsky 1959).  
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Indeed, according to cognitivists, cognition not only depends on the 
manipulation of mental representations, but this intermediate, non-observable 
layer is considered to be the real locus of cognitive process. In this sense, 
sensory inputs can be said to be the first element of the causal chain of 
cognition, and behavior is the last one, the ultimate effect of a mechanism 
whose explanatory powers have to be individuated exclusively in the human 
head. Then, the collapse of explananda and explanans, and the collapse of 
causes and effects too, is avoided by identifying cognition with the “slice”2 
between inputs and outputs.  
The “philosophical counterpart” of this general frame to study the mind is 
what is commonly known as “functional-computational” theory of mind.  
Since this chapter is not aimed at giving a detailed theoretical and historical 
description of first wave cognitive sciences, I will not take into account the 
different theories that endorse this philosophical stance in detail. Nevertheless, 
since the functionalist-computational approach to cognition has been the 
mainstream explanation of the mind for many years, and given that great part 
of the debate concerning “4Es” Cognitive Sciences focuses on the reassessment 
or on the criticism of the functionalist stance, I briefly introduce the main points 
of this theory, whose implications for an explanation of mental phenomena will 
be made clear later.  
According to the computational-functionalist approach to cognition, 
cognitive phenomena should be considered to be embedded in that language-
like inner layer previously mentioned, whose items (representations) are 
manipulated by sub-personal computational operations, that is operations 
whose rules and passages can be explicitly individuated.  
This is a formal way to reassess the assumptions of folk-psychological 
approaches to the mind, according to which the mind is a set of propositional 
attitudes or states (i.e. beliefs and desires), which cause intelligent behavior. 
This is clearly exemplified in the way Fodor -the “complete cognitivist” 
(Gardener 1985: 81) sums-up the two core claims of his representational theory 
of the mind (RTM). The two claims are the following ones:  
 
a) “For any organism O, and any attitude A toward the proposition P, there 
is a (‘computational’/’functional’) relation R and a mental representation 
MP such that 
MP means that P, and 
                                                          
2 The use of the word “slice” is not unintentional. Indeed, it recalls the phrase “sandwich 
model” coined by the philosopher Susan Hurley in her book Consciousness in Action (Hurley 
1998: 401) to critically refer to the cognitivist paradigm.  
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O has A if O bears R to MP” 
b) “Mental processes are causal sequences of tokenings of mental 
representations”  
(Fodor 1987: 17) 
 
Cognition takes place when there is an agent with a mental attitude (e.g. 
belief, desire) toward an intentional object (a representation), where mental 
attitude and intentional object are connected by a semantic relation. This is to 
say that a process is cognitive when it deals with mental states, whose contents 
are fragments of information represented by a mental symbol according to 
defined rules.  
This means that, in order to explain why and how an agent displays 
intelligent behavior, the philosophical theory has to focus on the concepts of 
state and information. To explain why a subject is acting in a certain way in the 
defined context of a cognitive task, the theory should consider the state 
“activated” in the system at the moment “t” (the mental state of belief or desire, 
for example) and information that this mental state bears in virtue of its 
representational capacities.  
For instance, thinking ‘It’s going to rain, so I’ll go indoors’ coincides with 
having a token of a mental representation whose meaning is ‘I’ll go indoors’. 
Meaning is caused, in a certain way, by the information contained in the 
tokened mental representation ‘It’s going to rain’, that is a language-like 
translation of the agent’s perceptions. The agent is able to behave in a certain 
way under certain conditions because she is able to sub-personally represent 
worldly stimuli, which become meaningful because they entertain causal and 
functional relations with other informational-representational states.  
Then, it can be said that the functional relation that links information with 
dispositional states is meant to explain the “how” of cognitive processes, namely 
the way knowledge is acquired.  
To explain the “how” of cognition within this complete cognitivist 
explanatory frame, the theory implicitly makes use of semiotic concepts. 
Indeed, the relation between information and cognition -that is the way 
information becomes meaningful within the context of holistic mental 
processes- depends on the notion of symbolic representation (Fodor 1987).  
To briefly explain this point, I will make use of a terminology I am familiar 
with: the Peircean one. The choice to make use of this semiotic gloss-  not very 
common in cognitive sciences - to clarify Fodor’s concepts,  is not only 
motivated by my philosophical background, in Semiotics and Pragmatism, but 
it is also motivated by a real theoretical problem. Indeed, there have been many 
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critiques of the way Fodor deals with the relation between mental signs and 
meaning/cognition
3, namely the “how” of cognition.  I suspect that the lack of 
clarity of the RTM is not only a consequence of the confusion that characterizes 
folk psychology and its reassessment within a naturalistic frame (Descombes 
1995: 84 – 89), but it also depends on the acritical use of the notion of symbol. 
Therefore, I will appeal to Peirce’s concept of symbol to see if I can give a more 
intuitive and synthetic description of this point concerning Fodor’s idea of 
processes of reasoning.  
A symbol is a kind of sign that represents an object, where in Fodor’s case 
that object is the content of a mental state, by exhibiting or displaying fragments 
of information as a token of a type. A symbolic representation is a general sign 
(CP 1.558) that stands for its object, denotes its object, according to a law (CP 
2.249) that connects each representational instance to a representational type. 
This means that X is a symbol if it is lawfully connected to “X”, where “X” can 
function as a law insofar its content is not derived from a previous 
representation.  
Then, the idea the RTM seems to convey is that cognition consists in the 
manipulation of information, which becomes meaningful because it entertains 
a lawful relation with a set of general images (that have a propositional-like 
nature), which have an “original” content (Fodor 1987: 111-127; Adams, 
Aizawa 2010: 37).  
Therefore, not only the “why” of cognition is individuated in a 
representational inner layer –because behavior is said to be caused by mental 
states, whose content is represented in a propositional-like structure- but also 
the “how” of cognition, namely the mechanisms through which knowledge is 
acquired, are explained by focusing on the way information acquires meaning 
when it is translated into a nomological representational relation.   
The explanation of cognition given within this theoretical frame is fully 
representational: on the one hand, representations are the 
immediate/intentional objects of mental states, on the other hand they 
constitute the “immaterial” substrate of realizability of cognitive processes 
(Fodor 1987: 17).  
 
ii) Computers.  
Despite computers are not central in all cognitive scientists’ everyday 
scientific practice (Gardner 1985: 46), the scientific production in the field of 
                                                          
3 See, among others, Searle 1980, in which he develops the famous thought experiment of the 
Chinese room.   
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artificial intelligence deeply influences the way old-fashioned cognitive scientists 
work. Indeed, if one the one hand it can be said that AI researchers take human 
intelligence as a model, as something that it is supposed to be reproduced in a 
machine (Winston 1984), on the other hand cognitive scientists take artificial 
intelligence as a way to study human intelligence.  
Cognitive scientists look at the way computers are built and at the way they 
display intelligent behavior as a material model to proof their theories. Artificial 
creatures are actors which perform (and in this performance test) the script 
(namely the theory) of cognitive scientists. 
Moreover, computers play a significant role in the cognitivists’ discursive 
practices, namely in the process where a piece of knowledge is developed and 
established as prominent at a given period.
4
  
In fact, cognitive sciences’ ultimate goal is giving a universal and naturalized 
account of the mind, which finds its place in RTM in virtue of the endorsement 
of a causal-informational theory of content. Therefore, computers are a good 
metaphor to think of cognition and the human mind: they are exactly designed 
to follow those causal, informational and representational laws at the core of 
mainstream theories of mind. 
Moreover, computers are a “physical proof” of another pillar of 
functionalism, which is the multiple realizability of functional systems. 
Computer software can be realized by different kinds of hardware; in the same 
way, according to a functionalist perspective on the mind, mental phenomena 
can be individuated in virtue of their functional and causal relations, 
independently from the brain or the physical body of their realization. 
Then, the computer metaphor is a successful way to “materialize” the 
encyclopedic knowledge
5
 -namely knowledge that silently operates under the 
manifestation of a culture or subculture- that supports cognitivism as a leading 
scientific paradigm.  
 
iii) De-Emphasis on Affect, Context, Culture, and History.  
Mainstream cognitive sciences, although they think that affective, contextual, 
cultural and historical are parts of human lives, avoid making use of concepts 
that belong from those realms. This decision, which concerns the theoretical 
level of their scientific practices, is motivated by a methodological need. When 
cognitivism born, it was almost impossible to think of an experimental 
                                                          
4
 See Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (Foucault 1969, in particular chapter II) for 
the use of the phrase “discursive practice”. 
5
 For a more detailed account of the relation between metaphor and encyclopedia see Eco’s 
article “Metaphor, Dictionary, Encyclopedia” (Eco 1984).  
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paradigm able to take into account all of those variables at the same time and 
to keep them together in a unified model of cognition supposed to ground 
experimental practice. Moreover, this necessity of cleaning up their research 
from what can function as a factor of differentiation or as a factual constraint is 
motivated by an issue of practicality. According to cognitivists, if research had 
taken into account all those individualizing and phenomenalistic elements, 
cognitive science’s project would have been emptied from its sense, because 
core of cognitive science’s project was an explanation of universal mechanisms 
of human mind. 
 
iv) Belief in interdisciplinary studies and rootedness in classical 
philosophical problems.  
At the core of cognitive science’s birth there was the attempt to reassess 
some classical philosophical problems within an interdisciplinary frame. 
Integrating knowledge and methods from different disciplines, cognitive 
science’s core aim is finding solutions to the problem of cognition and the 
human mind, by trying to rephrase the questions that lead philosophical 
research for centuries: How does a cognitive agent look like? What is the best 
way to explain the relation between cognitive agents and their world? How does 
the mind acquire a grip on external reality? Which are the mechanisms 
cognition unfolds by? Which are the criteria we should endorse to define the 
boundaries of the mind?  
 
Now, in virtue of this very short discussion of first wave cognitive sciences’ 
core features, some considerations useful to understand why “4 Es” Cognitive 
Sciences embody an alternative theoretical stance can be offered.  
It can be claimed that 4Es’ objections towards classical explanations of 
cognition and the mind in cognitive sciences depend on the unsatisfactory way 
the cognitivist paradigm -and in general mainstream cognitive science- deals 
with some classical philosophical issues.  
Indeed, what the cognitivist paradigm suggests is a Cartesian-like picture of 
the mind (Anderson 2003). This picture offers a fully internalistic and 
individualistic explanation of cognitive phenomena, which is grounded on the 
same set of conceptual oppositions critically assessed in centuries of 
philosophical research (especially by the phenomenological tradition and by 
the pragmatist one, I would say).  
By endorsing a strong representationalist account of cognitive phenomena, 
namely by describing the mind as a computational-representational software, 
first-wave cognitive science draws a robust opposition between internal 
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realm/external realm, subject/object, cognition/action, mind/world, 
cognition/experience, mind/body, materiality/function, cognition/culture, 
cognition/affect, fact/value.   
On the one hand, this set of oppositions could sound like a useful way to 
individuate accurate conditions to define cognition, and to set the boundaries 
of the mind. This would offer an explanation that, in principle, would be 
rigorous. On the other hand, exactly because of those same criteria, this 
approach to cognition seems to give an impoverished, flat and fragmented 
explanation of human cognitive life.  
In particular, although those attempts to explain cognition give generalizable 
models of the mind that can be in principle applied to a large variety of 
cognitive phenomena – and this would guarantee a practical simplification of 
research practices- those models are not actually able to account of cognition 
in real life.  
By claiming that cognition consists in a set of mental representations sub-
personally computed, the cognitivist explanation seems not being able to have 
a grip on what human agents experience and do in their everyday life.  
Behavior and action are put in the realm of out-puts, then they are not 
considered to be constitutive parts of cognitive processes. Rather, they are 
considered to be mere effects of a process entirely performed by an innate 
software embedded in human heads. Cultural, historical and affective features 
of human life are completely cut off from their experimental and theoretical 
framework. Therefore experiences that usually take place outside of the 
laboratory, namely experiences in which enculturated, affectively tuned 
embodied agents do something in their environment, are not taken into 
account as interesting subjects of study.  
This suggests that the cognitivist paradigm cannot offer a cognitive model 
that intuitively justifies what humans do when they are engaged in their cognitive 
practices. It gives a “sanitized” explanation of cognitive phenomena that, 
precisely because of this sophisticated level abstraction, does not account for 
the dirtiness of human experiences. This makes cognitivism unable to fully 
develop cognitive sciences’ project: explaining how human cognitive life 
unfolds.  
“4Es” cognitive sciences’ project can be seen as a revolutionary attempt to 
account for the philosophical problem of cognitive experience.  
In order to account for this dirtiness of experience, for its folds and 
interstices, “4 Es Cognition” try to gradually reassess what is left outside of the 
boundaries of mind in the cognitivists’ approach to cognition.  
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To briefly explain what will be taken into account in more detail later, it can 
be said that “4 Es” try to account for cognitive experiences by focusing on the 
following dirty factors, which are considered to be important variables, 
constraints or constitutive parts of cognitive processes:  
 
i) The cognitive agent’s body, considered in its neural components, as 
an anatomical body or as a living and moving body. 
ii) The natural and cultural context where cognitive practices take 
place. 
iii) The human agent’s on-going interaction with the problems the 
cognitive situation displays. This interaction is said to be mediated 
by a skillful and embodied manipulation of the context or of parts 
of it (objects).  
 
The progressive inclusion of those factors within the realm of the cognitive 
entails huge implications for a philosophy of the mind.  
The argumentative structure of those explanations is similar to the cognitivst 
one: both explanations claim something about cognition in order to define or 
explain what the mind is. Nevertheless, the pictures of the mind these two 
approaches to cognition draw are completely different.  
On the one hand, classical functionalist explanations of cognition, by 
endorsing a theoretical framework made of couples of oppositions, define the 
mind as something internal, completely distinguished from the world and the 
cognitive agent’s body.  
Moreover, by endorsing a mechanistic and representational perspective, 
shaped by the heuristic metaphor of the mind-computer, classical cognitivist 
explanations of cognition seem to draw a passive picture of the human mind. 
By considering actions and behaviors as mere effects of cognition and not as 
core ingredients of it, namely as unavoidable parts of cognitive processes, those 
explanations entail a strict dichotomy between theoretical knowledge and 
practical knowledge. Indeed, by the word “mind” they mean a set of mental 
states that have a propositional-like nature: having a mind means knowing 
that…, believing that…, desiring that... That is to say that the cognitivists’ mind 
“does not care” about practical knowledge, about that “knowing how” or 
phronetic
6
 knowledge, which is the ground of the encounter between the 
                                                          
6 Here I use the phrase “phronetic knowledge” implicitly referring to the Heideggerian thought. 
This one, despite its great differences with research in cognitive sciences, is progressively 
becoming an important reference point to understand some issues in this field of study 
(Dreyfus 1972; Wrathall, Malpas 2000; Kiverstein, Wheeler 2012; Wheeler 2005). In 
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human agent and her world. They do not take into account what comes before 
any speculative attitude, what shapes our experience in its “average-
everydayness”, as Heidegger would say (Heidegger 1927: §5). To put it in other 
words, standard explanations of cognition and the mind do not consider 
cognition as something humans actively experience when they do something in 
their world, namely when they cope with those problematic situations that ask 
for practical solutions
7
 we face all the time in everyday experience.  
On the other hand, “4Es Cognition” -by including those said “dirty factors” 
in their explanations of cognition- redefine the mind as something that is not in 
principle separated by that same body, that same world the cognitivists’ 
“Cartesian Mind” considers to be non-cognitive, and then non-mental. “4Es” 
respond to cognitivism’s internalistic stance by prospecting a sort of “externalist 
turn”.  
As it will be shown later, not all those new theories endorse an externalist 
approach to the mind at the ontological level, claim according to which the 
mind actually encompasses what is “external” to the head. Nevertheless, they 
are said to endorse an externalist stance about cognition and the mind (Hurley 
2010) at least at the epistemological level. Indeed, even when they explain 
cognitive processes by appealing to old-fashioned cognitive science’s concepts 
(e.g. the concept of representation), they seriously consider the body and action 
in the environment, namely what the cognitivist explanation left unaccounted.  
For those reasons, that is thanks to the endorsement of a progressively 
externalist and active account of cognition, those new approaches to cognition 
and the mind have been said to constitute a new, anti-Cartesian science of the 
mind (Rowlands 2010). This non-dualistic and anti-Cartesian framework is 4Es’ 
common philosophical ground.  
After this very short and general introduction to “4 Es”, I start to explain 
what the different theories of the debate claim in more detail.  
                                                          
particular, I refer to the Heideggerian idea – prefigured in the seminal paper of 1922 
“Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles”, and then developed in Being and Time 
- that human’s primitive encounter with the world is shaped and determined by the Aristotelian 
modality of φρόνησις, namely by a practical wisdom, a practical circumspection that guides 
human actions an behaviors in the environment without the need of a speculative look towards 
this same practical attitude.  
7
 This way to explain practical knowledge echoes John Dewey’s ideas described in Logic. The 
Theory of Inquiry (Dewey 1938). This reference could sound like not “well placed” in the 
context of cognitive sciences. On the contrary, as in Heidegger’s case, it points to some 
theoretical directions that new studies in cognitive sciences are taking. See among others the 
quotation that opens Clark’s book Supersizing the Mind (Clark 2008); Johnson 2010; Johnson, 
Rohrer 2007, Johnson 2006; Gallagher 2009; Menary 2016.  
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In particular, I will consider the argumentations concerning cognitive and 
mental externalism, and I will take into account different ways in which action 
plays a certain role in this multilayered process of “mind-extending”. 
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I.3 Moving the level of pertinence of semiotic systems. Towards an 
embodied account of meaning.  
 
The first critical response to the Cartesianism at the core of the cognitivist 
approach to cognition consists in thinking of a way to ground that symbolic, 
language-like system that, according to functionalism, constitutes the software 
of the mind.  
As previously explained, the functional-computational approach to 
cognition describes cognition as taking place in the internal slice situated 
between inputs from the world and behavioral outputs. It explains the mind as 
something that is (in principle) isolated from the world and from the material 
substance that embodies the mind’s representational software.  
The semantics of that system of symbols is thought to be dependent on the 
internal relations that constitute the structure of the system in itself. Information 
that enters into the system through the sensory system is said to become 
meaningful because it is represented as a token of a type according to a 
compositional law, namely as an occurrence of a symbol-type, whose content 
is underived by previous representations. 
Those approaches to cognition seem to endorse an explanatory perspective 
that has a peculiar semiotic nature.  
I offer a citation from Hjelmslev’s Prolegomena to a Theory of Language to 
make this claim clear.  
 
“[…] linguistic theory was established as immanent, with constancy, 
system and internal function as its sole aims, to the apparent cost of 
fluctuation and nuance, life and concrete physical and phenomenological 
reality. A temporary restriction of the field of vision, was the price that had 
to be paid to elicit from language itself its secret. But precisely through that 
immanent point of view and by virtue of it language itself returns the price 
that it demanded. […] Instead of hindering transcendence, immanence has 
given it a new better basis; immanence and transcendence are joined in a 
higher unity on the basis of immanence” (Hjelmslev 1969: 127)  
 
The fundamental idea of the linguistic method in its structuralist version- 
Hjelmslev and Saussure are representative of-  consists in claiming that, in order 
to scientifically study linguistic phenomena as they are produced in the 
experience of a linguistic community, the scientist should operate a temporary 
abstraction from concrete, contingent, phenomenological manifestations of 
language. She should rather look at the structure that supports and motivates 
those phenomena.  
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In this semiotic tradition, structure is defined as a model built according 
certain operations of simplification, which allow the scientist to make different 
phenomena homogenous, looking at them through the lens of a defined point 
of view. For instance, I observe different human beings and, in order to find 
some common features that allow me to talk about different phenomena by 
appealing to homogenous conceptual tools, I produce a simplification. I can 
consider the human body as a web of relations I find in the skeleton, and I can 
draw a simplified graphic representation of this one. In this way, I individuate 
a structure all human beings share, a system of relations made of differences 
between elements that appear as discrete because they are modeled as 
occurrences of a topological, formal structure. Structure is not something that 
exists in itself; its ontological reality is undefined, or at least problematic.
8
 It is 
rather a conceptual way to gather different items within a common frame (Eco 
1968: 46; 48; 283- 288). Items that populate the structure acquire their 
conceptual reality in virtue of the oppositional relations that constitute the 
structure; the oppositional structure lights up those items as individual items, 
which can be conceptually manipulated. They show up as individual not 
because of their material, substantial or phenomenological features, but 
because the set of oppositions the structure is made of gives a formalization of 
a set of peculiar features (defined by the “direction” of the scientist’s gaze), 
which show themselves as being different from another set of features.  
This structure, defined by a differential topology, constitutes the plane of 
immanence semio-linguistic research should operate on. The concrete 
linguistic manifestations, conceived as a chaotic cluster of variables, transcend 
the semiotic analysis.  
That is to say that, in order to develop a successful analysis of an object 
(language, in this case), the scientist is supposed to establish an accurate level 
of pertinence of her research practice, which defines the epistemic borders of 
the object of study. In the case of language, this level of pertinence is the 
relational, oppositional and componential structure of a closed or bounded 
semiotic system.  
                                                          
8 There is a huge debate that deals with the problem of the ontological reality of structure. In 
my discussion, I endorsed Eco’s position, according to which structure has a methodological 
value. Other scholars (Saussure, Jakobson, Tesnière, Hjelmslev, Piaget, Lévi-Strauss, Deleuze, 
Petitot), even if they do not actually make use of terms such as “realism” and “nominalism”, 
endorse a different approach to structure, position that has been called “ontological realism”. 
According to this approach, structure, in order to actually be an explicative concept, should be 
conceived as a category of possible experience (see Petitot 1985: 23-26). For a more detailed 
discussion of this point, see also Nöth 1990: 196:197.  
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By the expression “closed” or “bounded” semiotic system, I refer to a 
system in which each semiotic occurrence acquires its meaning in virtue of its 
lawful relation with determined exhaustive sets of classificatory alternatives, 
which are internal to this same system (Lemke 2000; Pattee 1995). Meaning 
never goes out, never escapes the system and never takes something from the 
grey and blurry landscape outside of this “semantic micro-universe” (Paolucci 
2010: 49). The system is separated from the phenomenological, pragmatic and 
experiential landscape from a robust grating. This one is made of oppositions 
that follow a dyadic principle (for example contrariety, contradiction, and 
implication among couples of elements in Greimas, or oppositions between 
phonemes in Jakobson), or the law of “participatory oppositions”, for example 
when an element of the structure takes part in the value of the opposite 
element, like what happens with extensive and intensive terms (Paolucci 
2010:49- 79).  
 
The functionalist explanation of cognitive phenomena seems to fit with this 
idea of closed semiotic system. According to this philosophical stance, 
cognition and meaning have to be studied as immanent to a well-defined level 
of pertinence, that is the formal level in which functional relations among 
semiotic mental entities unfold, abstracting from any kind of variable that 
cannot be modeled within this frame. Those variable are part of the non-
scientific realm of transcendence.  
In principle, there is nothing wrong with the attempt to scientifically study 
an object by modeling it through the concept of closed or bounded semiotic 
system. If the plane of immanence of the research is established by making use 
of pertinence as a methodological tool in a reasonable way - that is following 
the criteria of observational adequacy, according to which a semiotic model 
should be built taking into account its applicability to the empirical objects that 
it models (Hjelmslev 1969: 17)- a closed semiotic system can actually be 
explicative.  
Indeed, by working on a formal schema that can be generalized to huge 
classes of objects, a closed semiotic system is, in principle, able to explain 
different kinds on phenomena in an economical way.  It makes use of a 
minimal set of concepts to account for a variety of meaningful dynamics, variety 
that develops within the boundaries of the established system. Therefore the 
problem of a bounded semiotic does not depend on closure in itself, but it is 
rather strictly dependent on the way closure is established. In order to give an 
appraisal of the explanatory efficacy of a semiotic system, one has to wonder 
whether the borders of the closure are adequate or not to the object of study.  
The Mind and its varieties  
26 
 
Now, the objections first embodied approaches to cognition raise against the 
functional-computational account of meaning-production, seem to concern the 
way those theories individuate the level of pertinence of meaning-acquisition in 
cognitive processes. By individuating the level of pertinence of meaning in the 
formal relations of a closed semiotic system, whose boundary is the skull, those 
approaches are not able to account for the acquisition of meaning in cognitive 
activities performed by an embodied cognitive agent. They fail to give a ground 
to the symbolic cognitive system (Anderson 2003; Harnad 1990; Glenberg, 
Robertson 2000; Niedenthal, Barsalou, Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, Ric, 
2005). This makes their model inadequate to its object of study: human 
cognition.  
In particular, by considering the body as transcendent that bounded 
semiotic system, and defining the closure of the semiotic system before the 
cognitive agents’ body, they fail to account for the explanatory value of mental 
representations “in real-world terms, for the agents that deploy them” (Robbins, 
Aydede 2009: 4), when they perceive the world and act upon it.  
The first attempts to re-situate cognition within the context of human 
experience consist in moving the level of pertinence of the semiotic system so 
that it includes the body, which is considered to be the matrix of meaning-
acquisition and cognition more in general. This implicitly entails a relocation 
of the body in the theoretical space of the research: it stops to be a vague and 
blurry materiality that the structural grating cannot grasp, and it becomes the 
primary source in virtue of which symbolic entities acquire their meaning.  
The ultimate goal of the inclusion of the body within the closure of the 
semiotic system, is to find that grip on the reality of experience cognitivists’ 
formal language-like mental system misses. Indeed, the core idea of this 
embodied or grounded approach to cognition is that mental representations 
can play a meaningful role in a cognitive system to the extent that their very 
constitution, their being embodied representations, immediately points to what 
cognition is: a skillful bodily activity.   
 
Now, to understand this point -that is the way semiotic items of a mental 
symbolic system acquire a grip on the reality of human cognitive experience 
because they are thought as constitutively connected and dependent on bodily 
activities- it is worth to take a step back towards the broader theoretical frame 
in which the relation between meaning and body is the central subject of study: 
cognitive linguistics. Later, a short sketch of what embodied representations are 
and of the way those ones play a certain role in the theoretical history of 
embodied approaches to cognition will be provided.  
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I.4 Cognitive linguistics. Looking for an embodied matrix for 
meaning-acquisition 
 
Cognitive Linguistics, a research field born in the US in the 80’s, is grounded 
on the idea that cognition has to be found where there is language, or where 
there is a language-like structure or function.  
Generally speaking, the aim of this research can be summed-up in this way: 
 
“Cognitive Linguistics focuses on language as an instrument for 
organizing, processing and conveying information. […] Language, then, is 
seen as a repository of world knowledge, a structured collection of 
meaningful categories that help us to deal with new experiences and store 
information about old ones” (Geeraerts, Cuyckens 2007: 3-5) 
 
That is, cognitive linguistics’ aim is not studying language as a mere 
communicative means. Rather, this research aims to find a way to explain all 
kinds of cognitive phenomena, namely different ways in which cognition has a 
grip on reality, by focusing on language. This one is not considered to be 
independent from cognition but, on the contrary, is said to be constitutive of it 
(Lakoff 1990: 40).  
At first glance, the core claim of cognitive linguistics seems to point to the 
same direction the classical cognitivist paradigm headed to, namely the idea 
that, to understand what the mind is, the scientist has to look at the way its 
functions unfold linguistically.  
Nevertheless, this similarity makes sense on a very general level only. 
Indeed, the very birth of cognitive linguistics as a new research field is set forth 
by the attempt to overcome some problems the historically prominent position 
in linguistics -namely generative grammar, first developed by Chomsky- 
entailed. In particular, cognitive linguistics claims that semantics should be 
radically reassessed: another way to explain how linguistic signs acquire their 
meaning should be discovered.  
 
Generative linguistic is grounded on a “generative commitment”. This 
“generative commitment” consists in claiming that language should be 
described as a “system of combinatorial mathematics”, as a set of “formal 
grammars” (Lakoff 1990: 43). The main aspect of language taken into account 
in this theoretical framework is then the syntactical one. Nevertheless, between 
the 60’s and the 70’s, many linguists of the Chomskyan tradition pushed the 
generative project towards “Generative Semantics” (Taylor 2007: 571).  
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By endorsing the core idea of Generative Grammar, generative semantics 
tries to explain meaning by focusing on a description of transformational rules 
that convert deep syntactic structures in a “surface” structure, which is the 
semantic one. The core idea of this formalist approach to meaning consists in 
the postulation of two distinct and autonomous modules, in which there are 
different production rules (Chomsky 1965): one for syntax (a set of strings of 
uninterpreted symbols) and one for semantics.  
Meaning-acquisition is explained in mechanistic terms, and this recalls the 
computer metaphor (Lakoff 1987: 302 - 303) previously taken into account: 
the semantic module takes the syntax module as its input, it performs an 
algoritmical translation of the occurrences of this formal structure, and 
produces linguistic meanings as outputs of this process. Linguistic meanings are 
created through this process of linking two different formal systems, which 
translates the entities of the first domain into the second one, following 
appropriate rules. These two formal systems, even if they interact in a certain 
way, keep on being two different systems.  
By considering this idea of the separation between syntax and semantics, 
cognitive linguistics makes its objections to this way to conceive of semantics. 
The generative model, even if it tries to draw a possible link between these two 
domains, is committed to a counterintuitive and empirically blamable 
assumption: the idea that syntax logically comes before semantics, namely the 
idea that it plays a foundational role. Syntax founds semantics, which is 
considered to be a superficial structure, an effect of a deep structure that causes 
it, in a certain sense.  
To Lakoff, this idea is not motivated by the observation of linguistic 
phenomena, by an analysis of what humans actually do in their linguistic 
practices. It rather depends on the a-critical endorsement of a linguistic product 
as a core heuristic tool in an epistemic frame: the idea that natural language can 
be metaphorically modeled as a mathematical language. The core claim of this 
objection is that any attempt to explain semantics within a generativist 
framework is unsuccessful, doomed from the start, because this explanation 
does not understand that the justification of the reasons it provides does not 
depend on the consistency of reasoning itself, namely on the logical consistency 
of the argumentation. Justification comes rather from a space of reasons that 
comes before the argumentative structure the generative model appeals to. This 
space of reasons is that built on the mechanistic metaphor of language, which 
shapes scientific practices at any level.  
The problem with that does not consists in the use of metaphor in itself, but 
it depends on the use of the wrong metaphor. In fact, by making use of the 
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“computer metaphor” to account for language, the generativist project 
underplays the most important feature of language: language is primarily and 
originally a semantic realm, because i) it is an expressive means of thought, ii) 
it is also the matrix, the ground from which concepts arise and constitutively 
depend on.  
Contrary to what Chomsky claimed (Chomsky 1965), Cognitive Linguistics 
states that language is not separated from the faculty of conceptualization; it is 
not  “encapsulated” in a module that is autonomous from the conceptual one, 
which primarily deals with meanings, but it rather lays the foundations of it.  
 
In this peculiar theoretical framework, in which language and concepts are 
thought to be constitutively tied, cognitive linguistics develops the first attempt 
to give a body to meanings.  
The core idea of Cognitive Linguistics, first developed in two famous books 
by Lakoff and Johnson, Philosophy in the flesh (1999) and Metaphors we live 
by (1980), is the following one. Metaphorical language, that kind of figurative 
language that linguistics usually studied at a rhetorical level, actively structures 
humans’ whole cognitive life, and it does so because metaphors have an 
embodied ground.  
Lakoff and Johnson describe metaphor as a system in virtue of which one 
aspect of a concept is comprehended in terms of another concept or another 
set of concepts: metaphor is the linguistic (and conceptual operation) by means 
of which two semantic fields are unified. Metaphor linguistically materializes 
the conflation of two semantic and conceptual domains.  
I give an example in order to explain that better. In our everyday linguistic 
practices, it is very common to understand the concept of “arguing” by making 
use of the concept of “battle” or “war”: argument is war. We use a variety of 
expressions, such as: 
  
“Your claims are indefensible. 
He attacked every weak point in my 
argument. 
His criticisms were right on target. 
I demolished his argument. 
I’ve never won an argument with him. 
You disagree? Okay, shoot! 
If you use that strategy, he’ll wipe you 
out. 
He shot down all my arguments”  
(Lakoff, Johnson 1980: 4)  
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It is important to notice that we do not just talk about arguments in terms of 
war or battle. Our experience of arguments, what we do when we argue, is a 
battle. We lose or win arguments, we see the person we argue with as an 
opponent, we attack her claims and we defend our position, we use 
argumentative strategies, and so on.  
This example shows what we do when we make use of a metaphorical 
concept: we use “war” as a metaphor to understand what we do in the 
(semantic) realm of “arguing” and, at the same time, we structure our linguistic 
practice metaphorically. We make use of linguistic expressions as conceptual 
tools, and we do that in a natural and quasi- immediate way because the 
mapping between conceptual realms metaphors produce is not arbitrary. We 
do not need to perform implicit inferences to subsume a linguistic occurrence 
under a pattern of meanings and possible linguistic uses set by convention. On 
the contrary, our use of these expressions is quasi-immediate, because 
metaphors our linguistic experience unfolds by are motivated by that thing that 
makes us “us”, by what we cannot avoid to deal with all the time: our body.  
Linguistic metaphors our conceptual system is built on are motivated by 
what we do by means our bodies, or, more precisely, by means of a particular 
kind of knowledge that blends propositional-like knowledge with a sort of 
practical knowledge. This hybrid knowledge includes  
 
a) the subject’s perceptual experience of her body;  
b) the subject’s conceptual understanding of her body, which includes folk 
and/or scientific knowledge of her body;  
c) the subject’s emotional attitude towards her body (Gallagher, Zahavi 
2008: 146).  
 
This kind of knowledge is what Lakoff and Johnson describe with concept 
of image-schema. Image-schemas are “dynamic analog representations of 
spatial relations and movements in space derived from perceptual and motor 
processes” (Gibbs, Colston 1995: 349), such as in-out, pushing-pulling, near-
far, front-back. They are representations of sensorimotor and perceptual 
possibilities of the body, namely representations of what our bodies can do in 
the space.  
According to Lakoff and Johnson, metaphors are built on the recurrence of 
such image-schemas. Their core idea is that linguistic experience, and then 
conceptual experience too, unfolds through the representation of bodily 
relations and possibilities of embodied actions.  
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The argumentation they offer can be unpacked in this way. Since language 
is grounded in experience, and since any kind of experience humans have is 
mediated by the bodies we have, a grip for linguistic uses and concepts have to 
be found where the body is or, more precisely, where the body makes sense. 
This “making sense of the body” is precisely individuated in image-schemas. 
Those ones, by representing aspects, features and possibilities of the body, give 
the agent a cognitive access to the body. In doing so, they consequently light up 
the why of the metaphors our linguistic and conceptual experience live by: they 
cognitively penetrate the “average-everydayness” of our bodies, which motivate 
all metaphorical experiences.  
The core idea of this approach to cognition is that image-schemas, by 
representing and deploying that hybrid knowledge of the body the subject has, 
“explain” how the meanings human cognitive life unfolds by make sense for 
creatures with this kind of body.  
 
“Concepts of front and back […] make sense to beings with fronts and 
back only. If all beings on this planet were uniform stationary spheres 
floating in some medium and perceiving equally in all directions, they would 
have no concepts of front and back” (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 34).  
 
Image-schemas give a representation of the way our bodies function as a 
constraint for our cognitive experience, understood in its linguistic and 
conceptual aspect.  
 
To conclude this short sum-up of the core ideas of Cognitive Linguistics, it 
can be said that this research field matters to the theoretical development of 
embodied accounts of cognition because it is the first attempt to give back to 
language the substance the generative/cognitivist tradition stole to it. By 
conceiving of the body as a “semantic engine” (Gallagher 2011a for this 
expression), namely as something that functions as a constraint for meaning-
acquisition and conceptual development, cognitive linguistics gives a living and 
embodied response to the problem of “meaning grounding” and “symbol 
grounding” standard explanations in cognitive science suffered from. The 
process thanks to which mental symbols acquire their meaning, namely their 
grip on reality, is no longer described as an obscure disembodied 
computational procedure, which maps the relation between two distinct formal 
systems, but it is rather conceived to be radically grounded in the experience 
of the body. 
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The body comes into the process of meaning-acquisition to the extent that 
it is represented by that particular kind of hybrid representations that image-
schemas are. Metaphors make use of those hybrid representations in order to 
schematize and to make meaningful embodied experience, and the linguistic 
and conceptual ones as well. Indeed both kinds of experience are said to be 
metaphorically grounded.  
To express the core idea of cognitive linguistics by a motto I would say:  
«The mind is where embodied metaphors, built on image-schemas, structure 
our cognitive processes» 
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I.5 Grounded Cognition. Embodying modal representations.  
 
The “psychological” counterpart of this project aimed at giving a body to 
meanings developed in linguistics is that research field known as “grounded 
cognition”9 (see Barsalou 2008). 
Grounded cognition begins its argumentation by pointing out that 
contemporary cognitive scientists, namely those who first took part in the 
“cognitive revolution”, develop radically new approaches to mental 
representations, which strongly contrast with pre-twentieth century thought 
(Barsalou 1999: 578; Barsalou 2008: 619). Before that said cognitive 
revolution, the most dominant view of cognition held that higher order 
cognition is inherently perceptual: it relies on mental images that produce a 
synthesis of sensory perceptions. With the birth of cognitive sciences, which is 
heavily influenced by developments in logic, linguistics, statistics and computer 
science, the way scientists think of mental representations as cognitive media 
radically changes. As explained previously, the formalist trend at the core of 
cognitive sciences pushes scientists to think of mental representations as 
“sanitized” representations10, namely as representations perceptual features are 
completely cleaned up from.  
According to grounded cognition, those approaches to mental 
representations not only suffer from the problems cognitive linguistics wants to 
find a solution to, namely the idea that, by conceiving syntax and semantics as 
separated systems, those theories lead to an obscure and unsatisfactory account 
of meaning. Indeed, standard explanations of mental symbolic systems also 
claim that the mental module designated for semantic knowledge is 
autonomous from the brain’s modal systems, such as that of perception (e.g. 
                                                          
9 It is worth to make clear that the expression “grounded cognition” refers to a wide set of 
theories, which focus on different aspects of cognition, such as memory (e.g. Glenberg 1997), 
social cognition (e.g. Goldman 2006), the relationship between language and action (e.g. 
Glenberg, Kaschak 2002; Pulvermüller, Hauk,  INikulin, Ilmoniemi, 2005). Nevertheless, in 
this paragraph I will focus on one problem only, namely the symbol grounding problem, and 
I will take into account Barsalou’s approach to grounded cognition. In particular I will discuss 
the theory of perceptual symbols, which aims to account for conceptual embodiment.  
10
  For the sake of accuracy it is worth to notice that the expression “sanitized representation” 
was coined by Gallagher (Gallagher 2011a) to refer to Goldman and de Vignemont’s B-formats 
(body representations). The way I use this phrase in this paragraph has no reference to the 
objections Gallagher makes to this approach to embodiment. The use of this expression has 
rather a pure heuristic value in the economy of my exam of Barsalou’s version of grounded 
cognition.  
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vision and audition) action (e.g. movement and proprioception) and 
introspection (e.g., mental states, affect; Fodor 1975; Fodor 1983).  
Standard approaches to cognition endorse a-modal theories of knowledge: 
cognition is said to depend on principles that are completely different from 
those which rule perception. Perception, exactly because it rests on 
mechanisms different from those higher order cognition unfolds by, is said not 
being part of the realm of “fully-fledged cognition”, that is knowledge that takes 
propositions as models in order to understand cognitive processes.  
To put it in other words, according to standard approaches to the mind, 
perception is something different from “real cognition” because they postulate 
a priori that mental symbols, namely what ontologically constitutes the mind, 
have a non-perceptual nature. They are rather defined as a-modal, namely as 
symbolic-systems that bear an important relation to words and language. To 
explain this point Barsalou writes:  
 
“Just as language processing is assumed to involve the sequential 
processing of words in a sentence, so conceptual processing is assumed 
to involve the sequential processing of amodal symbols in list-like or 
sentence-like structures” (Barsalou 1999: 579).  
 
A-modal symbols, in the same way words of sentences are not related to 
their referents by systematical similarities, do not stand for the perceptual states 
that take place during cognitive processes according to an analogical relation, 
which is what, in semiotic terms, is an iconic relation that maps the formal 
similarities between two items (CP 2.778). Those theories, by modeling any 
mental entity on a-modal, language-like symbols, not only do not account for 
the “material”, embodied ground of mental representations, but are also unable 
to give a successful explanation of the way mental symbols can grasp perceptual 
reality. By focusing on abstract and formal properties of mental symbols only, 
those accounts seem unable to explain how those formal structures are mapped 
back into perceptual states and entities of the world. That is to say: by modeling 
those symbols on words, which entertain a mere arbitrary connection with the 
objects they stand for, the theory holds that the relation mental symbols 
entertain with perceptual states is just arbitrary.  
According to supporters of grounded cognition, by conceiving the relation 
between mental symbols and sensorimotor states in that way, those theories do 
not actually account for cognition as it is experienced by the cognitive agent 
when she takes part in the cognitive process, sensing and perceiving the world.  
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Then, the core aim of grounded cognition is to find a different way to 
account for mental representations. To some extent, this approach to cognition 
seems to go back to the pre-twentieth century idea that knowledge (included 
higher-order cognitive skills, such as language and conceptualization) widely 
makes use of mental images,  that is picture-like representations.  
The main idea that this new explanation pushes forward is the following 
one. The concept of mental representation is useful to explain cognition if and 
only if it accounts for agents’ cognitive experience. Since cognitive experience 
primarily unfolds in a perceptual way - that is, our primary encounter with the 
world takes place by means of the sensory apparatus- the symbols the theory 
should rely on should  have a perceptual nature and they should be modality 
specific, namely dependent on the sensory modality information comes from.  
Those ideas merge in what is known as the theory of Perceptual Symbols 
Systems - PSS.  
 
To begin my discussion about PSS, now I consider the core claim of this 
new theory about the format of mental representation by contrasting it again 
with standard approaches to cognition.  
Standard approaches to cognition account for cognitive processes that 
“begin” with sensory inputs and “end” with the conceptual organization of 
information in the following way (Barsalou, Simmons, Barbey, Wilson 2003: 
85). 
 
i) The cognitive agent’s sensory apparatus is stimulated by a physical 
stimulus. 
ii) Information about the physical stimulus travels up sensory channels, 
in this case the visual one. 
iii) Neurons aimed to feature-mapping fire and produce a sensory 
representation of the stimulus. 
iv) This modal representation of perceptual states is transduced into a 
non-representational perceptual format. Non-perceptual formats 
can be: a) a representation in which some features of the physical 
object are listed (feature list); b) a semantic network, which 
represents semantic relations between concepts using nodes and 
vectors (it is something like a mental graph); c) a frame, which is a 
set of informational slots, whose values and types are specified.  
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Figure 1.  
[Picture taken from Barsalou, L., Simmons, 
W., K, Barbey, A., K., Wilson, C. D. (2003)] 
 
 
 
This is to say that according to those standard accounts of mental 
representation, representations belonging from modal systems are transduced 
into a-modal symbols that represent knowledge about experience in semantic 
memory (Barsalou 2008: 618). Representations that stand for their objects 
accounting for the variables each sensory modality (e.g. visual, haptic, auditory) 
conveys are re-described or translated in an a-modal way, abstracting from 
those variable aspects. The final product of this operation of transduction is an 
invariant structure that represents a category of objects (a concept) in all 
contexts. It is a non-context sensitive representation the cognitive system makes 
use of and re-uses in its overall dynamics, never relying on memories of the 
sensorimotor states that transduction redescribes. It is a disembodied 
representation, since it does not bear any relation with the sensorimotor state 
that caused it. It is a static representation: it is a-temporal because it is defined 
without any reference to real-time cognitive activities; it is an invariant, discrete 
symbol (Barsalou 1999: 584).
11
  
According to supporters of grounded cognition, the problem with this kind 
of account of mental representation concerns the effects produced by the 
operation of transduction, namely what I would call “sanitizing process of 
mental images”. Standard views of mental representation postulate that the 
overall dynamic of cognitive processes has to be described in terms of a-modal 
representations. Those ones are symbols the cognitive system makes use of 
when the stimuli that caused them (a sensory state) is absent. Any kind of 
cognitive activity is said to unfold by recalling those redescriptions of 
sensorimotor states. Those last ones, taken in themselves, namely as items not 
                                                          
11
 For a more detailed description of features ascribed to a-modal representations see Barsalou, 
Prinz 2000.  
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processed by the a-modal translation, are said to play no relevant role in 
cognitive dynamics such as language, memory and thought.  
The problem with this account of cognitive processes consists in the fact that 
the explanation, by stating the primacy of this kind of representations in 
cognitive processes (a-modal symbols are said to rule any aspect of human 
mental life), seems to be unable to account for perceptual cognition in a 
changing environment. How invariant, non-context sensitive and non-modality 
specific representations can explain the way the perceiver is able to cope with 
an environment that constantly changes? The features standard views ascribe 
to representations do not seem to fit with behavioral evidence: cognitive 
subjects are able to cope with their environment, by attuning their behaviors to 
the situations they face. Invariant and non-context sensitive representations  
seem unable to account for the adaptivity of the agent’s behavior, then it is not 
clear why evolution should have selected mental representations as a “central 
design function for cognition” (Barsalou, Prinz 2000: 58). “Sanitized 
representations” do not have adaptive function: they do not guide action. 
 
In contrast with this a-modal approach to cognition, PSS posit a kind of 
representational process whose core features can be explained in the following 
way.  
 
i) As in standard approaches to mental representations, at the 
beginning neural representations represent objects in vision.  
ii) Nevertheless, contrary to old-fashioned approaches to mental 
representations, grounded cognition claims that visual 
representations, instead of being transduced into a-modal 
descriptions, are captured by neurons in nearby association areas. 
iii) Later, when the sensory input is no longer present, the system is not 
said to recall those “sanitized representations” standard approaches 
postulated. Rather, the areas nearby the visual area re-enact visual 
states. 
iv) This re-enactment of perceptual states contributes to the overall 
dynamics of cognitive process. For example, there is re-enactment 
in memory, language and thought. 
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Figure 2.  
[Picture taken from Barsalou, L., Simmons, W., K, 
Barbey, A., K., Wilson, C. D. (2003)] 
 
 
 
As this brief sum-up shows, the main difference between the two approaches 
taken into account consists in a theoretical shift: transduction is substituted by 
the concept of re-enactment. Broadly speaking, the word “transduction” is 
meant to refer to an operation that produces a passage of an X in a given field 
to another field, where the two fields or domains are heterogeneous. The 
outcome of transduction is an irreversible change of the nature of X. For 
example, think about the membranes of microphones. When an analogical 
transduction takes place (namely when an X of a given field is mapped into 
another field preserving the internal relations of X in the first domain into the 
second one) the mechanical energy produced by the speaker’s voice is 
transformed into electric energy by the microphone membrane. The 
microphone membrane works as a transductor of energy (Paolucci 2011: 408): 
it turns mechanical energy into electric energy. These two kinds of energy are 
different Xs, but their structures preserve an analogical relation: mechanical 
energy in the first domain is what electric energy is in the second domain.  
At first glance, it seems that, according to Barsalou, the problem with 
transduction concerns the domains the transposition deals with. The outcome 
domain in the case of the transduction of sensory signals, as it is conceived by 
a-modal approaches to representations, is the crystalized domain of 
abstractness and a-modality. The operation of transduction, in the cases 
critically taken into account by Barsalou, is cleaned up by its analogical features. 
Indeed, when sensory signals are transposed at the symbolic level, they seem 
preserving no significant relation with what they were before transduction. They 
do not bring traces of what caused them, namely the perceptual properties of 
the objects the agent deals with while she performs her actions. Those features 
are dynamical features, not only because they have dynamical effects of the 
agent’s bodies (for example, think of the microkinesis of the body) but also 
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because they are part of a perceptual dynamics in which the agent does not 
perceive neutral objects, but she perceives objects she can do something with 
in that context (e.g. the example of the chair in Barsalou, Prinz 2000).  
Senses mean something in cognitive processes because they afford action. 
In the case of symbolic representations the issue of meaning is not considered 
in this way, it is not conceptually linked to the problem of action. Indeed, 
symbolic representations are tokens of conceptual types. They are part of a 
representational relation because they are occurrences of their types: they 
acquire meaning because they can be subsumed into a category. Therefore, the 
kind of relation that symbolic tokens have with their types is a passive relation: 
they are objects of a subsumption, and not agents of a relation.  
Barsalou’s PSS are aimed at justifying and explaining the analogical relation 
that connects what the agent senses (e.g. possibilities for action) in her 
perceptual experience and what happens inside of her head. Moreover, 
Barsalou’s concept of perceptual symbol is aims to explain how the sensory 
domain and the conceptual one can be considered to be part of the same 
system.  
The idea of re-enactment is central in this project. The re-enactment activity 
Barsalou talks about in order to account for representational activity in the 
absence of the stimuli that first caused the representation-token is a specific 
kind of simulation. It is the partial re-enactment of the active features of 
sensorimotor representations performed by a neural activation (Barsalou, 
Simmons, Barbey, Wilson 2003: 85)
12
 when the stimulus is absent. This 
simulation of perceptual states performed by the neural area nearby the one 
activated during the very perceptual and motor state of the cognitive process is 
what the expression “perceptual symbol” refers to.  
Perceptual symbols represent the object they stand for, that is the perceptual 
state, by re-activating the perceptual/motor state that caused the first 
representation in nearby association areas. They “channel” action and 
perception into a neural area of the same system in which sensory signals 
occurred, and they preserve the perceptual and active features of the stimuli.
13
 
Nevertheless, even if re-enactment entails a passage from a neural area to 
another one, this passage has a different nature from the mechanisms described 
                                                          
12 See also Barsalou (2009),“Simulation, situated conceptualization, and prediction”, 
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, 364, pp. 1281-1289 and Barsalou (2008), 
“Grounded Cognition”, Annual Review of Psychology, 59, pp. 617-645 for a detailed 
description of empirical evidence of neural re-enactment.  
13
 This operation is known as “neural reuse”: neural circuits established for one purpose acquire 
new uses after an initial or original function is established (Barsalou 2016; Anderson 2010).  
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by standard views of representations: it does not entail transduction because 
perceptions and simulations of perceptions are part of the same system. 
Moreover, the operation of simulation Barsalou talks about has the following 
features.  
First, it is active: re-enacting means re-acting out, that is representing 
something through of action (as it happens in theatre performances, for 
instance).  
Second, this simulation is dynamic and not discrete. Perceptual symbols are 
not something like feature lists, frames or semantic networks, namely static and 
invariant representations of a set of objects (concepts). They are rather 
conceived of as associative patterns of neurons whose activation may vary 
widely (Barsalou 1999: 584) according to the context. 
They are context-sensitive and flexible: they are like “tracking devices” 
(Barsalou, Prinz 2000: 63), which track features of the object they stand for by 
representing them according to what the context requires. 
They are modality-specific: they are representations that stand for their 
objects by entraining an analogical relation with the perceptual activation that 
caused them. Neural areas activated when the stimuli is absent and present are 
not exactly the same; nevertheless they are responsible of the same 
mechanisms. Perceptual symbols are represented in the same system of the 
sensorimotor/perceptual state that caused them, that is why they are not said to 
be transduced: there is not a passage from a system to another (this is what the 
word “transduction” suggests), but there is a re-enactment of sensory processes 
that occurred in the same system, namely the perceptual one. To explain this 
point Barsalou writes: 
 
“The neural systems that represent color in perception, for example, 
also represent the colors of objects in perceptual symbols, at least to a 
significant extent. On this view, a common representational system 
underlies perception and cognition, not independent systems. Because 
perceptual symbols are modal, they are also analogical. The structure of 
a perceptual symbol corresponds, at least somewhat, to the perceptual 
state that produced it”. (Barsalou 1999: 578)  
 
This is to say that perceptual symbols, namely mental representations the 
cognitive system uses also when the cognitive process does not deal with 
perceptual or sensorimotor tasks, are embedded in the same neural system 
responsible for perceptual states. This suggests that representational 
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mechanisms that guide perception and higher order cognition have the same 
structure.  
 
To offer some philosophical considerations about this description of mental 
representational activity, it can be said that because concepts and 
sensorimotor/perceptual states are said to be embedded in the same system, 
PSS theory is able to guarantee the explanation an embodied and active 
ground. By describing mental symbols in this way, and by substituting the 
concept of transduction with that of simulation or re-enactment, PPS not only 
explain the way representations are embedded in neuronal areas, but it also 
explains how representations relate to the embodied activity of the perceiver. 
The brain, by representing dynamic processes analogically, “re-performs 
internally” what the cognitive agent does in her cognitive experience. At the 
same time, it displays cognition, perception and action as part of the same 
neural system.  
In this way, the explanation of mental activities offered by grounded 
cognition seems to take the issues cognitive linguistics deals with seriously. As 
cognitive linguistics does, grounded cognition in Barsalou and colleagues’ 
version of embodied cognition tries to found an embodied matrix for meanings 
and concepts. Moreover, it gives an embodied account of the continuity of 
cognitive skills (e.g. reasoning, thinking, perceiving, memory), and it does so by 
giving an epistemic primacy to the cognitive agent’s body.  
To conclude this paragraph, I would say that, if a motto for this approach to 
cognition should be coined, it would sound like this: «The mind is where there 
is a sensorimotor activity or a re-enactment of it in terms of perceptual 
symbols».  
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I.6 The body’s βίος: towards the very materiality of the body.  
 
In the last paragraphs, I took into account two interpretations of embodied 
cognition.  
What those approaches share is the philosophical problem they come from:  
the symbol grounding problem.  
This motivates the way they account for embodiment in mental processes. 
The mottos I wrote in order to sum-up the core claims of those views of 
cognition were:  
 
i) «The mind is where embodied metaphors, built on image-schemas, 
structure our cognitive processes». 
ii) «The mind is where there is a sensorimotor activity or a re-
enactment of it in terms of perceptual symbols».  
 
As the two sentences show, the idea of embodiment that Cognitive 
Linguistics (in Lakoff and Johnson’s version) and Grounded Cognition (as 
endorsed by Barsalou) give is strictly connected to semantic and conceptual 
issues. Cognition (and consequently the mind) is said to be embodied because 
meanings and concepts take the body as their “matrix of emergence”.  
Even if in different ways, these two approaches still make use of the concept 
of representation as an explanatory tool to have an access to the body. 
Obviously, the idea of perceptual symbol and that of image-schema are peculiar 
ways to think of cognitive representations, which differ from standard views of 
mental representations, namely from representations modeled as “words”. In 
particular, perceptual symbols and image-schemas are attempts to account for 
cognition as active and embodied. As already shown, perceptual symbols are 
neuronal patterns that re-enact sensorimotor states in the absence of the 
sensory stimuli, by preserving an analogical relation with the sensorimotor state 
that caused the activation of the neuronal areas nearby. Image-schemas are 
what I defined “hybrid representations” (they are also called weak 
representations
14
). They are not proper sensorimotor states (Gibbs, Colston 
1995: 349), but analogical representations of them. Moreover, this perceptual 
(and emotional) implicit knowledge about the body is combined with the 
subject’s conceptual understanding of her body. This kind of representation, 
as in the case of perceptual symbols, acts as a mediator in the process which 
structures higher order cognitive processes (i.e. language and memory).  
                                                          
14 See Gallagher 2011a.  
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Cognitive linguistics’ approach (in Lakoff and Johnson version) to image-
schemas particularly stresses the conceptual aspect of them. They are through 
to be conceptual (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 34) and what is interesting is that when 
Lakoff and Johnson discuss the inseparability of categories, concepts and 
experiences, they define concepts as “neural structures that allow us to mentally 
characterize our categories and reason about them” (Lakoff, Johnson 1999: 
19).  Therefore, even if in other publications they state that the only concept of 
representation they endorse is not an “inner mental entity” but a “flexible 
pattern of organism-environment interaction” (Lakoff, Johnson 2002: 249-250, 
as cited in Gallagher 2011a: 64), Lakoff and Johnson seem to still refer to a sort 
of embodiment “neurally mediated”. If image-schemas are enabling conditions 
for the metaphorical thought, and if they are thought to be conceptual within 
an explanatory frame in which concepts are (sometimes) defined as neural 
structures, then it is possible to claim that, somehow, this approach to the body 
can be considered as a weak version of embodiment (Gallagher 2011a).   
 
Now, some embodied approaches to cognition that come from 
phenomenology (Gallagher 2005), philosophy of psychology and biology 
(Shapiro 2004), and biology (Chiel, Beer 1997) reproach to approaches to 
cognition that look for the cognitive role of the body in embodied 
representations to underplay the role of the body “before and after the brain”. 
That is to say: those theories are said to underestimate the role of the body 
(conceived in its anatomical, motor, and chemical aspects) in pre-processing 
and post-processing information in the cognitive system (Gallagher 2011a). 
According to those approaches -which do not constitute a philosophical 
school in a proper sense, but that nevertheless share the idea of “biological 
embodiment”- in order to actually account for the role of the body in cognitive 
process, embodied theorists should consider its very materiality as a factor that 
does the most part of the work in cognitive processes.  
Reassessing what Gallagher points out (Gallagher 2011a: 61) quoting 
Shapiro (Shapiro 2004: 190), it can be said that the idea of “biological 
embodiment” holds that the materiality of the body not only constrains 
cognitive processes (i.e. the body affords some kinds of cognitive operations 
and prevents the cognitive agent from performing other kinds of cognitive 
activities). The body, precisely in virtue of its extra-neural “material 
constitution” (anatomy), its “dynamical constitution” (motor aspect), and its 
“chemical constitution” (see for instance hormonal processes), should be taken 
to be a constitutive part of the cognitive system. This is to say, those factors 
should not be considered as something that has just a causal influence on the 
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mind (also cognitivism recognized that –Shapiro 2011: 159); rather, they are 
constitutive of the mind. Indeed, changes and differences in anatomical, 
chemical and motor factors produce changes and differences in the effects of 
the cognitive activity (i.e. cognitive contents) and also in the modality in which 
cognition unfolds (i.e. fluency in performing the cognitive task). That is why 
they should be considered to be constitutive of the mind. 
In Gallagher’s article previously quoted, empirical evidence to support this 
philosophical claim is given. For instance, he cites research done by Roll and 
Roll (Roll and Roll 1988: 162) that shows that changes in body postures caused 
by vibration-induced proprioceptive patterns change the way the environment 
is perceived, and how hormonal changes, visceral and musculoskeletal 
processes affect perception, memory and decision-making (Damasio 1994; 
Bechara et al. 1997). 
Other empirical evidence to proof how the body plays a constitutive role in 
determining the mind’s contents and the qualitative aspects of cognitive 
processes (modality) before neural processing can be also found in some 
research developed by the neuroscientist and cognitive scientist Daniel 
Casasanto at the psychology laboratory of Chicago University. Those 
experiments are meant to verify the “body-specificity hypothesis” (Casasanto 
2009), or “bodily relativity”. According to the “bodily relativity hypothesis”, 
 
“to the extent that the content of the mind depends on our interactions 
with our environment, people with different kinds of bodies – who interact 
with the environment in systematically different ways – should tend to form 
correspondingly different neural and cognitive representations” 
(Casasanto 2011: 108)  
 
The hypothesis that should be verified consists in saying that cognitive 
representations (namely mental contents) constitutively vary according to the 
cognitive agent’s body. Moreover, the hypothesis entails that the way the 
“anatomical and motor body” affects mental contents follows a continuous 
path: this does not only shapes perceptual contents, but it also constitutively 
determines the contents of higher order cognitive processes. 
The basic idea of this hypothesis is that anatomical and motor differences 
of the body do not merely correlate with cognitive differences; they rather 
entertain a stronger relation with mental contents: mental contents, cognitive 
representations, neural representations entertain a relation of constitutive 
dependence with bodily features.  
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That is why, shifting the argumentation to a more philosophical level, those 
ones should be considered to be constitutive of the cognitive process, and then 
of the mind. The body matters for cognition not only because it is represented 
in a certain way (i.e. PSS and image-schemas) by the mind, and then those 
representations deeply influence the overall dynamics of cognitive processes, 
but also and especially because it entertains a “more primitive” relation with 
cognition. Representations that are said to give a cognitive access to the body 
are strictly dependent on the very materiality of the body they represent. 
Moreover, the body seem to be considered to be cognitive also before it is 
processed by internal representations. 
To understand this point, it is worth to have a look to the experimental part 
of Casasanto’s research. In the article “Different Bodies, different Minds: The 
Body Specificity of Language and Thought” (Casasanto 2011), Casasanto 
describes an experiment made with Evangelia Chrysikou in which they studied 
how people think about “god” and “bad” and make judgments about those 
values after the ordinary function of their dominant hands has been 
handicapped. The experiment tested space-valence mappings (namely the 
association of positive or negative values and objects situated in different parts 
of the spatial context of the cognitive task) in a task in which healthy university 
students were asked to perform a motor-fluency task while wearing a clumber-
some glove on their left hand or on their right one. This temporarily turned 
right-handed people in left-handed people and left-handed people in right-
handed people. After 12 minutes of lopsided sensorimotor experience, 
students removed the glove. Then the cognitive task was performed again 
without the glove-constraint. Casasanto and Chrysikou discovered that students 
that had worn the left glove during the first task, still thought that “right” was 
good (that is, they associated “good” with “right” in their judgments about 
objects in the space). On the contrary, participants who had worn the right glove 
associated “left” with “good”, as naturally left-handed people usually do.  
The conclusion the two scientists drew from that experiment (whose results 
were compared with those from experiments in which space-valence mappings 
were tested in relation to stroke patients with hemiparesis on their left or right 
side)
15
 is that higher order and complex forms of cognition (i.e. emotional 
judgments) are strictly connected to the very material constitution of the body 
(and to the way this has a great influence on motor habits). This means that the 
body matters for cognition, it “shapes the mind”, also before complex 
                                                          
15
  In order to check the explanatory efficacy of the results of this experiment, see also Casasanto 
2009; Casasanto, Chrysikou 2011; De la Vega, Dudschig, De Filippis, Lachmair, Kaup 2011.  
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representational processes take place (this can be tested by looking at the timing 
of emotional judgments formation). The body does not only give a ground to 
mental representations, but it works as a “content shaper” also before brain 
processing.  
This emphasis on the very materiality of the body is what another theory in 
the “4E cognition” debate, Enactivism, focuses on, integrating it with some 
philosophical assumptions taken from phenomenology.  
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I.7 Making sense of inter-action: Enactivist Embodiment.  
 
Until this moment I focused my attention on some ideas about cognition 
some approaches in the embodied cognition framework suggest. I started my 
discussion taking into account the “symbol grounding” problem the cognitivists’ 
explanations suffer from (namely what lays the theoretical foundations of new 
approaches to cognitive science), and I summed-up the way some theories in 
the embodied cognition framework deal with this issue. This discussion showed 
the necessity to re-embody the mind, in order to successfully explain the 
experience of cognitive processes. Until this point of my discussion, the 
inclusion of just one of the said “dirty factors” (see §I.1.2) in the explanation of 
cognitive processes was taken into account. What can be said is that the 
considerations made point to a redefinition of the mind’s borders by including 
the body (considered as a brain and as a whole bodily structure) as one of its 
constituents. The mind extends into the body. 
Nevertheless, as sketched out in §I.1.2, the broader project of “4 Es” 
approaches to cognitive sciences points to a picture of the mind that is even 
broader, whose borders encompass the context where cognitive practices take 
place as well.  
Considering the temporal development of “4 Es Cognition” it can be said 
that, strikingly, the inclusion of factors that are beyond the body within the 
realm of the mental is first suggested by a theory that is “fully embodied”: the 
enactivist approach to cognition.  
 
The roots of the Enactive Theory of cognition should be found in works by 
Varela, Thompson, and Rosch (The Embodied Mind, 1991), and by Maturana 
and Varela (The Biological Roots of Human Understanding, 1987).  
As said at the end of the previous paragraph, this approach to cognition and 
the mind begins its philosophical considerations by claiming that cognition is 
fundamentally dependent on biological factors; or better, it states that the 
biology of a cognitive system is an unavoidable constituent of cognition.  
Nevertheless, rather than focusing on the singularity of bodily factors (this is 
what I tried to do in the previous paragraph), the enactive approach to cognition 
starts its argumentation by inquiring the broader organization of biological 
systems, which are investigated by means of the concepts of autonomy, sense-
making, and enaction.  
Autonomy is the capacity of a system to specify its own laws (Maturana, 
Varela 1987: 48), namely to display regular mechanisms by means of which it 
shows its organization, - where the term “organization” refers to the relations 
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existing among the components of the system (Maturana, Varela 1987: 47). 
Those regularities are laws according to which processes that are part the 
system generate and sustain the biological system as a unity. 
Despite at first glance it seems to be the case that this claim entails a 
conception of the body that accounts for it as a thing, as a unitary autonomous 
res, the philosophical direction enactive cognition takes is the opposite one. 
The claim that living systems should be considered to be autonomous does not 
entail a metaphysical view according to which living organisms should be 
conceived as autonomous entities. Indeed, autonomy describes the way the 
processes the organism unfolds by display recognizable features. 
Varela says: 
 
“(…) autonomous systems are organizationally closed. That is, their 
organization is characterized by processes such that (1) the processes are 
related as a network, so that they recursively depend on each other in  
the generation and realization of the processes themselves, and (2) they 
constitute the system as a unity recognizable in the space (domain) in 
which the process exists” (Varela 1979: 55; italics added)  
 
Biological systems, that is embodied systems, are said to display a coherent 
behavior because their organization is characterized by an operational closure. 
The system sustains itself (and consequently it is able to stand out as a unity in 
space and time) to the extent that processes that take place within the 
boundaries of the organism recursively depend the one on the others. This is 
to say that the system develops through the relation between interdependent 
processes, through the reciprocal attunement of processes I would say, in order 
to maintain a high degree of stability (homeostasis).  
In the enactive approach to cognition, the body is precisely defined by this 
operational closure. The “closed” relations between its structure, namely the 
components and the relations that constitute a particular unity of the 
organization of the living organism (Maturana, Varela 1987: 47), are what allows 
the body to individuate itself as distinct from its immediate surroundings.  
Then the body is described as a self-individuating (Di Paolo, Thompson 
2014: 68) set of processes (not as an entity) that reciprocally define themselves. 
It is a body understood biologically, but this biological identification is not given 
by considering discrete parts (the chemical one, the motor one, the anatomical 
one) that constitute the biology of the system. The identification of the 
biological system is dependent on the individuation of the relations between 
the activities that constitute it, and on the appraisal of their capacity to sustain 
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themselves, allowing the body to show itself (namely being recognizable) as a 
unity of interdependent processes. The unity of the body should be 
individuated in the consistency of its activities.  
It is precisely this capacity of self-individuation that makes the body 
cognitive. As some scholars claimed (Di Paolo, Thompson 2014; Froese, 
Stewart 2015), by individuating “the mark of the living” with autonomy, 
enactivism also individuates what is known in the broad literature about “4 E 
Cognition” with the phrase “mark of the cognitive”.16  
As Barandiaran points out (Barandiaran 2016: 2), autonomy constitutes the 
fundamental logic of the living: only a system that can maintain itself stable 
through changes in time, by attuning itself to changes, can survive. That is why 
autonomy lays the foundations of the embodied feature of processes. The body 
can be experienced in cognitive processes because there is life: it can constitute 
a lived and experiential structure because its organization guarantees the 
continuity of the living experiences cognition unfolds by (see also Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch 1991: 16).  
This self- regulation of the system, its operational closure, also endows the 
organism with the ability to adapt itself to conditions that can produce changes 
in the system. This is to say that adaptivity is the counterpart of autonomy. 
Contextual conditions can improve or deteriorate the system, and this one, in 
order to keep on being a living system (a system whose functions persist and 
are coherent) has to find adaptive paths to attune itself to those unavoidable 
conditions.  
Explained in this way, it seems to be the case that the environmental context 
plays the function of an external constraint for living systems: the environment 
the biological system is situated in compels the system to attune its processes to 
its conditions in order to survive. Nevertheless, despite this explanation that 
defines the context as an external, unavoidable constraint for living systems can 
seem intuitive, conceiving of the environmental context in which biological 
systems live just as a “perturbation factor” leads to a substantial 
misinterpretation of the enactive approach to cognition. Indeed, if it is true that 
in its birth enactivism defined its conceptual framework by making use of the 
notions of operational closure and autonomy, the meaning those concepts 
                                                          
16 Even if in a different way (indeed the issue of the “mark of the cognitive” has concerned 
more the debate about the Extended Mind), this point is expressed in the life-mind continuity 
thesis. According to the life-mind continuity thesis “life and mind share a common pattern or 
organization, and the organizational properties characteristic of mind are an enriched version 
of those fundamental to life. Mind is life-like, and life is mind-like” (Thompson 2004: 385).  
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acquire in the overall enactive picture of cognition leads to think that the 
closure of the system does not entail that the environmental context is just a 
constraint for the cognitive system. The relation between the living system and 
the environment should not be conceived in dualistic terms: there is not a real 
internality of the embodied system and an externality of the environmental 
context. In fact, one of the core claims of the enactivist interpretation of 
cognition is the idea that cognition is an inter-active process defined as enactive 
sense-making.
17
  
On the one hand, the active attunement of processes within the biological 
system defines the system as something that individuates itself as a unity that 
stands out from a background. On the other hand, the concept of enactive 
sense-making not only explains how the living system shows itself as cognitive, 
displaying its ability of making sense of changes over time, but it also justifies a 
Gestaltic-like conception of the relation between the organism and the 
background it stands out from, that is its context.  
 
Before explaining what enactive sense-making is in more detail, it is worth 
to consider the relationship between figure and background in the Gestaltic 
perspective, in order to understand better why I claim that by means of the 
concept of sense-making, enactivism gives a “Gestaltic” account of the relation 
between organism and environment. 
Gestalt theory is an approach to perceptual organization that focuses on the 
concept of organized structure or organism (Kanizsa 1988: 17). Instead of 
considering perceptual processes as developing in the association of atomistic 
sensations caused by discrete stimuli, Gestalt theory defines perception as a 
process of pattern recognition that takes place in time. This is to say, according 
to this approach to perception, we do not perceive individual stimuli, but 
perception is the recognition of recurrent figures that show themselves as 
perceptual wholes.  
Considering the issue I am interested in, that is the relation between figure 
and background, it can be said that Gestalt theory accounts for this relation by 
                                                          
17  It is worth to notice that, even if the concept of sense-making is already developed in early 
works that endorse an enactive approach to cognition (see among others Varela 1984), it seems 
to be the case that its centrality in the philosophical debate is more recent, and it is due to 
attempts to socially extend the enactivist perspective (e.g. De Jaegher, Di Paolo 2007) and to 
investigate the normative aspect of cognitive processes in depth (e.g. Barandiaran, Egbert 2014;  
Barandiaran 2016). Nevertheless, since this paragraph aims to provide some general insights 
about enactivism, for explicative purposes, here I integrate different perspectives on sense-
making.  
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considering the idea of structure: figure and ground stand out as two 
individuated perceptual wholes (namely, they can be perceptually segregated) 
in virtue of their inter-definition. The figure stands out as a figure because its 
features contrast with those of the ground. Usually the figure is smaller than 
what is perceived as a background, it has a closed structure (and then it is 
perceived as more solid), it has a simpler structure, and so on. All the qualities 
attributed to the figure depend on those of the ground: they cannot be defined 
without a term of comparison (the figure is smaller, more solid, its structure is 
more closed, and so on), and then the figure cannot stand out as a figure, it 
cannot actually be perceived as a figure, without the ground. The same can be 
said about the ground. The two stand out as distinct perceptual wholes because 
there is something they stand out from. Nevertheless, the perceiver cannot 
perceive what each perceptual entity stand out from and each individual 
perceptual entity at the same time. The two perceptual paths are exclusive, and 
this is what makes the two perceptual entities individual. Nonetheless, this 
individuation is constitutively dependent on the existence of the “opposite” or 
“negative” of the figure the perceiver’s attention is directed towards. The two 
perceptual poles theoretically constitute a unity: they constitute something 
coherent in virtue of an intrinsic relational structure. In this sense, it can be said 
that the ground is not something that is actually external to the figure, and the 
figure is not something that is actually contained in the ground. Not only it is 
not possible to perceive the “internal” and the “external” at the same time, but 
also, at the theoretical level, there is not an “internality” that foreruns an 
“externality” or an “externality” that foreruns an “internality”. Perceptual 
organizations define their features and their individuality in virtue of the 
relation that connects them: their existence constitutively depends on this 
interaction.  
 
Shifting the discussion towards the enactive conception of the relation 
between the living system and its ground, it can be said that, similarly to what 
happens in Gestalt psychology, according to enactivism it cannot be claimed 
that there is something like a locating structure (the context) that foreruns a 
located “thing” (the living system). Rather, the two inter-define themselves in 
their dynamic interactions. This is explained by means of the concept of sense-
making. This concept can be unpacked in the following way:  
 
“sense-making is behavior or conduct in relation to environmental 
significance and valence, which the organism itself enacts or brings forth 
on the basis of its autonomy. […] An autonomous system produces and 
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sustains its own identity […] and thereby establishes a perspective from 
which interactions with the world acquire a normative status” 
(Thompson, Stapleton 2009: 25, italics added).  
 
Sense-making is a relational concept coined in order to account for the way 
the organism, in virtue of its actions, behavior or conduct, brings forth 
environmental conditions suitable to maintain its self-persistence or integrity 
(autonomy). The basic idea of sense-making is that the organism, by means of 
its actions within a context, creates a salient space -a space that makes sense- in 
its world (Umwelt ). It enacts its own Umwelt.  
“Enacting” means “acting something out” (Noë 2004: 1), “acting from 
within”, “establishing a law” (Barandiaran 2016: 2), “bringing forth” (Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch 1991: 149): the organism, in virtue of its behavior, defines 
a salient environment that stands out from “the rest of the world” because it 
has a significance, a meaning for the cognitive system. This significance 
precisely rests in the capacity of the Umwelt to solicit a living system’s actions, 
which are aimed at maintaining the unity of the system. Then it can be said that 
on the one hand, the living system defines its Umwelt by acting it out; on the 
other hand, the Umwelt defines the living system by providing the meanings 
according to which the organism’s activity unfold. The context where the 
embodied system lives ceases to be the theatre of the agent’s actions and 
becomes a space of valences and saliences the agent actively creates dealing 
with what the world offers.  
To explain the peculiar relation between organism and environment more 
clearly, it can be said that on the one hand, the Umwelt stands out as something 
different from the cognitive agent, to the extent that it displays problematic 
situations in which the system shows up as an agent (namely it shows its agency, 
its capacity to act), because it acts upon something in order to bring forth 
conditions suitable for the stability of the system. On the other hand, the 
Umwelt shows itself as a “familiar space”, an “affordable space” in which the 
agent can display intelligent behavior because the Umwelt, by displaying the 
meanings the agent needs, is perceived as always and already meaningful and 
cognitively manipulable. This familiarity makes the living organism perceiving 
the Umwelt as continuous with its actions.  
That is why it cannot be said that the Umwelt just acts as a “locating” factor 
in relation to the living system. The agent is not just located in an environment, 
but it acts it out: the environment conceived as an Umwelt does not exist before 
the actions of the system. On its turn, the Umwelt makes the living system 
existing as a cognitive system: it displays the meanings, the valences and the 
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values the system deals with in its activities of self-individuation and self-
sustainment.
18
 
 
At this point, it would probably be clearer why I claimed that autonomy 
(conceived as the integrity of the living system) provides the “mark of the 
cognitive” in the enactive approach to cognition. The concept of autonomy 
entertains a relation of interdependence with those of sense-making and 
enaction. Indeed, those last ones are understood as repeated patterns of actions 
(which unfold regularly and habitually in time - Barandiaran, Di Paolo 2014: 6) 
that bring forth conditions able to guarantee the continuity of life, which, as 
explained before, is interpreted as co-extensive to cognition.  
Sense-making and enaction are considered to be “cognitive operations” 
because they endow the world with a normative status, and normativity is what 
usually allows philosophers to define something as cognitive. Indeed, they 
“create” an Umwelt, a system of meanings and “life-values” according which 
actions can be judged as adaptive or maladaptive, good or bad for the 
preservation of life-mind in that subjective world.  
As Rowlands notices (Rowlands 2012), broadly speaking it can be said that 
within the frame of philosophy of knowledge, it is commonly endorsed that 
something can be considered to be cognitive if it entails a normative claim on 
the world. This is to say that cognition “says” how the world ought to be: 
cognition has to display what is supposed to produce it.  
To explain this point I consider an example taken from an article by Mark 
Rowlands, which does not precisely endorse an enactive perspective as the one 
I am currently taking into account, but that can be still useful to make my point 
clear.  
Rowlands says:  
 
“Not everything that actually does produce my belief that there is a horse in 
front of me should produce this belief: the donkey that is in front of me and 
is, in fact, causally producing my belief should not do so. It does produce 
the belief, but it shouldn’t” (Rowlands 2012: 134)  
                                                          
18
 It is worth to notice that both classical enactivists (e.g. Varela, Maturana, Thompson and 
Rosch) and contemporary enactivists (e.g. Noë, Barandiaran, Di Paolo, Gallagher, Rietveld) 
explain this point by recalling Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. According to that perspective, 
the relation between the world and the agent is described in terms of inseparability (the subject 
is conceived as a project of the world, and the world as a projection of the subject –Merleau-
Ponty 1962: 439) and of transitive and circular action (the organism is related to its milieu 
because it affects it through its actions and the milieu affects the organism because it “responds” 
to the organism’s general attitude towards it – Merleau-Ponty 1963: 148).  
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Cognition has to be found where there is a normative domain that allows us 
to judge if a mental state, behavior, or action
19
 should have been produced or 
not. This is what distinguishes cognition from a mere fact. Facts just happen, 
they cannot be judged as true or false, they cannot be disputed or rejected 
because they have just the modality of existence. They are not produced 
according to a law that displays them as connected, gathered within the 
boundaries of a certain domain endowed with an internal consistency. In 
contrast, something can be defined as cognitive because we have reasons to 
judge it as true or false, successful or unsuccessful, useful or not useful, and we 
can do that because there is a normative domain that makes cognitive 
judgments possible, by defining the lawful relations among the “entities” of this 
normative domain.  
Discussing the enactive approach, it seems to be the case that this normative 
dimension cognition rests on is co-extensive with biological normativity 
(Barandarian 2016: 7). This naturalistic account of normativity is dependent on 
the endorsement of the “life-mind continuity thesis” that, as previously pointed 
out, lays the foundations of the enactivist perspective. Actions can be 
considered to be cognitive because they can bring forth certain conditions in 
the world that can be judged as “good or bad, appropriate or inappropriate”, 
adaptive or maladaptive, as viable or non-viable ways to maintain the biological 
integrity of the system (Barandiaran, Egbert 2014: 5).  
To explain this point more in depth, it is worth to have a look at the primary 
sources that enactivists consider in their explanation of the cognitive relation 
between organism and environment. As previously pointed out, the enactive 
approach to cognition describes the environment in terms of Umwelt. This is 
a concept developed by the Estonian theoretical biologist Jakob Von Uexküll 
(Streifzüge durch die Umwelten von Tieren und Menschen: Ein Bilderbuch 
unsichtbarer Welten - 1934), and that has been widely used in Merleau-Ponty’s 
thought (see in particular the series of lectures given at the Collège the France 
in the late 1950’s)20, in which enactivists find the source of many of their ideas.  
                                                          
19 Within the philosophical frame in which this discussion develops philosophers usually talks 
about mental states only, because they are considered to be the locus of cognition. 
Nevertheless, in my discussion, I extend the argumentation to behaviors and actions. Indeed, 
as implicitly shown in this paragraph, the enactivist perspective does not endorse the classical 
framework of philosophy of mind (folk psychology, functionalism): rather than identifying 
cognition with the ownership of mental states (that can be accessible or non-accessible to 
consciousness) it describes cognition as the possibility of acting meaningfully (see the concept 
of enaction).  
20
 See Merleau-Ponty, M. (2003) Nature: Course Notes from the College de France, D. Seglard 
[Ed.], English translation by R Vallier, Evanston, Northwestern University Press.  
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The central idea of Von Uexküll’s biology consists in claiming that each 
living being lives in its own Umwelt (built by means of its actions, behaviors, 
perceptions and so on), which is considered to be a subjective universe. It can 
be described as a habitat, namely a world that is not made by sets of neutral 
objects, but that is rather a domain of “performance qualities” (Uexküll 1982: 
28), namely objects that are “subjectively tuned” because they afford some 
action and prevent the agent from doing other actions.  
To explain this I consider an example developed by Uexküll (Uexküll 1982: 
27). An angry dog barks at me while I am walking in the street. In order to drive 
it off, I frighten it by grabbing a stone and throwing it in the middle of the street. 
To the dog, the stone I throw at him had acquired a ‘throw-quality’, and this 
quality makes sense to it. The boundaries of its Umwelt include the perception 
of this performance quality. That is to say, the animal is able to respond 
meaningfully to this quality: according to the context, it can run to grab the 
object that has been thrown (if the context is playful), or it can run away in order 
to rescue itself (if the situation is perceived as a dangerous one). 
Nobody observed my action, and the stone is left in the middle of the street. 
The time runs and the stone is incorporated in the country road: it will serve 
as a support for the walker’s street. The shape of the stone, its weight, its 
physical and chemical properties have not been altered. Nevertheless, 
something really relevant changed: its meaning. To the walkers that enjoy a 
walk in this countryside street, the stone had acquired a ‘path-quality’. It has 
now a meaning that it did not have in the dog’s perspective. Indeed, having a 
walk following a defined path delimited by stones is something that humans do, 
animals usually do not.  
Even if this example is very simple, it shows one of the most important ideas 
at the core of Uexküll theoretical biology, and it can be helpful to make clear 
an epistemological point of the enactivist perspective on cognition.  
Within the boundaries of an Umwelt, objects play the role of meaning-
carriers: they invite the living being to perform actions that can be judged as 
meaningful because they are occurrences of the comprehensive meaning-plan 
(Uexküll 1982: 43) of a living creature. The concept of Umwelt refers to specie-
specific meaning-plans: each specie builds a meaningful universe according to 
its needs and possibilities, and it does that according the possibilities of action 
its bodily and motor structure offers.  
The existence of meaning-plans (that is motivated domains of meanings), 
which should be interpreted as the horizon of possible actions that an agent can 
perform, is precisely what provides the reasons according to which actions 
performed in the world are accountable for cognitive judgments.  
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Sense-making provides an internally consistent space of meanings that 
allows the interactions between organism and environment to be judged: i) as 
meaningful (and according to the enactivist approach this meaningfulness is 
precisely what cognition is); ii) as fulfilling or not fulfilling what the overall 
meaning-plan requires. It is precisely in this sense that it has been claimed that 
sense-making endows the world with a normative status: it sets a ground of 
related meanings the organism brings forth or do not bring forth while it acts. 
In this sense it can be said that there is a criterion to judge if an action is 
successful or not for the preservation of life, if it consistent with the life-
meaning-plan of the organism.  The possibility of being “wrong” (in this case 
this means performing an action that does not match the meaning-plan of an 
organism, and then “wrong” means “unsuccessful”) lays the foundations of 
cognition, or better, of cognitive behavior, by distinguishing it from a mere 
reaction. It situates actions in the realm of reasons and not in that of causes.
21
  
 
This point about the way the enactivist approach to cognition looks at the 
normative domain  the possibility of cognition rests on is particularly interesting 
for the purposes of this research, because it not only determines a radical 
distinction from classical views of cognitive sciences, but it also distinguishes 
enactivism from other theories of the “4 E Cognition Debate”.  
I briefly explained why normativity is a necessary condition to talk about 
cognition. If there is a normative domain one can refer to, there is also the 
possibility to make what -according to the rules that define the normative 
domain- is a mistake. This constitutive connection between cognition and the 
possibility of being wrong goes back to Descartes, and it shaped the overall 
discussion in philosophy of mind until nowadays. Usually the issue of the 
relation between cognition and normativity is faced by appealing to the concept 
of representation. Indeed, the apparatus of mental representations has been 
developed in order to account for the epistemic gap between mental contents 
(which show themselves according to reasons) and contents of the world, 
namely “factual information”. As previously explained, the contents of the 
mind, in contrast to those belonging from world, might or might not be what 
they should be (Rowlands 2012: 134). To account for this possibility of error, 
mainstream approaches to philosophy of mind conceive of mental states as 
relations to representations.  
                                                          
21 In this part of my argumentation I implicitly make use of some ideas of the debate on “spaces 
of reasons” and “spaces of causes” developed in Sellars’ book Empiricism and the Philosophy 
of Mind (in particular §36), and then in McDowell’s Mind and World.  
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Even if there is not a unitary perspective on representations within the 
contemporary debate in Cognitive Sciences, it seems to be the case that 
different theories usually share a core point about the epistemic efficacy of 
representations. Representations can actually account for the normative 
dimension that lays the foundations of the realm of cognition because they are 
discrete items (tokens) that can be tokened incorrectly (Rowlands 2006a: 167): 
representations can misrepresent what they are supposed to stand for. The 
relation of mediation they entertain with stimuli of the world (what is supposed 
to cause it) can be correct or incorrect.
22
 Therefore, by conceiving of mental 
states as relations to representations, those approaches to philosophy of mind 
and cognitive sciences accounted for the possibility of mental states to be 
wrong: their content can misrepresent external reality, and then it can be judged 
as wrong/incorrect/false.  
Now, what is interesting about enactivism is the fact that this philosophical 
stance takes into account the issue of normativity, cognition and error in a way 
that is radically different from those standard approaches to philosophy of 
mind. In my discussion of this problem according to the enactive approach, the 
notion of representation has never showed up. Indeed, the picture of cognition 
the enactivist perspective draws is non-representational. The concept of 
representation is completely substituted by that of action (and this means many 
things: perceptually guided action, enaction, sense-making, skillful action, 
intelligent behavior, and so forth).  
This shift from representation to action is strictly connected to the idea of 
life-mind continuity, to an experiential conception of cognition, to a strong 
embodied perspective, and to an explanation of meaning that sees its origins in 
Uexküll theoretical biology. This can be expressed with a citation from Varela, 
Thompson and Rosch, which sums up great part of the discussion offered in 
this paragraph.  
 
“The key point is that such systems [= living organisms] do not operate 
by representation. Instead of representing an independent world, they 
enact a world as a domain of distinctions that is inseparable from the 
structure embodied by the cognitive system” (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 
1991: 140, text in brackets added)  
 
                                                          
22 In this paragraph I do not take into account the relation between the normativity condition 
and the misrepresentation one in detail, and I do not even talk about other “representational 
conditions”. A detailed exam of this problem will be developed in Chapter II. For the moment, 
I aim to discuss just some general points, which are useful to understand some of the core ideas 
of the enactive approach to cognition.  
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The citation says that living organisms are tied to their Umwelts because the 
“historicity” of enaction (that is the effects of repeated transactions between 
organism and environment, which endow the subject with a practical 
knowledge with a “knowing how to act” or “being ready to do [something]” 
according to environmental circumstances – Noë 2004: 2, text into brackets 
added) depicts the agents’ world as a “field of relevant affordances” (Rietveld, 
Kiverstein 2014; Rietveld 2008a; Rietveld 2012a) inseparable from the 
embodied structure of the agent. The agent and the Umwelt co-emerge as 
structurally coupled (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991: 151). This means that 
the cognitive agent and her world become a unified system, whose parts are 
interdependent and inter-defined.  
To explain this point, I try to offer a thought experiment. Think of the 
activity of climbing, in which a climber has to cope with what in cognitive 
science would be described as a problem-solving task: heading towards the top 
of a rock by following the simplest and safer route. According to an enactive 
approach to the problem, the climber and the mountain would be described as 
a coupled system. On the one hand, the repeated actions of the climber, or 
better of the community of climbers, modified the structure of the rock, and 
this made the physical structure of the mountain suitable for the performance 
of successful practices. Not only the rock is full of spits for the passage of ropes, 
but also it is quasi-immediate to guess the best route to follow, because the 
climbers’ repeated actions left traces of their activities on the rock. For 
example, the color of some parts of the rock is lighter because its material 
surface has been repeatedly rubbed by the climbers’ feet and hands. On the 
other hand, the trained climber’s body has changed in virtue of the repeated 
interaction with the rocks. For instance, professional climbers’ hands become 
a bit curve, and the texture of their skin harder because they use to spend a lot 
time holding parts of the rock, keeping their hands in the grabbing/holding 
position. The interaction between the climber and the rock created a system 
that makes cognitive practices successful. The modification of the climbers’ 
bodily structure (and their knowing how to act) and the modification of the 
rock, makes the process of problem solving -which is identified in the on-going 
embodied action of following the best route and not in a speculative conscious 
decision
23
- economical in terms of time and physical (and emotional) effort. 
                                                          
23 This problem-solving task has been described in this way, namely by stressing on implicit 
practical knowledge, in order to be faithful to the enactivist approach to cognition, which de-
emphasizes intellectualist aspects of cognition. It is also worth to notice that, concerning the 
example offered here, I agree with this non-intellectualist account of problem-solving. 
Empirical evidence that supports this claim can be found, for example, in Milner and 
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The success of the cognitive activity depends on the overall dynamics of world-
engaging practices, in which human actions and environmental modifications 
are co-attuned.  
Looking at this example, it can be explained how, within the enactive 
explanatory frame, one can account for “errors”, which, as already explained, 
are fundamental for the definition of cognition. Those ones would not be 
explained in terms of misrepresentation of the external reality, but as gaps in 
the continuous dynamical coupling between the cognitive agent and her 
environment, as breaking points in the habit-based transactions between parts 
of the system.  
As already explained, the climber is endowed with a multilayered implicit 
or unreflective knowledge about her practices. As any embodied agent, she 
knows how the perceptual array will change according to her movements 
(sensorimotor dependencies), then she will move her body in a certain way in 
order to accommodate her “perceptual expectations”. Moreover, since she has 
been trained, she is endowed with an immediate responsiveness to the rock 
shapes: those ones are not just shapes, but they are holds, surfaces perceived 
according to the “grabbing” or “holding” modality. Furthermore, she is 
sensitive to the texture and to the color of the rocks. According to the climber-
rock coupled system, this means being sensitive to the viability of a route. 
Focusing on the “skilled” level of the climber’s embodied practical 
knowledge, it can be said that errors can be explained in terms of a temporary 
disattunement (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014: 9) between the agent and her 
environment. For instance, suppose that our climber goes to train herself in a 
new place. The rock wall looks exactly as the other rock walls she saw in the 
past, excepting for a detail she does not know. For some reason, non-viable 
parts of the rock have been artificially rubbed and de-colored and they look 
like what, according to the climber’s implicit practical knowledge, would be a 
track. Obviously, she does not have an accurate knowledge of the rock-wall 
structure. It is the first time she goes there, so she cannot recall some memories 
about the structure of the wall. Moreover, even if she looks at the wall, she 
cannot have an accurate image of what she will find while she will be engaged 
in the activity of climbing, because the perceptual experience of the rock wall 
                                                          
Goodale’s neuropsychological research on visual perception (which some works that endorse 
a radical enactivist approach to cognition take into account; Hutto, Myin 2013: 46-50). This 
research shows that agents can perform complex manual acts in a very accurate way even when 
they lack the capacity to give verbal reports of their activities or to explicitly describe the visual 
scenes they are engaged with (Milner and Goodale 1995: 128 -138, on subjects affected by 
visual agnosia).  
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is a paradigmatic and exaggerated example of a fundamental feature of 
perceptual arrays: they are deeply perspectival and they vary according to the 
perceiver’s bodily postures and movements. Looking at the wall from the 
bottom of it, she cannot figure out what she will have to cope with.  
The climber starts to climb and she heads to the point where those “fake 
holds” has been placed. She reacts to the present environmental conditions as 
she did in the past in similar circumstances. Her practical and habit-based 
knowledge about climbing makes her ready to move her body in a certain way 
(she co-ordinates her movements, she moves parts of her body at a certain 
speed, and so on), acting upon the context by following some implicit 
embodied practical rules. Nevertheless, while performing what her “knowing 
how” suggests, she fails to cope with those sabotaged pieces of rocks. Probably, 
a supporter of representations would explain the climber’s failure by saying that 
a misrepresentation of stimuli from the world occurred in her mind. She did 
not represent the structure of the rock accurately: since her mental state of 
believing was related to a wrong representation, her belief that that piece of 
rock was a reliable hold was false.  
An enactivist would rather explain this case of error by saying that she acted 
relying on what her body learnt during her recurrent previous experiences with 
rocks, she immediately deployed a contextual set of skills which worked well in 
past engagements with the environment-rock, but she acted in this way within 
the boundaries of the wrong system.  
She relied on embodied skills that experience shown as reliable in the past, 
but that were not attuned with that (partially) new practical context. The error 
that occurred within that situation then depended on a temporary 
decouplement or disattunement between the agent and her environment. 
Something was perceived as an affordance for a specific action, which become 
quasi-stereotyped thanks to recurrent habitual practices, when the context 
required a different kind of practical arrangement.  
The cognitive error occurred because of a lack of context-switch
24
: this 
temporarily turned the skillful agent into a stranger in her own land of 
affordances. This is to say that cognitive errors, rather than happening in the 
head, namely because of the occurrence of a non-accurate or wrong 
representation a mental state is related to, occur when the “inter” of inter-
actions between the agent and the environment is filled with a wrong relation, 
                                                          
24 For a detailed account of the relation between cognitive efficacy and context-switching in a 
non-representational perspective see Rietveld 2012a.  
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which produces a temporary crack in the dynamical coupling that habitually 
makes the organism and the environment a persistent unity of processes.  
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I.8 Embedded Cognition: discussing the project of locating 
cognition in externalities.  
 
In the previous paragraph, the project of extending the boundaries of the 
mind made a step beyond. The enactivist approach to cognition, focusing on 
the idea of biological embodiment and on phenomenology, describes cognition 
as a dynamical process that takes place in the interaction between the embodied 
agent and the Umwelt. This entails a relational account of the mind. The realm 
of the mental is identified with the continuous inter-relation of processes, whose 
locus cannot be actually individuated neither in the cognitive agent’s singularity 
(i.e. in her brain, in her body), nor in discrete informational occurrences the 
context of a cognitive practice offers.
25
 The mind is rather explained as the 
relation between the agent and the environment, interaction that is realized 
within the dance of embodied actions, their effects on the environment, and 
the effects that these meaningful and cognitively relevant parts on the world 
have on the deployment of action. As shown in my discussion, this approach 
to cognition is more radical than other embodied explanations of cognitive 
experiences, because it really stresses on the way our bodies are tied to the 
context of cognitive practices. More precisely, it can be said that the contexts of 
cognitive practices cease to be just locating factors of cognition, becoming what 
can be defined a cognitive agent. In this way, the world, in its being cognitive, 
becomes a part of the mind. 
Another way to include what is external to the boundaries of the skull and 
of the cognitive agent’s biological body into the realm of the mental is offered 
by what is known as “Embedded Cognition”. To be accurate, it is worth to 
notice that, within the contemporary debate about “4 Es” approaches to 
cognitive sciences, the label “Embedded Cognition” is not used in a univocal 
way. Sometimes it is a synonym of “situated cognition”, expression that refers 
to the broad project of re-situating cognition in the real-world environment 
(Wilson 2002; Dawson 2014; Rupert 2009), and this claim is endorsed by all 
the philosophical approaches of “4Es”, at different degrees and by developing 
different philosophical strategies. Moreover, the expression “embedded” is 
sometimes coupled with “embodied” (e.g. Clark 1999; Stapleton, Ward 2012), 
and it is used to describe how cognition unfolds through the coupling between 
the organism and the environment, as I tried to explain in the previous 
paragraph considering the enactive approach to cognitive sciences.  
                                                          
25
 For this reason the enactivist stance has sometimes been said to be the “tertium non exclusus” 
in the debate between internalists and externalists (Thompson, Stapleton 2009).  
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Generally speaking, the phrase “embedded cognition” has been coined to 
stress the fact that cognition is a practice that unfolds in a given natural and 
cultural context. This last one functions i) as a constraint for cognitive practices 
(namely it affords some actions and it prevents the agent form doing other 
actions – see approaches that widely rely on affordances, e.g. Rietveld 2012a; 
Rietveld 2008a; Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014), ii) as an enabling condition and as 
a constitutive factor (namely it makes the realization of some kinds of contents 
possible– Clark 2008; Clark, Chalmers 1998), iii) as a form external scaffolding 
(namely as a reliable and trustable support for the management of the cognitive 
load– see Sterelny 2010; Clark 2003; Clark 2005a; Clark 1998).  
Nevertheless, despite it is true that the broad project of “4Es” points to the 
situated nature of cognitive process, it seems to me that this broad use of the 
term “embedded” is misleading. “To embed” means “to fix firmly in a 
surrounding mass of some solid material”, and the word was coined in the 
domain of geology to refer to fossils in rocks (Oxford English Dictionary: 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/60835?redirectedFrom=embed#eid). Hence, 
if the etymology of the word “embedded” is taken into account seriously, the 
term should be used to refer to something that is firmly located in something 
else. Therefore, relying on this original meaning of the word, I suggest that the 
phrase “Embedded Cognition” should be used to refer only to those theories 
which endorse a “locational claim” about cognition (i.e. cognition is located in 
the environment or in parts of it). That is why I prefer not labeling theories 
such as the enactive one as “Embedded Cognition”, because Enactivism rejects 
any “locational claim” about cognition and it widely relies on the concepts of 
process and dynamicity, features the verb “to embed” cannot account for.  
I rather prefer using the expression “Embedded Cognition” to refer to the 
claim that cognitive processes entertain a relation of dependence with 
environmental structures (Rowlands 2010: 69). This is to say, Embedded 
Cognition claims that, while accomplishing some cognitive tasks, a cognitive 
agent manipulates parts of the environment in a successful way, namely in such 
a way that the cognitive work she does internally
26
 is made lighter. In this way, 
the cognitive load (or “epistemic credit”, to quote Clark and Chalmers – Clark, 
Chalmers 1998: 8) the task requires is distributed between internal resources 
and the environmental ones. Then, the basic idea of Embedded Cognition 
consists in stating that some cognitive processes should be considered as heavily 
dependent on environmental structures because in absence of the appropriate 
                                                          
26
 I.e. mapping the environment by means of mental representations, mentally planning the 
steps of the cognitive activity, building internal predictive images of the results of the cognitive 
practice, and so forth.  
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environmental structures the agent may not be able to successfully accomplish 
that task (Rowlands 2010: 69), where when I talk about success I refer to the 
speed and the accuracy of the task (Kirsh 2010: 443). Then, since the 
realization and the success of some cognitive task is strictly dependent on how 
things are in the environment, Embedded cognition claims that, in order to 
understand how cognitive processes deploy, the scientist should individuate 
those discrete parts of the environment (that is external cognitive structures) 
that play this relevant function in cognitive processes. The context in which a 
cognitive task is performed is included in the picture of cognition the 
Embedded perspective draws because parts of it function as the locus in which 
some cognitive work is get done.  
An example useful to explain what Embedded Cognition is can be found in 
Kirsh and Maglio’s work, in particular in the article “On distinguishing 
Epistemic from Pragmatic Action” (Kirsh, Maglio 1994).  For the sake of 
accuracy, it is worth to notice that these two cognitive scientists do not make 
use of the phrase “Embedded Cognition”. Nonetheless, I claim that some of 
the theoretical insights this article offers, and also the experimental results the 
two cognitive scientists consider, are consistent with the picture of “Embedded 
Cognition” I want to draw. Moreover, the case study the two scientists present 
is particularly interesting for the consideration of a philosophical point that, as 
it will be shown along the development of my research, makes the difference 
in the contemporary debate about “4Es”: computation.  
The article I am taking into account aims at drawing a distinction between 
pragmatic actions and epistemic actions. The first kind of action is identified 
with those sets of movements whose function is to bring the agent close to her 
physical goal. An example of pragmatic action is what a football player does in 
order to reach the ball that runs on the grass: she moves her body in certain 
way, she implicitly checks the balance between different bodily parts, etc. The 
task the agent is supposed to perform has a mere physical nature: the agent 
interacts with her environment in order to bring forth physical conditions that 
satisfy her goals. The second kind of action, the epistemic one, is a physical 
action as well, but its effects do not just lay in the realm of facts, to use the 
distinction considered in the previous paragraph. Differently, the term 
“epistemic action” refers to those actions that, by producing physical effects in 
the environment, modify the agent’s computational states. Epistemic actions 
are external actions the quality of the cognitive the agent’s internal states (i.e. 
computational states) depends on. They are actions performed upon some 
parts of the environment; those parts of the environment, when manipulated 
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in a certain way, function as external representations, or as external cognitive 
structures, on which a computational work is done.  
That is why the quality of the computational states internal to the cognitive 
agent changes: they become “lighter” because some computational work is get 
done outside, in the world. To explain this point in another way, it can be said 
that epistemic actions are physical actions that, in their making information 
easily available by producing changes in external structures, simplify the 
cognitive agent’s tasks because they  
 
i) reduce memory-work involved in mental computation;  
ii) reduce the number of steps involved in mental computation;  
iii) reduce the probability of error of mental computation (Kirsh, 
Maglio 1994: 513).  
 
To verify this hypothesis about the way external structures produce a 
distribution of the cognitive load of a task, Kirsh and Maglio focus on the case 
study of Tetris, considered as a paradigmatic example of what cognitive agents 
do when they cope with real-time problem solving tasks performed in the real 
world.  
Tetris is a real-time interactive video game in which the player has to 
maneuver falling zoids of different shapes into specific arrangements on a 
screen. The zoids fall from the top of the screen one at time, and each zoid 
keeps on falling until it reaches the bottom of the screen or the surface of other 
zoids that previously landed. When a row of zoids is built, this arrangement of 
shapes disappears from the screen. The aim of the game is to keep the screen 
as clean as possible: when Tetris bricks reach the bottom of the screen the 
game is over. In order to keep on playing, the player has to build rows of zoids, 
maneuvering the zoids as quick and accurately as possible.  
To account for successful problem-solving tasks of this kind, the two 
cognitive scientists individuated two possible explanatory models.  
The classical one is called “process model”. It relies on classical 
cognitivism’s assumptions, coupled with those of good old-fashioned artificial 
intelligence (GOFAI). This approach would explain the problem-solving task 
of Tetris playing by saying that the cognitive agent internally manipulates 
representations of the Tetris zoids, computing the best place to put the zoids 
and the best trajectory of moves to place them. This is to say, according to a 
classical information-processing of Tetris Cognition, each action performed in 
the real-time game playing (e.g. motor control) is forerun by an internal 
planning of action, described in terms of computations performed on internal 
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symbolic representations. Indeed iconic representations of the Tetris bricks are 
said to be encoded in symbolic representations, according to a process similar 
to that of transduction described in §I.5. Hence, according to this model, the 
player is said being able to successfully perform the Tetris problem-solving task 
because she builds an internal map of the external representational structure 
the game is made of. She is said to have a cognitive grip on the structure of the 
cognitive task, and consequently to perform a successful set of actions, because 
she re-works the external cognitive situation, by internally planning motor 
action.  
The second model is built on the “epistemic action claim”. The basic idea 
of this model is that the player is able to successfully perform the cognitive task 
because she is trained to fluently maneuver (rotate or translate, where by 
“translating” I mean moving left to right or in the opposite direction) the zoids 
on the screen using a joystick. The player is said to perform the problem-
solving task without following a plan embedded in her working memory; she 
rather relies on the external representations available in the action-context of 
the task, making the information they bear easily available by performing 
epistemic actions. While the agent moves the zoids on the screen, she modifies 
the physical structure of a portion of the environment, and in doing so she 
modifies the informational states the cognitive task implies. By means of action, 
she actively alters her perceptual domain, and within this alteration, 
information relevant for the accomplishment of the problem solving-task (i.e. 
spatial relations among the zoids, compatibility between shapes) is immediately 
made present in the environment. The success of the cognitive practice is said 
to depend on this “cooperative and interactional relation with the world” 
(Kirsh, Maglio 1994: 546): problem-solving and decision-making are 
constitutively dependent on (epistemic) action-perception loops. They 
entertain a very tight relation of dependence with what is outside of the subject’s 
head: some cognitive operations are directly performed on the screen where 
representations are embedded.  
In order to test this two explanatory models, namely i) the idea that problem-
solving cognition takes place in the head versus ii) the idea that those kinds of 
cognitive tasks are performed by distributing the cognitive load between 
internal and external cognitive structures, Kirsh and Maglio made an 
experimental study in which two cognitive strategies, expressive of the two 
explanatory models, were confronted. i) They collected tachistoscopic tests of 
subjects that performed mental rotation tasks related to Tetris, they 
implemented a program called “RoboTetris”, built on classical information-
processing model of game expertise,  ii) and they observed the behavior of 
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agents engaged in real-time Tetris playing, focusing on two kinds of actions 
performed while manipulating the joystick (rotation and translation), recording 
the timing of keystrokes.  
What emerged from the comparison of these experimental situations is that 
neither the results of tests on RoboTetris, nor those emerged from mental 
rotation tasks were consistent with those from the observation of an embodied 
agent playing Tetris. For instance, according to a classical informational-
processing model of Tetris cognition, the bigger the time window in which a 
subject can plan her moves (relying on mental rotation of zoids) is, the fewer 
the external manipulations of Tetris bricks are. Experimental results 
contradicted this hypothesis, showing that rotations and translations acted on 
the screen occur in abundance (graphs of those experimental results, and a 
wider discussion of data, can be found in Kirsh, Maglio 1994: 523 – 524).  
According to Kirsh and Maglio, those results confirm their hypothesis: 
agents that are well adapted with the environment where a cognitive task takes 
place know how to balance internal and external computation. That is, subjects 
are able to successfully perform a problem-solving task relying on a variety of 
cognitive strategies which, in some cases, rely more on what is present in the 
context of the task and on what can be done in the environment rather than on 
the intellectualization or internalization of what is in the environment. 
In this sense, some cognitive practices have an embedded nature: their 
success and quality depend on external actions (epistemic actions) that make 
the external world being its own representation, to explain this point by making 
use of Brooks’ words (Brooks 1991:140). Epistemic actions, by successfully 
manipulating information available in the environment, make the cognitive 
agent able to acquire a grip on the situation she faces because the relations 
between parts of the environment (i.e. zoids of different shapes, concave and 
convex spaces, and so on), on which the success of the cognitive practice heavily 
depends, are externally represented.  
 
Now, after this very brief discussion of Kirsh and Maglio’s work, I would 
like to focus on some core points of this approach to cognitive practices, which, 
on the one hand distinguish this explanation from other philosophical stances 
(i.e. Embodied Enacted Cognition), on the other hand lay the theoretical 
foundations of the Extended Mind Hypothesis (EMH). 
In my explanation of Embedded Cognition, I focused on the concept of 
epistemic action. This attention to action in cognition, the realization of a 
cognitive practice is said to be strictly connected to, can make the reader 
thinking that this approach to cognition is totally consistent with the enactive 
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one. Indeed, as explained in §I.7, Enactivism is grounded on the philosophical 
claim that cognition is action (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991), and that 
cognition (namely knowledge considered in its active and operational aspect
27
) 
constitutively depends on an implicit, embodied practical knowledge (Noë 
2004).  To me, this similarity has a superficial nature only. Indeed, even if Kirsh 
and Maglio claim that their approach accounts for a “cooperative and 
interactional relation with the world” (Kirsh, Maglio 1994: 546), aspect that 
would be consistent with the relational account of cognition Enactivism points 
to, it seems to me that Embedded Cognition underplays the wider implications 
of inter-action in cognition. If it is true that on the one hand this distribution of 
the cognitive load between internal and external representations seems to point 
to the “inter” of interaction, on the other hand, focusing on the concept of 
computation, this Embedded Account of cognition seems to miss the relational 
aspect of cognition it wants to account for.  
Indeed, in order to describe cognition as a relational process, the scientist 
should look at what is in the middle of the relata. To explain this point in 
another way, it can be said that to account for cognition as a relation, a theory 
should conceive of cognition as the dynamical process by means of which two 
elements become related. Enactivism seems to satisfy this philosophical 
requirement because it focuses on the concept of sense-making, which makes 
the organism and its Umwelt emerging as interdependent through action. The 
Embedded approach to cognition (as taken into account in this paragraph) 
seems to miss this point
28
. Even if Kirsh and Maglio consider problem-solving 
as dependent on action-perception loops (where the concept of loop would 
account for process and dynamicity by pointing to the circularity of action and 
perception), the two scientists tend to depict action as isolated and discrete. 
They do not take into account action in its dynamical and processual 
development; they prefer focusing on the passages, on the operational steps in 
which external representations are manipulated. This is dependent on the 
implicit endorsement of wide computationalism as an explanatory frame. By 
“wide computationalism” I refer to an approach to cognition that reassesses the 
core ideas of folk-psychology (which individuates cognitive states in 
computational states) by claiming that computational states, namely cognitive 
states, do “not supervene on the intrinsic, physical states of the individual” 
                                                          
27
 For this definition of cognition, which accounts for the etymology of this word (form the Latin 
cognitionem: getting to know, ability to know), see Steiner 2008: 86.  
28
 My objection concerns the article published in 1994 only. Indeed, in other publications (e.g. 
Kirsh 2010) a more relational account of cognition is given by re-working on the enactive 
concept of sense-making.  
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(Wilson 1994: 352), but they can be instantiated also by what is outside of the 
individual subject. Broadly speaking, computations are “effective procedures” 
(Aizawa 2010: 227), procedures whose states and rules can be made explicit, 
and that are performed on representations. In the case study of Tetris, zoids 
can be considered as external representations (they stand for the bricks of an 
imaginary wall) that are computed, that is effectively manipulated, externally, 
making the information embedded in external representations available.  
The way Embedded Cognition accounts for action is peculiar: epistemic 
actions are steps of a computational processes, they are operations that can be 
individuated as discrete because they show, make available, informational states 
(e.g. the translation from right to left, performed in one motion, can light up 
the relation between a zoid and the space where it is supposed to land). Action 
is modeled on the concept of computation. In this sense, even if Embedded 
Cognition accounts for the dependence of cognitive processes on what is 
beyond the boundaries of the individual, the philosophical framework it relies 
on is still classical, conservative, I would say. It endorses an explanation of the 
relation between information, representation and computation that re-
produces in the external world what, according to classical cognitive 
psychology, happens within the boundaries of human mind, by saying that the 
contents of external representations are made “cognitively manageable” via 
computations.  
Moreover, this approach to cognitive practices, even if it accounts for the 
dependence of cognition on external structures, still relies on a classical account 
of what happens in the human mind when a cognitive agent is engaged in a 
cognitive practice. Indeed, cognition is said to be embedded in the 
environment to the extent that computations on discrete parts of the 
environment alter the subject’s internal computational states. The first term of 
the comparison between internal and external cognitive processes is 
“computation on mental representations”. Then, the appraisal of a cognitive 
process as partially embedded is dependent on the appraisal of changes in 
internal computational states.  
For those reasons, the Embedded approach to cognition is appreciated by 
philosophical stances which endorse the claim that cognition is dependent on 
external structures, but that reject the idea that the mind is extended in the 
environment (Rowlands 2010: 70, which refers to Rupert 2004; Adams, Aizawa 
2001; Adams, Aizawa 2009; Adams, Aizawa 2010b). This makes the position 
that Embedded Cognition occupies in the debate of “4Es” even more unclear 
than what was shown in my terminological discussion of the phrase “Embedded 
Cognition”. On the one hand the fact that Embedded Cognition i) endorses a 
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dependence claim, ii) and develops its argumentation relying on the 
assumption that the criteria to define the “embeddedness” cognition should be 
found in the appraisal of the cognitive agent’s internal states modifications 
caused by the engagement with external structure, make this approach 
consistent with theories that individuate the mark of the mental within the 
boundaries of the individual. On the other hand some concepts of this 
approach (e.g. external representations, wide computation, external 
manipulation of information, epistemic action) are reassessed by the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis, which not only claims that cognition is dependent on or 
caused by external structures, but also aims to account for the cases in which 
the Mind itself extends in the environment (constitution claim).  
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I.9 The Extended Mind. A radical theory to extend the mind? 
 
As sketched out in the previous paragraph, the Extended Mind Hypothesis 
(EMH) claims that, in some cases, cognition extends (namely it is realized by) 
into parts of the world. Then, if the word “mind” is used to refer to cognitive 
processes, in those said cases of cognitive extension, the mind should be said 
to extend (namely being constituted of) into the world.  
To explain this thesis, EMH, in Clark and Chalmers’ version and in its 
following developments by Clark (Clark, Chalmers 1998; Clark 2008), begins 
its argumentation by endorsing a philosophical position about the extension of 
cognition and the mind that has been defined as content-enabling externalism 
(Hurley 2010: 105). According to Hurley’s taxonomy of externalisms, content-
enabling externalism, or vehicle-externalism or active externalism (Clark, 
Chalmers 1998 for this last expression) is a peculiar kind of how-externalism.  
How-externalism is a philosophical stance that is more radical than classical 
externalist theories about mental contents. Classical externalist theories of 
mental contents claim that the content of mental states is determined by the 
external natural world (e.g. Putnam 1973) and social world (e.g. Burge 1979). 
How-externalism claims that not only intentional contents of the mind are 
dependent on the external world, but it also claims that the processes, 
mechanisms or vehicles mental states are enabled by extend beyond the 
boundaries of the human head. This is to say that not only the “what” of mental 
states is determined by the external world (e.g. the content of mental states 
about water is determined by the history of interactions
29
 with water) but also 
the “how” of mental contents, that is the way mental states unfold, is sometimes 
external. The material carriers of mental contents cross the boundaries of 
human heads, spreading out “across brain, body and certain aspects of the 
physical environment itself” (Clark 2005b: 1).  
This claim about cognitive extension can be unpacked by considering the 
very famous (and controversial) thought experiment of Otto and Inga, 
presented in the seminal paper “The Extended Mind” (Clark, Chalmers 1998: 
12-16).  
This thought experiment is about the cognitive practice of two subjects. Inga 
and Otto want to go to an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art in New 
York (MoMA) and one day decide to go for it. To fulfill her desire, Inga thinks 
                                                          
29 According to EMH, this focus on the historicity of interactions with the external world makes 
this position about the acquisition of mental contents a form of passive externalism: parts of 
the world present in the real-time engagement of the agent with her environment play no 
significant role in driving on-line cognitive processes (Clark, Chalmers 1998: 8).    
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about the location of the museum, she remembers that it is in the 53
rd
 street, 
and she goes there. To reach her goal, she just relied on her belief that the 
MoMa is in the 53
rd
 street, caused by the information about the location of the 
museum embedded in her long term memory.  
Otto, who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease, has to adopt another cognitive 
strategy. Indeed, he cannot recall information about the location of the 
museum embedded in his long-term memory because this cognitive function 
is partially damaged. To overcome the problems his disease entails, he 
progressively developed a strategy of cognitive balance (or substitution). He 
always carries a notebook with him. In this notebook, he writes down new 
information when he learns it. When he needs to have access to information 
learnt in the past, he checks his notebook. Then, when Otto has to recall the 
location of the MoMa, he looks at the address he previously wrote down in his 
notebook, and he goes to the museum.  
The two cognitive agents successfully performed the same cognitive task, 
even if they followed different cognitive strategies. In Otto’s case, the material 
vehicle of information was not embedded in his head, but in an external 
resource. According to the EMH, this is a case of “cultural extension” (Hurley 
2010: 127) of cognition. By relying on external resources explicitly designed for 
the agent’s engagement in a cognitive task, this last one can be judged as 
successful (i.e. the cognitive agent reaches her goal).  
Explained in this way, Otto’s example seems to point to the same theoretical 
direction taken into account in previous paragraph, where I discussed the 
Embedded approach to cognition: the success of a cognitive task heavily 
depends on external structures or external representations. Nevertheless, the 
EMH wants to go a step further. Indeed, this thought experiment was 
formulated in order to demonstrate a more radical claim: that about the 
constitution of cognitive systems. Contrary to what described in the previous 
paragraph, in which an ontic perspective was endorsed (namely the aim of the 
theory was explaining “how the things are”; Rowlands 2010: 56), the EMH 
endorses an epistemic claim, which has ontological consequences about 
cognition and the mind.  
What this thought experiment teaches is that cognitive practices does not 
just depend on external structures, but they are also built on them, they are 
constituted of them. This point is explained by Clark and Chalmers by means 
of the concept of coupled system. In the 1998 article, the concept of coupled 
system is explained in the following way: 
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“In this cases, [namely those of “cultural extension”] the human organism 
is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, creating a coupled 
system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right. All the 
components in the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behavior in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove 
the external component the system’s behavioral competence will drop, just 
as it would if we removed parts of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of 
coupled process counts equally well as cognitive processes, whether or not 
it is  wholly in the head” (Clark, Chalmers 1998: 9, text into brackets added).  
 
A coupled system is a system in which a human cognitive agent and external 
reality, or better, parts of it, are linked by a two-way interaction. This means 
that the cognitive agent actively manipulates external parts of the world (i.e. she 
performs epistemic actions in order to retrieve relevant information), and the 
world, modified by epistemic actions, causes changes in the cognitive agent, 
namely it produces cognitive states (i.e. mental states). The two-way interaction 
the EMH talks about is said not being “episodic”. On the contrary, this 
reciprocal influence is continuous. This continuity of the interaction between 
parts of the system makes the changes within the system flowing from one part 
to the other (van Gelder, 1995: 373), linking the parts of the system in a loop 
(Clark 2003: 75), namely in a lasting circle of causes and effects relevant for the 
deployment of the cognitive system’s activity (Clark 2008: 87).  
All the components of the system, its neural and extra-neural parts, play an 
active role: they drive real-time cognitive process. This active, non-distal role 
played by externalities makes them parts of the cognitive system: if Otto loses 
his notebook, the unity of the cognitive system is broken, then the cognitive 
practice cannot take place, because the cognitive agent (that is the coupled 
system) is not actually present in the situation of the task.  
Therefore when the EMH talks about coupled cognitive systems it is not 
just referring to the causal role externalities play in a cognitive practice, in which 
there is a “ready made” cognitive agent that manipulates parts of the world.  
I think that objections against the EMH miss this point, namely that 
concerning the formation of the structure of a cognitive agent. Examples given 
to demonstrate that the EMH makes a fallacious inference from causal 
relations to constitutive relations (this objection is known as “coupling 
constitution fallacy”; Adams, Aizawa 2001; 2009; 2010a; 2010b; Aizawa 2010a; 
Rupert 2004), integrating in the cognitive system what (according to those 
philosophical stances) is not actually cognitive, presuppose situations like the 
following ones.  
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i) The expansion of a metallic strip in a thermostat, which is causally 
linked to a heater that regulates the temperature of the room in 
which the thermostat is located (Adams, Aizawa 2001: 56);  
ii) the causal interaction between the kidneys and parts of the 
circulatory system in the process of alternation of the impurities of 
the blood (Adams, Aizawa 2001: 56); 
iii) the role of the economic conditions in Germany to understand the 
Nazi Germany’s invasion of Poland (Rupert 2004). 
 
Critiques of the EMH say that, in the same way  
 
i) the expansion of a bimetallic strip in a thermostat (which causes a 
modification in the thermostat, and then in the temperature of a 
room) is not a process that extends into the whole system, 
ii) the fact that parts of the circulatory system have causal influences 
on the work of the kidneys does not allow us to claim that the 
alteration of the impurities of the blood occurs within the 
circulatory system, 
iii) the fact that, to fully understand Nazi Germany’s invasion of 
Poland, one should have information about the economic 
conditions in Germany does not make those economical conditions 
part of the historical event of the invasion, 
 
the fact that Otto’s notebook plays an active causal role in driving a cognitive 
practice is not a sufficient condition to consider it to be a constitutive part of an 
extended cognitive system.   
All those examples are aimed at demonstrating that, in order to endorse 
EMH, considering informational and causal relations only is not enough. 
According to those critiques, it is not clear how the constitution claim can be 
derived from the active causal role played by externalities in cognitive process, 
in virtue of their informational content. 
As explained previously, the problem with those objections to cognitive 
extension rests in the fact that they do not focus on the way an agent becomes 
cognitive in virtue of the integration of internal and external cognitive resources. 
The examples offered above are expressive of this way of reasoning. They 
presuppose that there is a discrete agent, or item (the bimetallic strip, the 
kidneys, the agent’s understanding of Poland invasion) “cognitively 
implemented” by the encounter with an external carrier of 
information/contents (Menary 2006: 333). Then they claim that the causal 
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coupling with those external discrete resources or structures does not make the 
said discrete system extending beyond its already defined boundaries.  
The problem with those critiques consists in a misunderstanding of the 
original EMH project. Indeed, even if the EMH commonly focuses on cases 
of real-time, real-world cognition, it seems to endorse a philosophical position 
according to which we are allowed to consider a cognitive system as extending 
beyond the boundaries of the individual when there is an history of couplings, 
which theoretically builds the “integrated cognitive agent”. Even if Otto’s 
example deals with a defined cognitive task,  according to Clark, what matters 
for an explanation of extended cognition is not just the real-time causal 
interaction between parts of the system (i.e. Otto and his notebook), but it is 
this real-time causal interaction plus the previous experiences of coupling that 
made the system operationally successful through time. According to the 
EMH, Otto and his notebook constitute an integrated system, and then, 
considering that discrete task, the cognitive practice is a case of cognitive 
extension, because 
 
i) the information contained in the notebook was endorsed as true by 
the human agent in the past (and then it is considered to be trustable)  
ii) and because the history of the engagements with the cultural artifact 
shown that the notebook is a reliable and easily accessible source of 
information (Clark, Chalmers 1998: 17; Clark 2010a: 84).  
 
To put it in other words, according to the Extended Mind Thesis 
30supporters, and for “integrationists” about  cognition (Menary 2006; Menary 
2007; Menary 2010b) we can talk about extended cognition when a system that 
at given time built itself by coupling internal and external resources displays a 
cognitive behavior, which is made of hybrid processes. Then, the core claim of 
the EMH is not that cognition is extended because sometimes a pre-existing 
cognitive agent is coupled with external reality in a cognitive way. The core 
claim consists in saying that cognition extends into the world because some re-
iterated episodes of coordination between a human agent and artifacts or 
external structures created something that did not exist before these cognitive 
engagement: an hybrid cognitive system (Menary 2006: 333-334, for the 
original version of this  argumentative part).  
 
                                                          
30
 This is different from claiming for cases of cognitive scaffolding, namely cases in which, in 
virtue of causal relations, the environment functions as a scaffolding for a cognitive agent’s 
practice (Clark 2008: 30).  
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Until this moment, my discussion of the EMH was focused on cognition. 
To be accurate, the argumentations offered here were aimed at making a 
philosophical hypothesis clear, the Extended Cognition Hypothesis (ECH), 
which, on the one hand lays the foundations of the EMH, on the other hand 
does not guarantee the extension of the mind by itself. Indeed, even if at this 
point of the argumentation the EMH made a step beyond Embedded 
approaches to cognition (which is compatible with a claim of mere 
dependence), claiming that some informational processes take place outside of 
the head is still compatible with an internalist account of the mind (i.e. truly 
mental states, such as beliefs and desires, are determined by states of the brain 
only; Clark, Chalmers 1998: 12).  
To explain the way the EMH tries to overcome this narrow approach to the 
mental, by endorsing the ontological thesis of the partial external location of 
the mind, it is worth to look again at Otto and Inga’s example, focusing on the 
relation between information and mental states.  
The way Clark and Chalmers, and Clark in other publications (e.g. Clark 
2008; Clark 2010a) explain how the mind is partially constituted by external 
structures relies on some ideas very common in philosophy of mind, namely 
functionalism about mental states. Functionalism claims that mental states 
should be defined in virtue of their causal and functional relations and not in 
virtue of their spatial location, or in virtue of the material substrate they are 
embedded in. Mental states do not necessarily supervene on the brain’s 
physical constitution: being realized by a neural structure is not a necessary 
condition for the definition of mental states.  
According to Clark’s approach to the Extended Mind, claiming that mental 
states are necessarily embedded in human heads is not only consequence of 
the internalist prejudice that affected great part of the history of philosophy of 
mind, but it also depends on the unjustified premise that neural substrates are 
mental states because they are endowed with an intrinsic content.  According 
to this approach to the mind, by conceiving of mental states as neural 
populations, a theory is allowed to think of mental states as entirely non-
conventional carriers of a specific content. This would make them able to 
signify in a more direct way than conventional symbols do (Adams, Aizawa 
2001: 48).  
My point is that, not only the notion of intrinsic, or underived, content is 
obscure (and then what is left unexplained is the reason why we should think 
that intrinsic content is the mark of the mental), but also it is not clear how the 
intrinsic feature of mental content is tied to neural substrates. For instance, it 
seems possible to ascribe non-conventional contents to states of some artificial 
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creatures, or to silicon parts embedded in the brain, that do not have the same 
material constitution of neural areas (Clark 2005b: 4).  
Given the vagueness and the lack of clarity that wraps the idea of intrinsic 
content, Clark and Chalmers claim that we should think of looser borders for 
the mark of the mental: it should be broadly identified with the function that 
an item or process plays in the overall dynamics of a cognitive practice in virtue 
of the informational relations that it entertains with other states, which carry 
other pieces of information. 
According to this broad interpretation of functionalism about mental states, 
Otto and Inga’s thought experiment can be unpacked in this way. Inga goes to 
the museum because she believes that the MoMa is on the 53
rd
 street. The 
mental state of belief (interpreted as a disposition to act in a certain way in order 
to reach a goal) causes the intelligent behavior of going to the museum. 
Moreover, Inga believes that the MoMa is on the 53
rd
 street because some 
information about the location of the museum is embedded in her long-term 
memory. The information embedded in her long-term memory is represented 
by the intentional content of the belief. The causal relation between 
information, mental states, and intelligent behavior has  
 
i) an epistemic nature: it constitutes the explanation of the cognitive 
practice dynamics; 
ii) it points to an ontological claim: if cognitive behavior (namely the 
effect of a cognitive practice) is explained by appealing to the relation 
between a mental state and the information it contains, then the 
mind (interpreted as a cognitive device) should be individuated in 
mental states that cause cognition.  
 
Otto’s cognitive situation can be explained by following the same 
argumentative strategy. Information about the location of the museum is 
contained in Otto’s notebook, information causes the belief that the MoMa is 
on the 53
rd
 street, and this dispositional belief causes intelligent behavior. As 
Inga’s mind is constituted by her mental states, also Otto’s mind is constituted 
by the same “functional substance”. Nevertheless, in Otto’s example, this 
functional substance is not entirely neutrally realized. Given that information 
represented as the intentional content of a belief is embedded in a cultural 
artifact, belief (namely a part of the mind) is embedded in an external structure 
as well.  
To explain this point more accurately, it can be said that the relation that 
information, belief and cognitive behavior entertain in Inga’s case is the same 
The Mind and its varieties  
78 
 
as that entertained by information contained in Otto’s notebook, his long-term 
memory belief and his behavior. Information contained in Otto’s notebook 
plays the same functional and causal role of that one represented as the content 
of Inga’s non-occurrent belief about the location of the Moma. Then, even if 
Otto’s non-occurrent belief that the MoMa is on the 53rd street supervenes on 
a cultural artifact and not on brain structures, then the notebook should be 
considered to be part of the mental. Information it embeds causes the same 
disposition to act that Inga’s internal belief causes: it has the same coarse-
grained causal, functional, and explanatory role. Then, by endorsing a 
functionalist perspective on the mind, we do not have compelling reasons to let 
Otto’s notebook outside of the realm of the mental.  
 
Considering Otto and Inga’s example, it seems to be the case that the 
argumentation for mind extension Clark and Chalmers give implies an 
inference from the similarity of function and causal powers to the ontological 
commitment of the partial external realization of the mind. If we reassess the 
thought experiment discussed here, it seems to be the case that Clark and 
Chalmers claim something like this: Otto’s notebook is like an exogram. It is a 
set of memory records stored outside the nervous system (Sutton 2010: 189; 
Donald 2010: 71), which functions in a similar (or more successful
31
) way to 
engrams, namely memories embedded in the brain (Donald 2010: 71, who 
takes the expression from Lashley 1950). It provides information that can be 
retrieved along an extended time-scale; if incorporated in the cognitive agent’s 
cognitive practice in the right way, it is a reliable cognitive medium; it drives a 
pattern of cognitive actions established through time, and so on. The notebook 
functions as a transparent equipment in the Heideggerian sense (Clark 2005b: 
2). As Inga’s engrams, or biological memories, it is implicitly “taken for 
granted” in the cognitive practice: thanks to its transparency, it fluently drives 
the subject’s cognitive practices.  
The appeal to the concept of similarity, towards which there have been 
many critiques, is confirmed by the first formulation of the Parity Principle, 
given in the 1998 article (Clark, Chalmers 1998). The Parity Principle says that  
 
                                                          
31 For instance, we can have a “theoretically unlimited perceptual access to exographic records 
with various kinds of interface”, they exceed life span, they can be retrieved by following 
different cognitive strategies, they offer a material substrate for flexible reformatting of memory 
records (Donald 2010: 72). This example concerning engrams and exograms, which seems to 
be useful to reassess Otto and Inga’s example, gives me the chance to notice that the EMH (in 
its first formulation) focuses on the similarity between internal and external processes, not on 
the sameness of qualities or ways of information storage (Clark 2008: 115).  
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“If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process 
which, were it done in the head , we would have no hesitation in recognizing 
as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (so we claim) 
part of the cognitive process” (Clark, Chalmers 1998: 8)  
 
As the quotation clearly shows, according to the Parity Principle, which is 
one of the pillars of the first version of the EMH, the criteria to define 
something as mental presuppose internal structures or processes as the first 
term of comparison of this relation. As Di Paolo points out, even if the Parity 
Principle is aimed at laying the foundations of locational impartiality of 
cognitive processes, and then of the mind, the pre-theoretical understanding of 
what the mind is “is biased towards the inner” (Di Paolo 2009: 11), and, in the 
economy of a location neutral theory, this makes the appeal to the idea of Parity 
Principle a nonsense (Walter 2010: 288).  
This objection, at least on a broad logical level, seems to really make sense. 
Even if other parts of Clark and Chalmers’ argumentation provide interesting 
philosophical means to argue in favor of the external location of mental states, 
the appeal to this internalist pre-theoretical intuition about the mind seems to 
jeopardize the overall success of the general picture of the Extended Mind.  
Nevertheless it is worth to notice that, in some of Clark’s publications, the 
idea of Parity seems to be coupled with another notion, which does not entail 
this implicit primacy of internal structures: complementarity.  
For instance, in Being there (Clark 1997a), book that lays the theoretical 
foundations of the EMH as described in 1998 article, he talks about “external 
structures [that] function so as to complement our individual cognitive profiles 
and to diffuse human reason across wider and wider social and physical 
networks” (Clark 1997a: 179, text into brackets added). Moreover he says that 
“The complementarity between the biological brain and its artifactual props 
and supports is thus enforced by revolutionary forces uniting user and artifact 
in a virtuous circle of mutual modulation” (Clark 1997a: 213). Furthermore, 
this idea of complementarity is endorsed also in works published after 1998. 
For instance, in 2001 Clark writes: “one useful way to understand the cognitive 
role of many of our self-created cognitive technologies is thus as affording 
complementary operations to those that come most naturally to biological 
brains” (Clark 2001: 20). In 2003 he says that “one quite general way to see the 
contribution of tools such as pen and paper is thus in terms of a deep 
complementarity between what the biological brain is naturally good at, and 
what the tool provides” (Clark 2003: 74). And again, in 2010, he says that “given 
sufficient complementarity and integration, (…) we may sometimes confront 
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hybrid systems displaying novel cognitive profiles that supervene on more than 
the biological components alone” (Clark 2010a: 99). Also the broad picture of 
the mind drawn in Clark’s last book, Surfing Uncertainty. Prediction, Action, 
and the Embodied Mind (Clark 2016a), seems to convey this idea of 
complementarity. Indeed, all the discussion about the neural underpinnings of 
predictive/perceptual processes is integrated into an embodied and extended 
view of the mind, according to which “organismically salient (high precision) 
prediction error may thus be the all-purpose adhesive that, via its expressions 
in action, binds elements form brain, body and world into temporary problem-
solving wholes” (Clark 2016a: 262).  
This idea of complementarity, plus extended functionalism and the criteria 
for coupling, is particularly relevant to understand the pluralist approach to 
cognitive processes endorsed by Clark. The mind is said to be extended 
because cognitive processes take place in loops in which the cognitive functions 
of resources internal to the human head (i.e. representations, usually conceived 
as action-oriented representations or as predictive models; Clark 1997a; Clark 
2016a) entertain a continuous exchange (i.e. are complemented by) with what 
is external to the head (i.e. functions and processes of the body, external 
representations, external computations, artifacts, and so on). Then, the 
explanatory tools this theory relies on are multiple, and this diversity of the 
explanatory tools is aimed at giving a multilayered account of mind processes. 
 
Broadly speaking, I am sympathetic with the idea of extending the mind 
beyond the boundaries of human heads. I strongly agree with the idea 
(criticized by the EMH) that considering the mind is just as an internal 
representational device is a reductionist perspective, dependent on an 
internalist prejudice that, as shown by taking into account some objections to 
the EMH (i.e. the coupling-consitution fallacy, the intrinsic content 
requirement), seems to be not justified. I also think that this internalist 
prejudice depends on the implicit and arbitrary assumption, dominant along 
the history of western philosophy, that cognitive processes are processes by 
means of which the external reality is mirrored in the internal space of the 
mind, locus of cognition.
32
 Nevertheless, I have some doubts about the way 
extended mind theorists account for this process of “mind-extension”.  
First, although the idea of complementarity sounds appealing, the 
multiplication of the explanatory notions it entails is not cognitively economic. 
In order to hold together different vehicles of information, and then of mental 
                                                          
32
 For this broad critique to the relation between mind and representations see Rorty 1979. 
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contents, the EMH relies on notions whose common ground is sometimes 
unclear. This problem will emerge in more detail in the next chapter, in which 
I will take into account how the EMH deals with the problem of 
representations.  
Second, some aspects of the theory seem to be at odds with the general 
project of the EMH, namely that of giving a dynamical account of cognition, 
explaining it a set of  active processes that cross the individual’s boundaries 
(Clark 2008: 40 for this claim).  
At a general level, it can be noticed that the very meaning of the label 
“Extended Mind” hides this problem. “Extended” points to something static, 
to the result of a movement that goes from “inside” to “outside” (and this was 
shown at another level of explanation by considering the objections to the Parity 
Principle
33
). To account for the process of mind extension, it is better to look 
at mind extending, namely to the process through which the very activity of the 
mind unfolds. To some extent, Clark’s work points towards this direction. 
Indeed, the thought experiments and the cases that he takes into account deal 
with real-time and word-engaging cognitive practices. Nonetheless, it seems to 
me that the processual aspect the EMH aims to account for is still missed. This 
point is clearly taken into account by the enactivist critiques of the EMH, aimed 
to underline that the EMH, by endorsing a functionalist perspective, is unable 
to actually account for the extensive (Hutto, Kirchhoff, Myin 2014) nature of 
the mind.  
For instance, Gallagher (Gallagher 2011b; Gallagher 2013) points out that, 
relying on the concept of (mental, representational, informational)state, the 
EMH implicitly endorses a static and passive explanation of mind, which is not 
consistent with the idea that the mind is made of activities, practices, and 
processes, claim endorsed by Clark at different levels (Clark 2008 and Clark 
2016a). The functionalist frame in which the EMH is developed entails that, to 
find the “external mind”, we should find the external locus of cognitive states 
(Di Paolo 2009; Paolucci 2011 for this objection). The problem with the 
endorsement of this locational claim
34
 rests in the fact that it is at odds with a 
relational and interactive account of cognitive process, the idea of 
complementarity seems to point to. If it is true that the interactive nature of 
extended cognition is stressed out by second wave extended mind theorists in 
particular,  by means of the “manipulation thesis” (Menary 2007, chapter 4), it 
also true that in Clark’s work the idea of manipulation and that of the active 
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 For the discussion about the label “Extended Mind”, see also Sutton 2014: 14.  
34
 For my discussion of the locational claim see §I.6.  
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engagement with the external artifactual and social world is recurrent. For 
instance, Clark offers examples such as: the use of pen and paper to perform a 
long multiplication, the external manipulation of letters to play Scrabble (Clark 
2008: 221), mapping the environment with tags to work on conceptual relations 
between objects (Clark 2008: 46), he uses the term “interaction” to describe 
Otto’s cognitive engagement with his notebook (Clark 2008: xi), and so on. The 
problem with these examples is that, even if they are built on the assumption 
that the mind, at certain degree, unfolds through interaction (namely it has a 
relational nature), the functionalist explanation undermines this reasonable 
attempt. Indeed, the mind is said to be external because the little squares of 
scrabble, the paper with passages of the multiplication, and Otto’s notebook 
function as an external storage of information. What is not clear is how “being 
stored” can be considered to be i) an activity, ii) a process; iii) something that 
points towards a relational engagement. In other words, the endorsement of a 
functionalist perspective undermines the epistemic effects of active externalism: 
to what extent externalities can be considered to be active if they count as 
cognitive, and then as mental, because they store relevant information for the 
deployment of cognitive processes? Even if their functional and causal role is 
as active as that of internal resources, passivity is still there in the background.  
In conclusion, I think that the EMH is less radical than what has been 
thought in the development of the “4Es” debate. If we want to account for mind 
extending, other approaches to cognition, such as the enactive one, should be 
explored. 
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I.10 Concluding remarks. Convergences and tensions in the “4Es 
Cognition” debate.  
 
In this chapter, I tried to draw a fil rouge that links different theories of the 
“4Es Cognition” debate. To do that, I offered a theoretical narration, aimed at 
sketching out the web of problems the debate unfolds by. That is why I began 
my discussion considering the way those theories react to classical approaches 
to cognitive science. Moreover, even if Cognitive Linguistics and Grounded 
Cognition are not “officially” part of the current debate I took into account, I 
considered those theoretical stances as well, in order to account for the broad 
framework Embodied and Enacted approaches to cognition come from. This 
choice is consistent with the general aim of this chapter: trying to give a broad 
picture of the debate, based on the historical and theoretical development of 
different theories, and on the consideration of the general problems different 
theories deal with.  
This attempt of systematization was motivated by the way the debate 
unfolds. It is not uncommon to see Embedded, Embodied, Enacted and 
Extended cognition discussed together, as a whole. Even if, at a methodological 
level, understanding the theoretical links between the different approaches is 
fundamental, because this offers the conceptual tools to understand the debate 
and to actively take part in it, thinking that “4Es” actually are a robust 
philosophical coalition can be problematic.  
My discussion of the core points of each theory was aimed at making this 
point clear. Certainly, there is an actual connection of problems within the 
debate. For example, the symbol grounding problem founds the 
Embodied/Grounded approach to cognition; the relevance of contextual 
factors is at the core of Embedded, Enacted and Extended approaches to 
cognition; the role of action in cognition is taken into account by all the theories 
of the debate; all the approaches deal with the problem of mental 
representation, reacting to classical cognitive sciences in different ways, and so 
on.  Nonetheless, the ways each theory deals with the philosophical issues taken 
into account are very different. This draws different pictures of the mind, which 
sometimes integrate and reassess aspect of the other theories, other times offer 
explanations that are at odds the one with the other. Therefore it can be said 
that the voices of the debate are not harmonious, they do not sound like a syn-
phone, a concord of sounds played by an orchestra. The “4Es” Cognition 
debate looks more like a jam session, of which improvisation, anticipation, 
mistakes, corrections, the uncertainty about whether a player can successfully 
join the other musicians, are core features.  
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The outline at the end of this chapter shows the intersections and the points 
of friction of this philosophical jam session.  
Taking into account the main ideas gathered in this outline, it can be said 
that moments of tension can be individuated by considering (at least) three 
points: the role of the body in cognitive processes, that of representation, and 
that of action.  
If the role played by the body in cognitive processes is taken into account, 
two strands of thought that entertain a relation of tension can be individuated 
(Clark, Kiverstein 2009:1-2). One of those strands focuses on the body at any 
level of its arguments. The body is considered to be the very core of cognitive 
processes. By focusing on the fined-grained details of the body, the full thesis 
of the Embodied Mind -which also the Enactive approach to cognition 
endorses- individuates the source of all cognitive phenomena in the materiality 
of the body and on the possibilities of action, inter-action, conceptualization, 
simulation and other cognitive activities that it produces. 
Other theories, such as Embedded Cognition and the Extended Mind 
Hypothesis, have a different perspective on cognition. By resting on 
functionalist premises, they give no special role to the material substrates 
information is embedded in. According to EMH theorists, this functionalist 
perspective is precisely what guarantees the extension of the mind beyond the 
boundaries of the individual subject. According to supporters of this extended 
functionalist frame, this goal cannot be reached by the enactive approach to 
cognition, especially in its strong sensorimotor version (e.g. O’ Regan, Noë 
2001; Noë 2004). Indeed, according to the EMH, those approaches are too 
tied to the fined-grained details of the body (Clark 2008:177-179), and this 
makes them too “personalistic”, in a certain sense. In order to have the same 
cognitive experience, two different subjects might have the same body, because 
this guarantees a kind of similarity in managing sensorimotor laws. But, if 
cognitive experience is so tied to fine-grained bodily details, how is it possible 
to think of cognitive experiences that are intersubjectively or materially 
extended?  
If this idea suggested by the EMH is endorsed, it is seems possible to draw 
a “story of radicality” in the debate. This would start with Embodied 
approaches to the mind and it would end with the Extended Mind, passing by 
Enactivism. As said in the previous paragraph, I do not think that this story is 
true. Not only the EMH has some problems with mind extension, but also the 
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considerations about enactivism that EMH offers seem to be partial
35
. As 
explained in §I.7, also the enactive approach to cognition takes into account 
the problem of “mind-extending”, and it does that in a way that, at least on a 
provisional level, seems to avoid the problems the EMH entails. By endorsing 
a complete relational account of cognitive experience, enactivism gets rid of the 
locational claim and of the introduction of passivity in the explanation.  
 
These considerations bring me to the second point I would like to take into 
account: action. 
In the article Where’s the action? The pragmatic turn in cognitive science 
(Engel, Maye, Kurthen, Köning 2013), Engel, Maye, Kurthen and Köning 
claim that “4 Es” denote a “pragmatic turn” in cognitive sciences. Being action-
oriented is a common feature all the theories taken into account share. This 
means  
 
i) understanding cognition as the capacity of generating structure by 
action;  
ii) looking at the cognitive agent as immersed in her task-domain;  
iii) considering meaning-acquisition as tied to the context of action 
(Engel, Maye, Kurthen, Köning 2013: 203).  
 
Now, all the theories examined in this chapter endorse these points. 
Nevertheless, by considering the issue of action, two strands of thought can be 
individuated again. Even if the majority of theories is aware of the fundamental 
role of motor action in cognitive processes and of the centrality of action in the 
context of cognitive practices, the enactivist approach to cognition builds its 
explanation on the notions of enaction and sense-sense making, namely on 
inter-action. As explained in §I.7, the focus on these conceptions of action is 
aimed to a theoretical substitution of internal representations with the relation 
between organism and environment. According to enactivism, the only viable 
                                                          
35
 It is worth to make clear that I think that Clark’s way of considering the Enactive approach to cognition 
in his book Supersizing the Mind is partial and built “ad hoc” because he considers sensorimotor 
Enactivism only (in particular Noë 2004), and he makes use of his objections against the idea of full 
embodiment to introduce, and then to develop, his idea of Extended Mind. According to him, relying on 
functionalism, his explanation is said to be suitable to account for the continuous exchange of information 
between internal and external resources in cognitive processes (Clark 2008a: 219). Moreover, and this is 
not a critique to Clark, I think that this explanation of Enactivism, in retrospect, should be considered to 
be partial because Noë himself, which was Clark’s target in chapter 8, recently extended his notion of skill 
(which, in Action in Perception was mostly tied to sensorimotor knowledge), by considering cognition as 
a skillful practice that is not only perceptual but that is also cultural and intersubjective (e.g. Alva Noë’s 
last book Strange Tools, New York, Hill and Wang, 2015).  
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concept of action is external action, where by “external action” I refer to the 
externality of action in respect to the boundaries of the head, and not to 
something external to the organism-environment coupled system. Indeed, as 
already explained, the motto of the enactivist approach to cognition is “neither 
externalism, nor internalism” (Thompson, Stapleton 2009).  
Theories such as Embedded Cognition and the Extended Mind, also focus 
on external actions, but, by endorsing extended computationalism and 
extended functionalism, describe them in a “discretized” way, as pointed out in 
§I.8 and §I.9. As I previously claimed, this undermines the project of giving a 
relational and dynamic account of cognition.  
Moreover, the EMH seems to implicitly reassess some ideas about action 
developed in the theoretical frame of Grounded Cognition, and it does that 
when it talks about representations. As explained in §I.5, some versions of 
Grounded Cognition, such Barsalou’s perceptual symbol systems, conceive of 
mental representations as modal representations described as internal re-
enactments of sensorimotor activities.  
The way Clark conceives of internal representations has something in 
common with this approach. As sketched out in §I.9, the idea of 
complementarity between internal and external resources leads Clark to think 
of Action-Oriented Representations (AORs). Those ones, as Barsalou’s 
perceptual symbols, are representations strictly tied to action. They are defined 
as “local and action-oriented rather than objective and action-independent”, as 
representations that “reflect the profound role of bodily motion […] in shaping 
and simplifying the information-processing problems to be solved” (Clark 
1997a: 149). As Barsalou’s PSS, they internally reflect action and they are 
profoundly context-sensitive. According to Clark, this makes them interesting 
factors for the distribution of action (at least conceived in terms of function) 
between the internal realm and the external one. 
A detailed consideration of this point will be offered in Chapter II. Indeed, 
that of representation is a huge philosophical problem. Moreover, it is 
particularly relevant for the “4E Cognition” debate and, as shown in the outline, 
it is a central point of tension between the Enactive and the Extended 
approaches to cognition, namely the two theories which explicitly point to 
“mind-extension”. That is why, for the purposes of this research, this point 
should be taken into account in depth.  
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Figure 3: Body, Action, Context, and Representation in second-wave Cognitive Sciences.  
 
  
Cognitive 
Linguistics  
 
Grounded 
Cognition 
 
Biological 
Embodiment 
 
Enactive 
Mind 
 
Embedded 
Cognition 
 
Extended 
Mind 
 
 
B 
o 
d 
y 
 
 
 
Motor Body 
 
 
Body as a 
constraint 
 
 
Sensorimot
or Body 
 
Neurally 
represented 
 
Re-enacted 
Body 
 
 
 
Material 
Body 
 
 
Material 
Body 
 
Sensorimoto
r Body  
 
 
 
Manipulatory 
Body   
 
 
 
Functional 
Body  
 
 
A 
c 
t 
i 
o 
n 
 
 
 
 
 
Action as 
metaphor 
shaper 
 
 
 
 
Neurally re-
presented 
action 
 
Simulation  
 
Re-
enactment  
 
 
 
 
Motor Action 
 
Biological 
function  
 
 
 
Enaction 
 
Sense-
making 
 
Inter-action 
 
Epistemic 
Action 
 
Action-
Perception 
loops 
 
Action as 
computation  
 
 
Epistemic 
Action 
 
Action-
Perception 
loops 
 
 
C 
o 
n 
t 
e 
x 
t 
 
 
Linguistic 
Situation 
 
Experienced 
context of 
linguistic 
practices 
 
 
 
Re-enacted 
Context 
 
 
 
No particular 
stress on this 
element 
 
 
 
Transactions 
organism-
environment 
 
 
 
Manipulatory 
and symbolic 
context 
 
 
 
Artifactual/ 
Technologica
l context  
 
R 
e 
p 
r 
e 
s 
e 
n 
t 
a 
t 
i 
o 
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Weak – 
Hybrid 
Representati
on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PSS  
 
B-Formats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
De-Emphasis 
on Internal 
Representati
on 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No 
representatio
n 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Internal + 
External 
Representati
on  
 
 
 
 
Action-
Oriented 
Representati
on 
 
 
External 
representatio
n 
Chapter II 
88 
 
Chapter II 
 
Activating Representations.  
Looking for the whole story  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Activating Representations 
89 
 
II.1 Introduction. Approaching Action-Oriented Representations.  
 
In this chapter, I deal with the problem of representations between the 
Extended Mind Hypothesis and the enactive approach to cognition. In 
particular, I consider the problem of the relation between representation and 
action, which is one of the heated issues of the debate. Indeed, the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis claims that philosophical explanations need to account for 
action-perception loops by making use of the concept of action-oriented 
representation (AOR). On the contrary, theories such as “Radical 
Embodiment” and the enactive approach to cognition hold that AORs are not 
useful epistemic posits to solve the problem of selective responses to stimuli. 
This problem, also called “Generalized Relevance Problem” or “Frame 
problem” is the main reason why AORs have been introduced in philosophical 
explanations.  
The ultimate aim of this discussion is to consider whether the way the EMH 
talks about AORs contributes to the philosophical project of “mind-extension” 
or if it rather prevents the explanation to come to radical conclusions about the 
nature of cognition and the mind. 
In paragraph II.2, I consider the problem of practical knowledge in the “4 
Es” cognition debate, explaining in detail the reasons that lead philosophers to 
talk about AORs, giving a representational account of practical-perceptual 
knowledge. 
In paragraph II.3, I take into account Clark’s version of action-oriented 
representation. I also consider the objections to non-representational accounts 
of action-perception loops. Those objections persuade Clark to endorse 
AORs. I suggest that Clark’s arguments, in particular his notion of 
“representation-hunger”, hide an unwarranted rhetorical slip. 
Considered my worries about Clark’s AORs, in paragraph II.4 and in 
paragraph II.5, I focus on the very concept of AOR in detail,  in order to 
understand if it meets the criteria to determine if an item or a process is 
genuinely representational. Following Gallagher’s article Are minimal 
representations still representations? (Gallagher 2008a), I claim that if AORs 
do not meet all these criteria they should not be considered to be 
representations. In that case the explanation should not buy AORs.  
To develop my argument, in paragraph II.4, I consider the representational 
criteria endorsed by cognitive scientists, and I reassess them in a semiotic 
framework grounded in Peirce’s thought. The outcome of this exam is a 
reduction of representational criteria from six to four.  
In paragraph II.5, I apply this new set of representational conditions to 
Clark’s AORs, and I show that they do not match three of these criteria. This 
means that they are not genuine representations; therefore a representational 
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gloss -as that one Clark makes use of- adds nothing interesting to our 
philosophical explanations.  
Moreover, I consider the problem of AORs at a more general level of 
explanation, speculating about the role they play in the project of mind-
extension. To the formal objections built around the idea of representational 
conditions, I add some considerations on the active features AORs are said to 
be endowed with. I show that Clark claims that he wants to make his 
representations active and dynamical, in order to make them fit with mind-
extension, but he does not actually succeed in this project. Not only Clark’s 
concept of action-oriented representation is tied to an internalistic prejudice, 
but also AORs are not active and dynamical at all. In the conclusion of my 
discussion, I suggest that a possible solution to this lack of dynamicity and 
activity in representation can be found in Peirce’s concept of sign. This 
discussion of Peirce’s concept of sign is meant to be a preparatory stage for 
what will be considered in the following paragraph. 
Indeed, given the problems that Clark’s AORs entail, in paragraph II.6, I 
consider a possible solution to the generalized relevance problem, which is a 
philosophical proposal that does not make use of cognitive scientists’ AORs. 
This account of selective responsiveness to the environment crosses some 
Merleaupontian insights on bodily intentionality with ecological psychology, 
and explains cognitive agents’ ability to act meaningfully in a context by focusing 
on the concept of affordance. I claim that this is an interesting approach to the 
problem of relevance, and that it does not entail many of the problems Clark’s 
explanation suffers from. Nevertheless, I suggest that this “radical embodied” 
or enactivist explanation can be made stronger and more complete if it is 
integrated with Peirce’s concept of indexicality.  
In §II.7, I offer some concluding remarks concerning the notion of AOR. 
Here I claim that not only the enactivist approach to contextual relevance 
(especially if it is integrated within a semiotic framework) is the more viable 
one, but it is also suitable to account for the mind’s extension.  
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II.2 Acting without representing?36 Practical knowledge and 
minimal representationalism.  
In Chapter I, I discussed the main positions of the “4Es Cognition” debate, 
explaining why, even if those theories share a common theoretical ground (i.e. 
their critical reactions to internalism and methodological individualism 
defended by first-wave cognitive sciences), they cannot be considered to be a 
robust philosophical coalition.  
In particular, I considered three main points of friction, which constitute 
great factors of differentiation: the role given to the body in cognitive processes, 
the relationship between action and cognition, and the use of the concept of 
representation.  
I also noticed that both the enactive approach to cognition and the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis are theories which, relying on different explanatory strategies, 
endorse an “extensive”37 explanation of the mind.  When I say that both 
endorse an “extensive” view of the mind I mean that their claim is the following 
one. In order to understand what the mind is, we should explain how cognitive 
activities unfold by considering the cognitive role of personal resources (i.e. 
somatic and neural resources) and extra-personal resources (i.e. extra-somatic 
resources, such as information distributed in the environment or embedded in 
cultural and technological artifacts, in Clark’s explanation, and the space of 
intertwinement between the agent and the environment, according to the 
enactive perspective). 
Nevertheless, a closer look at those explanations aimed at accounting for the 
process of mind-extension shows that these two theories are radically different. 
In particular, what seems to make the real difference is the way these two 
approaches deal with the notion of representation in relation to that of action 
or activity.  
My working hypothesis about this point is the following one. In order to 
understand if and how those philosophical theories actually account for the 
mind as an extensive process, we should look at the way they deal with mental 
representations. Indeed, the internalistic stance of mainstream cognitive 
                                                          
36 The title of this paragraph recalls Clark and Toribio’s article “Doing without representing?”, 
Synthese, 101, pp. 401-431, 1994. 
37
 Here I borrow the expression “extensive” from the article “Extensive enactivism: Why keep 
it all in?” (Hutto, Kirchhoff, Myin 2014) and from Hutto and Myin’s book Radicalizing 
enactivism (Hutto, Myin 2013, Chapter 7) in order to avoid the problems the expression 
“extended” entails. Those problems have been already discussed in Chapter I, §9. This is my 
personal terminological choice. Indeed, some scholars which argue in favor of cognition/mind-
extension from an enactivist perspective or from a Radical Embodied view of cognition, and 
not from a functionalist one, seem not considering this kind of problem (e.g. Chemero 2009: 
31-32; Colombetti 2015).  
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sciences depends on two philosophical claims built on the concept of 
representation. The classical cognitivist-fashioned argumentation is this one.  
 
i) Representations distinguish the mind from the rest of the world. A 
state can be considered to be a mental state (namely a cognitive state, 
conceived as a propositional attitude that causes behavior) when it is 
endowed with a content that represents what is outside of the mind, 
namely when it establishes a mediation between the cognitive agent 
and the environment.   
ii) Cognitive representations set the boundaries of the mind within the 
limits of the brain. Representations can be defined as mental if and 
only if they vehicle naturalistically determined (namely non-derived) 
contents (Menary 2010c: 15). If a process does not involve intrinsic 
content, then it cannot be considered to be cognitive (Adams, 
Aizawa 2010b: 70). Indeed, representations that bear contents in 
virtue of norms socially established (think about road signs, written 
language, tags, and so on) have a representational function that is 
derivative only: their meaning-bearing feature is “parasitic” (Clark 
2010b: 48 for this expression), not original. Their “standing-for” is a 
feature that is ascribed to them from the outside. Then, according 
to those philosophical views, to talk about cognition properly, we 
should seek for items whose representational function is original, 
underived. Those representations are identified with neural states 
(Adams, Aizawa 2001; 2009; 2010a; 2010b): they are biological 
resources that naturally stand for the inputs that activated them. 
Developing their argumentation in this way, classical explanations of 
the mind, and also more recent brain-bounded approaches to 
cognition, exclude any possibility for mind-extension.  
 
Now, as sketched out in the previous chapter, the EMH brings into question 
the very idea that intrinsic content is a necessary condition to talk about 
cognitive processes properly and, at many explanatory levels, it rejects the idea 
that neural representations are the very core elements of cognitive processes. 
Nevertheless, it claims that there are some cases in which cognitive systems 
strongly rely on internal representations (e.g. when the cognitive system reasons 
about the counterfactual and the abstract; when the cognitive system deals with 
an informationally noisy context). Those kinds of internal representations are 
reworked in order to meet the core ideas of the EMH: they are said to be highly 
context-sensitive and action-oriented. Despite this reassessment of mental 
representations, I think that this philosophical move does not actually hit the 
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spot: the way the EMH thinks of representations still entails some of the 
problems classical notions of representation suffered from (e.g. it still accounts 
for cognition as the ownership of mental states and not as an activity). This is a 
flaw in the argumentative structure of the EMH, and it undermines the general 
project of “mind-extending”.   
Before considering the problem of “active representations” in the “4Es” 
literature in detail, taking into account the EMH proposal and the objections 
against this view made by enactive approaches to cognition, it is worth to offer 
a short introduction to the philosophical ground the idea of active 
representation comes from. This is useful to understand why some theorists 
think that we still need a minimal form of representationalism. Therefore, I 
will devote this paragraph to a general discussion of the enactivist anti-
representationalist stance and to consider the reasons that persuade some of 
the voices of the “4E cognition” debate to re-introduce mental representations 
as epistemic posits.   
 
As already explained, the enactive approach to cognition describes the mind 
as a relational process through which, in virtue of the transactions between the 
organism and the environment, sense (namely “living meaning”, a direction for 
action) is created. In other words, the mind is explained as generating structure 
(namely what I explained in my discussion of the problem of normativity in 
relation to the concept of Umwelt) through action. The mind is made of the 
continuity of the organism’s actions in an environment that, by means of those 
interactions, becomes part of a coupled, structured and structuring system, 
made out of the human cognitive agent and the space of salience of her 
activities. The mind is then understood as a process of creation (Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch 1991: 148), as the enactment of meaningful relations, which 
cognitively define both the agent and the world.  
This explanation radically differs from what Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
define “cognitive realism”. Cognitive realism claims that “the world can be 
divided into regions of discrete elements and tasks” (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 
1991: 147), namely into sections that have certain given (functional and 
computational) properties.
38
 Mind and world, according to cognitive realism 
(which the authors of The Embodied Mind identify with approaches to 
cognition such as cognitivism), should be described as independent the one 
from the other (Zahidi 2014: 461). There is a given world, endowed with its 
own properties, and a mind, different from the world in its materiality, features, 
properties and functions. Given this independence of mind and world, the 
                                                          
38
 It is worth to notice that, following what I said in §I.9, the EMH in Clark’s version fits with 
this definition of cognitive realism, and then it can be criticized relying on this enactivist 
argument.  
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mind, in order to acquire a cognitive grip on the world in which it acts, is said 
to internally represent properties, features and aspects of the world. By means 
of mental representations, human agents re-present, that is make present again, 
what is already present in the external world.  
As noticed in the discussion offered in §I.7, the concept of enaction is a 
critical reaction to this picture of the mind entailed by cognitive realism. My 
discussion of the role played by the context in cognitive processes, in which I 
metaphorically recalled the idea of the relation between figure and background 
according to Gestalt psychology, was precisely aimed at making this point clear. 
Conceiving of the space of cognitive practices not as an objective space 
endowed with pre-given properties, but rather as an Umwelt, the enactive 
approach to cognition gives a justification to the choice of cleaning up its 
explanatory framework from representations. The Umwelt is not a world that 
has pre-definite boundaries, but it is rather a negotiable space in which 
meanings vary according to the possibilities of action of an embodied agent, 
who is defined by the historicity of her personal situated experience. That is 
why cognition is said not being dependent on internal representations that 
mirror an external structure. The world where cognitive practices take place 
does not actually “exist” before the enactment of those cognitive practices.  
Then, according to Enactivism, it follows that there is nothing to re-present, 
namely to make present again, but there is a lot to create. As I explained at 
length in §I.7, there is a coupled system that has to be organized, namely 
brought forth. There is a space of meanings, of salience, invitations for action, 
which has to be created. And also, and crucially, there is a basic and 
fundamental “knowledge how”, an implicit “readiness to hand” (Varela, 
Thompson, Rosch 1991: 148) that has to be first achieved, and then enriched 
through experience. To explain this last point better, I would say that, in order 
to make the continuous looping
39
 between the organism and the environment 
possible, namely to guarantee the continuity of life and cognition, not only the 
environment has to be structured, organized in a certain way, viz. in a way 
suitable to satisfy the organism’s needs, but also the organism itself has to 
acquire a set of habit-based skills able to actualize the structural attunement 
between the agent and the environment. This is to say, through experience 
(where “experience” corresponds to “practice”), not only the world is 
structured in a certain way (e.g. as a habitat for the development of the 
organism’s life; as a familiar space, disseminated of the products of a culture) 
                                                          
39
 “Looping” is an expression that is more common in the literature about the Extended Mind 
(e.g. Clark 2008; Clark 2001; Clark 1997; Clark 1998) than in the enactive literature. 
Nevertheless, recently it has been used also by philosophers that endorse a critical stance 
towards the EMH (e.g. Noë 2015). To me, “looping” is a good word to refer to the 
intertwinement of the agent and the environment, because it accounts for its processual nature, 
it points to the continuity of these processes, and it points also to the realm of activities.  
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but also the human agent is changed, modified or organized in a certain way. 
Experience makes the agent able to support the dynamical balance with the 
contingent fluctuations of the environment (Cappuccio, Froese 2014: 5), 
endowing her with a fundamental kind of practical knowledge that makes her 
actions attuned to, and then relevant in an Umwelt. This one is not conceived 
as a physical space only, as a perceptual space or as a motor space, but it is also 
social and cultural. It is an Umwelt that people share in their being human and 
in their being shaped by culture (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991:  172-173).  
 
Here it is very important to pay attention to the term “attunement”. As 
already sketched out in §I.7, when the enactive approach to cognition explains 
how human agents have or acquire a grip on their reality, sometimes it describes 
this process in terms of attunement (e.g. Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014; 
Cappuccio, Wheeler 2012; Degenaar, O’Regan 2015; Hutto 2006; Gallagher 
2017; Ward, Stapleton 2012 for the use of this expression). Enactivism does 
not appeal to the idea of correspondence between the subject’s internal states 
and states of affairs or events of the world, correspondence whose “efficacy 
conditions” depend on an internal representational content which can or 
cannot fit with what is out there, in the external world. 
It is interesting to notice that “attunement” is not a new expression in the 
history of philosophy. Looking at its use in another philosophical approach can 
be useful to understand what “attunement” means in the enactive framework. 
“Attunement” is a translation of the word Befindlichkeit40. Befindlichkeit, 
according to the terminology of Heidegger’s Being and Time,41 is the 
fundamental “characteristic of finding oneself in a world through a mood” 
(Ratcliffe 2013: 157). Attunement is a fundamental existentiale. It pertains to 
the ontological constitution of Dasein. This means that it is not conceived as 
something that is experienced or owned as a state of mind by a psychological 
                                                          
40
 Other ways to translate Befindlichkeit in English are “disposedness”, “sofindingness”, 
“affectedness” (see Ratcliffe 2013 for a more detailed discussion of this point).  
41
 At first glance it could seem to be the case that this introduction of the term “attunement” in 
relation to Heidegger’s work is not consistent with the discussion I am offering here, which 
focuses on Philosophy of Mind and on Philosophy of Cognitive Sciences. Nevertheless, I think 
that this consideration is misleading. This for three reasons. First, enactivism is strongly 
influenced by the phenomenological tradition, of which Heidegger is a leading figure. This, at 
least at a general level of analysis, justifies the idea of considering some Heideggerian concepts 
to understand the philosophical roots of the problem I am dealing with. Moreover, although 
many works that endorse an enactivist perspective consider Merlau-Ponty’s thought more than 
Heidegger’s one, recent works in philosophy of cognitive science take Heidegger’s work as an 
important source for the development of their research (e.g. Malpas 2000; Kiverstein, Wheeler 
2012). Third, the issue I am considering in this chapter (namely new ways of conceiving of 
mental representations) has its roots in a discussion about non-representational artificial 
intelligence developed in Heideggerian terms (Dreyfus 2002; Dreyfus 2008; Cappuccio, 
Wheeler 2012; Wheeler 2005).  
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subject, nor it is experienced “out there”, in the world. Contrarily, attunement 
means “being part of a world that is pre-subjective and pre-objective, [and] all 
‘states of mind’ and all cognitions of ‘external’ things presuppose this 
background sense of belonging to a world” (Ratcliffe 2013: 157-158; text into 
brackets added). To put it in other words, “attunement” is what lays the 
foundations of our possibility of being engaged (viz. knowing how to cope) with 
the different practical meanings that worldly situations offer. Indeed, 
“attunement” refers to the ontological structure thanks to which meanings can 
be appreciated as “inextricable from our actual and potential activities” 
(Ratcliffe 2013: 158). “Being attuned” means finding ourselves as sensitive, 
responsive, ready to act upon the world in a certain, meaningful, way. This 
ability that Befindlichkeit founds is not a kind of propositional, intellectual-like, 
or “staring-like” knowledge about the world, but it is rather pre-theoretical, and 
it is always and already practical.  
There is a passage from Being and Time that could be useful to explain this 
point better. Heidegger writes:  
 
“the less we just stare at the hammer-Thing, and the more we seize hold of 
it and use it, the more primordial does our relationship to it become, and 
the more unveiledly is it encountered as that which it is—as equipment” 
(Heidegger 1927/1962: 98) 
 
Heidegger claims that our primordial relationship with the world, namely 
the most important way the encounter between the agent and the world unfolds 
by, takes place in practice. In the average everydayness of experience, that is 
what “4Es” approaches to cognitive sciences would define as ordinary cognitive 
experience (and, as explained in §I.2, this is what second-wave cognitive science 
aims at studying), we do not passively stare at what is in front of us. We do not 
encounter discrete objects, things that we should intellectually discover, by 
objectifying their features, namely by describing how they look, saying that they 
serve this or that purpose, and so on. On the contrary, in virtue of the 
constitutive ontological dimension of attunement, we encounter the world as 
ready-to-hand or as being-at-hand (Zuhanden), as actively graspable, and then 
as always and already cognitively graspable through action, and, in the case of 
the hammer, through manipulative action.  
Explaining what Heidegger says in the passage cited above, I would say that 
when we encounter a hammer, instead of looking at it and asking ourselves 
“what is it for?”, and answering to that question by saying “it’s just a hammer”42, 
ordinarily, we just use it, we inter-act, we pre-reflectively act-with the hammer 
                                                          
42 This passage is adapted from Richard Schmitt’s article “Heidegger’s Analysis of ‘Tool’” 
(Schmitt 1965: 73).  
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because we are disposed (attuned) to react to the “hammering of the hammer” 
(Schmitt 1965: 75). This is to say that we encounter the world as a rich field of 
‘in-order-to’s. We encounter objects that point to their manipulability, they 
display their goal-directedness, and, in doing so, they point to the significance 
of the possible world-engaging practices our experience unfolds by.   
We are open to, or, to use Heidegger’s terminology, we are “thrown in a 
world” of possible practical meanings. By the phrase “practical meaning” I refer 
to the possibility of making sense of the world through actions, where the 
condition of possibility of those actions has to be found in our circumspective 
way (Umsicht) to look (sicht means “sight”) at the world, or better, of being 
engaged with the world.  
Now, what has been said about the hammer can be somehow extended to 
all objects in humans’ practices. Obviously, the hammer is a peculiar case study, 
because its being a tool makes its constitutive feature of “pointing to” to the web 
of human practices more clear. Nevertheless, what Heidegger says about 
attunement, circumspection and practice seems to make sense for any kind of 
encounter with the world. Indeed, according to a Heideggerian perspective, the 
encounter with the phenomenological reality is said to be tuned by a kind of 
mattering (Ratcliffe 2013: 159). Things show up as “this” or “that”, they stand 
out as distinct the one from other, because they matter for this or that kind of 
practice. They are relevant to the context because they matter, and their 
appearing as mattering is dependent on that Umsicht, on that practical and 
primordial look through which the world and the web that connects things in 
the world is lived and acted.  
To explain this point in another way, it can be said that the world shows up 
as meaningful and as something that matters through action (or through the 
possibility of action). Actions are performed in a way that has a relevance that 
pertains the context of practice because there is a practical, pre-reflective, non-
intellectual background knowledge that makes us sensitive to contextual 
relevance.  
 
Now, a similar approach to the issue of practical knowledge and to the way 
this makes the cognitive agent sensitive to contexts, namely it makes her ready 
to act meaningfully in a given context (then “actualizing a condition of 
attunement”), can be found in some enactivist approaches to cognition.  
As said previously, it is common to find the expression “attunement” in the 
enactivist literature. Even if enactivist scholars do not always endorse an 
existential perspective as the Heideggerian one and they do not explain 
“attunement” relying on an ontological dimension, their way of thinking of this 
idea recalls some of the points that I briefly sketched out here.  
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According to the enactive approach to cognition, thanks to the repeated 
interactions of the agent with her Umwelt, the agent acquires a set of skills that 
she habitually displays during her practices. This makes the practical 
attunement between the agent and the environment continuous, spontaneous, 
taken for granted, unreflective in practice.  
To the enactive approach to cognition, the concept of skill, which seems to 
play the same epistemic role of Heidegger’s concept of circumspection, is firstly 
understood in its fundamental relation to the body: skills are embodied.  
This embodied conception of skill is already sketched out in The Embodied 
Mind by Varela, Thompson and Rosch. The authors of the book talk about 
motor skills (Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991: 147) as the fundamental 
embodied ability that makes agents able to cope with a changing environment, 
foreshadowing the huge debate about sensorimotor approaches to perception 
that is now one of the heated subjects of second-wave cognitive sciences’ 
debate.  
Here is my way to unpack their argument. If it is true that, in some particular 
cases, cognitive experiences (conceived as problem-solving tasks) take place in 
a space with defined limits (think about the defined space of chess in chess 
playing tasks, for example), our experience usually develops in a less 
circumscribed domain, whose parts seem to be not defined at all. Moreover –
and this is a crucial point- the environmental space of everyday cognitive 
practices is characterized by a high degree of mutability and unpredictability. 
Given this complexity of the environment where cognitive tasks take place, the 
authors of the book claim that it is unlikely that cognitive agents acquire a grip 
on the reality in which they act by mentally representing it in a detailed way. 
Indeed, the space of the cognitive task is not discrete and its details change 
quickly. Then it is not clear to what extent mental images (representational 
items with defined boundaries) that correspond to the environment or to parts 
of it can be produced efficiently.  
Moreover, given the dynamical and changing nature of that space, if we try 
to explain how the agent grasps her world by representing it, we are forced to 
suppose a really complex system of internal representations, which changes in 
tandem with the worldly domain. This is not epistemically cheap, because this 
kind of explanation requires the agent to be endowed with an extremely 
sophisticated system of internal representations, whose nature is not actually 
clear. How does the individual sensory impressions are connected the one with 
the others? How much work should the mind do in order to produce a 
synthetic image of the perceived space? To what extent and in which way this 
image corresponds to external reality? In which way this static image of the 
external reality affords action in real-time cognition? 
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 Then, it is more intuitive to think of the possibility of coping with the 
changing environment relying on the notion of practical knowledge or knowing-
how, for example describing the activity of successfully moving in a space of 
ever-receding levels of detail by directing bodily movements and by attuning 
them to contingent circumstances in virtue of motor abilities, which structure 
the perceptual space in order to satisfy the cognitive agent’s expectations. For 
example, the agent moves her head, eyes or her whole body to have an access 
to what is present in the world, performing a motor task in a successful way.  
 
This idea according to which the agent’s perceptual attunement with the 
environment is dependent on an implicit knowledge that habitually structures 
the environment is then developed widely in more recent enactivist-fashioned 
approaches to cognition (Noë 2004; Noë 2010; O’Regan, Noë 2001). For 
instance, Alva Noë, in his book Action in Perception, develops a non-
representational account of perception
43
 based on the concept of skill. The 
notion of skill is understood primarily as bodily skill, and it is strictly tied to the 
notion of sensorimotor knowledge (Noë 2004: 12). Indeed, the core idea of 
this approach consists in claiming that, in our perceptual experience, we do not 
represent contents (such as shapes and spatial relations) but we rather enact 
them, and we do so thanks to the mastery of sensorimotor knowledge. 
Sensorimotor knowledge is the practical embodied knowledge of the way the 
spatial relations between the cognitive agent’s body and objects in the 
environment vary according to bodily movements. By moving our body in a 
certain way, we enact “contents” that are virtually present in the environment.  
According to this philosophical stance, perception is like the activity of 
painting, namely a skill-based, world-engaging process of exploration in which 
the eye probes the scene, then it goes back to the painting, and then again to 
the scene, and so on. This comparison between perceptual experience and the 
activity of painting is aimed at explaining that perception takes place in a circle 
in which we do what we perceive, and we do that in a “good way” because we 
“implicitly know”44 the bodies we have. We know how to move around in order 
                                                          
43
 Here it is important to notice that, by recalling the phenomenological tradition, he claims that 
perception founds any kind of cognitive experience, included what we do with concepts (Noë 
2004, Chapter 6). 
44
 It is worth to point out that, at first glance, one could be tempted to interpret this kind of 
knowledge by recalling the concept of image schema, notion I took into account in §I.4. This 
interpretation of the agent’s knowledge of her body, in the case I am taking into account here, 
is misleading. Indeed, the kind of knowledge I am referring to does not entail any residual 
reference to representational contents. Those ones were implied in image-schemas, which were 
defined as “dynamic analog representations of spatial relations and movements in space 
derived from perceptual and motor processes” that are intentional objects of consciousness 
(Gibbs, Colston 1995: 349). In contrast to image-schemas, the kind of knowledge Noë talks 
about is non-representational, and it seems that it can be described well by making use of the 
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to make present what is given as virtual in the environment because we “possess 
the sensorimotor knowledge to be effective in our exploration” (Noë 2004: 75, 
italics added).  
An example that Noë offers is the following one (Noë 2004: 77 and 
followings). Consider an opaque, solid object, like a tomato. When this object 
is seen, it has visible and invisible parts. The agent, since she is always situated 
in the environment in a certain way, namely according to her bodily constitution 
and posture, can see part of the surface of the object only (for example its facing 
side). Now, if we try to explain the perceptual (visual) experience of the tomato 
by considering sensory impressions only (maybe conceived as metal 
representations of the sensory data present in the world), we would probably 
find ourselves in a theoretical situation that sounds a bit paradoxical. If we 
report our perceptual experience of the tomato, we can talk about an object 
that is round, voluminous, three-dimensional. How is this possible? If 
perception was a result of an internal association of representations of sensory 
data, the image of the external object that we would represent would be bi-
dimensional. Bu this is not the case. It seems more luckily that we experience 
parts of the tomato that, strictly speaking, we do not see, and then cannot be 
manipulated by the process of “internal translation” that starts with sensory data 
and ends up with mental images or representations.  
According to Noë, visual experience has this structure (viz. we perceive solid 
objects as solid even if we see them just from one perspective; we perceive 
something that makes sense to our experience even if the bottom-up data alone 
seem to suggest another story) because perception is supported (and made 
possible) by sensorimotor skills. We know how to move our bodies in order to 
make present what is given in a virtual modality in the environment. We 
implicitly know that, if we turn our head a bit, the spatial relation between us 
and the perceived object will change. We implicitly know that we will have 
access to another side of it.  
To unpack this point, Noë writes: 
 
                                                          
concept of body-schema. By “body schema” I mean a “non-conscious performance of the 
body”, a performance that is not an intentional object present to the subject’s consciousness, 
but that is rather a performance by means of which the body acquires a certain kind of 
organization in relation to the environment. “The body schema is an active, operative 
performance of the body, rather than a copy, image, global model, or conception of existing 
parts of the body. […] [It] is the body as it actively integrates its positions and responses in the 
environment” (Gallagher 1986: 542, 548; text into brackets added). Body schemas, rather than 
entailing a kind of intellectual understanding of one’s own body, are the pre-reflective, non-
conscious organization of our bodies in relation to the environment, and consequently in 
relation to our possibility of inter-action with the environment.  
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“To experience the figure as a cube [or as a voluminous object, such as a 
tomato], on the basis of how it looks, is to understand how its look changes 
as you move” (Noë 2004: 77; text into brackets added)  
 
Perception consists in an active process enabled by an implicit, non-
conscious, ready-to-hand practical understanding of the way our actions modify 
how the environment looks like, and then our relation with parts of the context 
of the cognitive practice. Our perceptual experience unfolds smoothly, quickly, 
directly (and this seems to point to a relation of attunement between the 
perceiver and the environment in which the perceptual experience takes place) 
because we are skillful embodied agents that act upon, or act out (enact) the 
environment according to an embodied knowledge that is always present in the 
background of our experience.  
 
This account of perceptual experience is widely accepted by most enactivist 
scholars, and, even if some points of this theory are not widely developed by 
each individual version of enactivism, or they are explained in different terms
45
, 
what all the enactivist scholars consider to be at the core concept of their 
approach is the notion of skill. 
Skill is a concept useful not only to account for perceptual experience, but 
it also lies at the core of explanations of other aspects of cognition, usually 
defined as higher-order cognition. For example, this idea that skills are at the 
very core of our cognitive experience has been developed further in the so-
called enactive tradition to account for more complex kinds of experiences of 
attunement, such as collective practices.  
For example, Gallagher and Ransom, in their article “Artifacting Minds: 
Material Engagement Theory and Joint Action”, integrate some enactivist 
insights with Material Engagement Theory
46
 (MET) to explain how collective 
action takes place. In this article, they endorse a critical stance towards theories 
of joint action that preserve intellectualistic or internalistic traces. They claim 
that, instead of trying to explain collective action by positing a set of 
sophisticated conditions
47
, it is better to endorse a more embodied approach, 
                                                          
45
 See for instance the huge problem of the relation between cognition and consciousness, or 
the use of expressions such as “actual” and “virtual”, very common in Noë’s books but not in 
other enactivist approaches to cognition.  
46
 See for example Malafouris, L. (2013), How things shape the mind. A Theory of Material 
Engagement, Cambridge (MA), The MIT Press.  
47
 Such as individual plans or individual intensions that forerun shared beliefs that structure 
joint action; or the idea that individuals with separate intentions form plural subjects relying on 
normative commitments to act together; or the idea that collective agency takes place when 
there are individuals with interlocking intentions and meshing sub-plans (Gallagher, Ransom 
2015: 341).  
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which also and crucially pays attention to the cultural dimension of skillful inter-
action.  
To explain their argument, it is worth to examine one of the examples they 
offer (Gallagher, Ransom 2015: 345 and ff.). Think about the joint action of 
moving a bookcase. This is a kind of action that - given the bodies we have and 
the material structure of the artifact the action deals with- cannot be performed 
by individuals separately. It is an action whose efficacy heavily depends on the 
coordination of the two subjects’ bodily movements. Moreover, the success of 
the joint action heavily depends on the material structure of the artifact the 
action deals with, and also by the material structure of the environment in which 
the practice takes place. 
For example, to move the bookcase from one room to another, the 
participants of the joint action have to get the bookcase through the door. This 
entails an attunement of movements. I feel that the bookcase starts to go on the 
right, that is your left, and so I automatically change the position of my hands, 
or I change the amount of force to apply to that part of the bookshelf. We 
jointly deal with this practical task thanks to our sensorimotor skills. I react to 
your movements quickly because I implicitly know the possibilities of my body, 
and I feel the possibilities of yours thanks to the manipulation of the material 
artifact. I understand what you are doing (and this matters for the development 
of our joint practical task) because we are jointly manipulating the same object, 
which functions (at least) as a medium for the communication of spatial and 
motor relations.  
Since collective action is not the main topic of this chapter, I will not explain 
the philosophical implications of this approach further. Nevertheless, it is worth 
to notice again how much the enactivist perspective broadly understood
48
 
emphasizes notion of skill (and consequently that of attunement, as I already 
explained). Also when it explains complex cognitive practices, such as collective 
action, it gets rid of internal representations, which, in the domain of study of 
joint action, could be understood in terms of plans mentally represented, as the 
internal representation of the other agent’s intentions, or as the mental 
representations of features of the objects manipulated in the practical 
engagement. The emphasis is rather on skills the agents share. Primarily, 
sensorimotor skills, and then on what can be interpreted, to some extent, as 
“social skills”. 
Focusing on this last idea of skill they write: “In some regard, when I add 
my skills (strengths) to your different set of skills (strengths), we both may gain 
by expanding the affordance space to offer more possibilities” (Gallagher, 
                                                          
48
 I say “broadly understood” because in Gallagher and Ransom’s article there’s a lot of MET, 
theory which combines the enactive approach with distributed, extended cognition and 
cognitive archeology (Malafouris 2013: 3). 
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Ransom 2015: 347). It is in this sense that skills become “social”. Through 
interaction, agents exhibit their skills, and, by showing them, they share them. 
In doing so, they create a new space of affordances, a space that solicits actions 
whose performance was limited or prevented before the joint action took place. 
Think again of the example of the bookcase. The relations between the agent’s 
possibilities of action and the environment
49
 -conceived as situation, namely not 
objectively (i.e. as a physical space that can be described by individuating its 
properties), but as the agent-context system- before the exhibition of joint skills 
are different from those emerging from skillful collective performances. 
Without you, the bookcase in the room points to a different field of 
affordances, namely to different kinds of possible actions, holistically 
connected. The situation taken into account can be described as disseminated 
of invitations for action such as: reading the books situated in the bookcase, 
appreciating the design of the bookcase and its harmonic relation with other 
pieces of furniture in the room, climbing on the bookcase shelves to grab the 
DVDs on the last shelf, and so on. There are many actions that can be 
performed in that situation, but the field of affordances made of the abilities of 
the individual agent and the environmental situation does not afford the action 
“moving the bookcase”. On the contrary, it prevents this action from being 
performed. The skillful joint action changes and enriches this landscape of 
affordances (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014, for the use of the expression “landscape 
of affordances”). The joint activation and coordination of motor skills makes 
actions such as turning the bookcase, lift it, slide it on the floor and so on, 
possible. To put it in other terms, the practical meaning of the object 
“bookcase” changes or is enriched by means of inter-action, because, relying 
on “collective abilities”, the set of actions our relation with the bookcase affords 
changes (namely what can be done with the bookcase changes). A new space 
of meanings, and then for action, is created.  
 
After this short explanation of the role of practical knowledge, skills and 
abilities in cognitive processes according to the enactive approach to cognition, 
some general considerations can be offered. The concepts of implicit practical 
knowledge and that of skill, considered in relation to different cognitive levels 
                                                          
49
 This is an interpretation of the concept of affordance offered by Antony Chemero (Chemero 
2003; Chemero 2009) in order make this notion clearer. Indeed, in its original formulation 
developed in The ecological approach to visual perception by James Gibson (1979), the notion 
of affordance oscillated between being a source of the environment (Gibson 1979/2015: 127) 
and being  the relational space between the agent and the environment (Gibson 1979/2015: 
129). Other contemporary interpretations of the concept of affordance focus more on the 
“invitation-aspect” of parts of the world, which are considered as available resources for 
possible actions (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014: 327, which cite Reed 1996 and Silva, Garganta, 
Araújo, Davids, Agular 2013).  
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(e.g. perception, collective action), seem to play a kind of “foundational” role 
in cognition. We know what we know, and we get to know the world in this 
way, because we are embedded in cognitive situations according to a certain a 
kind of attunement, which is always practical and active. Even perceptual 
experience, which along most part of the history of philosophy was said to entail 
a certain degree of passivity, is explained as an active process grounded on 
practical knowledge.  
This focus on practice, which not only pertains human cognitive abilities, 
but also the way the environment shows up as practically loaded, is strictly 
connected to the issue of representation in cognition, as already sketched out 
taking about Varela’s et al. (Varela et al. 1991) objections against cognitive 
realism. This stress on action in cognition is a reaction to a certain way of 
conceiving of cognitive processes as relying on passive representations, namely 
representations modeled as words, which bear meaning in virtue of their 
standing in appropriate relations to things extrinsic to them, thanks to an 
external action of interpretation performed by something- an interpreter- that 
is “outside” of the representation (Rowlands 2006a: 2). Moreover, this way to 
explain cognition and how the cognitive agent is attuned with her world, 
represents a critique to explanations of cognitive processes that account for the 
relation between agent and world by appealing to internal mediations more in 
general.  
 
Now, as anticipated in Chapter I, this attention paid to practice is not an 
exclusive idea of the enactive approach to cognition. As the outline at the end 
of the chapter shows, the broad project of second-wave cognitive science points 
towards this direction. Nonetheless, it seems to me that there is one approach 
to cognition that tries to be as faithful to practice as Enactivism is: the Extended 
Mind Hypothesis.  
For example, one of Clark’s core ideas is that the mind extends into the 
world thanks to processes of looping, which are grounded in action. Some 
examples of looping are: what we do with pen and paper, performing a mental 
activity in which the “internal realm” and the “external” one reciprocally 
influence each other (Clark 2008: xxv); agents that improve their conceptual 
capacities by manipulating external media, such as material symbols or tags 
(Clark 2005a: 257); improving mathematical skills by manipulating external 
medias, such as an abacus, or more in general, mathematical notations (Clark 
2015: 277).  
The examples taken into account share some characteristic features.  
First, they entail the concept of skill, directly or indirectly. Learning, 
thinking, conceptualizing are dependent on the acquisition of an ability, of a 
kind of knowing-how, that gives sense to practice. To use pen and paper to 
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think, the agent has to be able to manipulate pen and paper, and she has to 
know how to work with arbitrary notations (such as the letters of a language). 
The same things can be said about the example of tags, and about the example 
of mathematical notations.  
Second, all the examples implicitly rely on the idea that skills can be 
acquired and improved because humans structure the environment in a certain 
way. In doing so, the environment becomes a space in which cognitive tasks 
can be performed smoothly, quickly and efficiently. Pen and paper, the abacus, 
symbolic notations modify the cognitive space of our tasks because they offer 
us a space to display our skills smoothly. Skilled agents and scaffolded 
environments constitute what has been called a coupled system, notion that is 
not very far from what I called “attunement”.   
Nevertheless, despite this attention to practical knowledge (conceived in 
terms of skills, active manipulation, action, sensorimotor knowledge and as 
non-verbalized knowledge; Clark 2008, Clark 2015; Ward, Roberts, Clark 
2011), there is a fundamental element that distinguishes this perspective from 
the enactive one. Skillful action is said to be mediated by internal 
representations that, in contrast to classical notions of representation, which 
implied passivity at a certain degree, are said to be active and action-oriented.  
The introduction of the concept of action-oriented representation not only 
depends on the pluralistic frame in which the EMH is developed and on the 
core ideas of this theory (e.g. cognitive impartiality and complementarity), but 
it also constitutes a critical response to the way the enactive/radical embodied 
approach to cognition explains how the cognitive agent and the environment 
are practically attuned.  
The issue that critiques of fully anti-representational accounts of cognitive 
practices consider is the following one. Acknowledged that many of our 
cognitive experiences have a practical core, and acknowledged that our ability 
to cope with our environment depends heavily on the knowing-how that we 
embody, is skill in itself enough to explain how we act meaningfully in a given 
context? Skills are something that cognitive agents acquire through experience: 
skillful agents are endowed with sets of specialized knowing-how, which make 
sense in a particular ad defined context. There is a subtle difference between 
claiming that agents cope with their environments by means of practical 
knowledge and saying that they display exactly that kind of skill that makes their 
actions meaningful, relevant in that particular context (Wheeler 2010a: 333). 
How can we explain the fact that humans usually exhibit the right kind of skill 
the practical situation requires?
50
  
                                                          
50
 This is a formulation of what is called Frame Problem. Broadly speaking, the Frame Problem 
is the problem of cognitive relevance. There are many versions of the frame problem. When 
I talk about a cognitive agent that has to choose among different kinds of skills, I refer to the 
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To understand this point better, it is worth to notice that the kind of practical 
knowledge the word “skill” refers to seems to have two fundamental aspects. 
On the one hand, it is described as an implicit practical knowledge that the 
agents embody. It has a pre-theoretical nature: it becomes habitual through 
experience. That is why the agent does not need to get access to it by means of 
an intellectual act (e.g. by mentally representing the rules this kind of knowledge 
unfolds by; Dreyfus 2002b: 367). This kind of knowledge, trough time, 
becomes part of the agent’s non-reflective, smooth acting in familiar 
environments (Rietveld 2008b). On the other hand, if it is true that this practical 
knowledge is something that agents embody, and in this sense it is something 
agents are endowed with (even if they do not usually speculate about it), it is 
also true that skills heavily depend on the cognitive situation in itself. Skill is a 
kind of situated knowledge, in the sense that it is not only triggered or activated 
by aspects of the environment, but it is also realized in the space between the 
acting agent and the environment. The word “skill” points to a kind of 
relational practical knowledge that is constitutively context-dependent, in the 
sense that occurrences of the habitual knowledge agents embody are solicited, 
activated and made meaningful by what is there, in the environment. In this 
sense, agents can be said to display the right kind of skill in that given situation 
because the practical knowledge I am talking about is relational. It is not just an 
ability agents are endowed with, but it is also something the environment 
affords. What is in the environment is part of the realization of this practical 
knowledge.  
Think again about Uexküll’s “performance qualities”, taken into account in 
§I.7. The core idea of Uexküll’s theory of meaning consisted in claiming that 
the world, conceived as an Umwelt, is not a neutral space, but it is a meaningful 
space endowed with active, practical qualities. The world shows up as active, or 
capable of being activated under certain respects (e.g. the throw-quality of the 
rock, the path-quality of the country road, and so on). In doing so, namely in 
its being active in specific ways (performance qualities), in its entanglement with 
the skillful agent, it realizes a specific kind of knowledge, relevant for that 
peculiar situation. To put that in other words, agents display the right or 
relevant kind of skill during cognitive practices because the environment in 
which their actions unfold actively takes part in the cognitive process, offering 
itself as performatively qualified. 
Now, minimal representationalist theories, at a general level, seem to agree 
with this broad picture of practical cognition. Nevertheless, they are critical 
towards the attempt to explain any cognitive phenomena by endorsing a non-
representational conception of practical knowledge. Indeed, if we focus on the 
                                                          
Epistemological Relevance Problem, which is the problem of how a system knows what is 
relevant in a defined cognitive task. Later, when I will refer to contextual relevance, I will refer 
to what has been called Generalized Relevance Problem, namely the problem of selecting (i.e. 
framing) only relevant information distributed in the context of a cognitive practice (Chow 
2013: 312- 315).  
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relational aspect of this ability, a fundamental, problematic aspect can be 
shown. If it is true that practical knowledge is strictly dependent on the fact the 
world shows itself in a certain way, what about cases in which the world does 
not clearly show up as endowed with this or that “performance quality”? This 
is to say, what about cases in which the context of the cognitive practice is less 
regulated, unruly, or “noisy”? If the core claim of fully-non-representational 
accounts of practical knowledge is that agents display a regular and meaningful 
behavior in situated cognitive practices because the structure of the 
environment directly affords the activation of this or that skill (and this means 
that the agent’s behavior is regulated by the environment), it seems to be the 
case that, if in those complex and unruly contexts agents still display intelligent 
behavior, their actions should be regulated by something else, by something 
that is not in the environment, but rather is in their heads: action-oriented 
representations. 
 
To be accurate, it is worth to notice that, if we take into account the specific 
debate about the nature of practical knowledge (representational vs. non-
representational), we will not see Andy Clark performing the role of the main 
character. Indeed, the discussion about whether practical knowledge, abilities 
and skills conceived as non-representational account for the issue of coping 
with the context or if we still need some kind of representational mediation 
interested other leading figures of philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences: 
Michael Wheeler (Wheeler 2005; 2008b; 2010a; Cappuccio, Wheeler 2012) 
and Hubert Dreyfus (Dreyfus 2002a; 2002b; 2008). This is a specific debate 
that has a Heideggerian flavor, and it has been developed around Dreyfus’ 
attempt to think of a “Heideggerian AI”, namely to a way of doing artificial 
intelligence aimed at producing models of on-line thinking that account for our 
practical, non-intellectual and non-intellectualized “being-in-the-world”51. 
Nevertheless, I think that there are some good reasons to consider this problem 
in relation to the broader literature about the enactive approach to cognition 
and the EMH.  
First, these two approaches to cognition confronted in the debate, 
Wheeler’s one and Dreyfus’ one, are theoretically connected to the enactive 
version of Embodied Cognition and the Extended Mind. Considering 
                                                          
51
  Dreyfus refers to Rodney Brooks and colleagues’ project developed the MIT Mobile Robot 
Laboratory. The idea of this project can be summed up by the slogan “Fast, cheap and out of 
control!”. Indeed, the aim of Brooks and colleagues’ work was building robotic creatures 
(Mobots) able to display intelligent and adaptive behavior without being controlled by a rich 
centralized representational system, considered to be not cheap for both theoretical and 
practical purposes (design). For a more detailed explanation of the project, see Brooks 1989; 
1990; 1991; 1995; 1998.  
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Wheeler’s approach, it is easy to individuate an affiliation with Clark’s thought, 
because Wheeler himself explicitly endorses some core ideas of the EMH (e.g. 
Wheeler 2010b, about mind extension and extended functionalism). In 
contrast, Dreyfus’ case is more complex. Indeed, Dreyfus does not make use 
of the label “enactivism”. Nevertheless, his embodied approach to cognition 
centered on practice and action is not at odds with the core ideas of the enactive 
perspective, according to the interpretation of it I gave till now.  
Second, the problems at the core of this debate are considered in the 
broader discussion about AORs by scholars who endorse an enactive approach 
to cognition and the mind (Rietveld 2008a; 2012a; Gallagher 2017). Moreover, 
Clark himself (Clark, Toribio 1994; Clark, Grush 1999; Clark 1997a), when he 
discusses the role of active representations in cognition, frames the problem by 
taking into account the relation between skillful coping and representational 
formats. Then, it seems that not only Wheeler’s discussion about AORs is an 
attempt to respond to the philosophical problem I took into account here (the 
frame problem), but also Clark’s view of AORs has a lot to do with this issue. 
 
After this discussion of the philosophical reasons that encourage some 
scholars to consider AORs, I take into account some arguments of the debate 
in more detail. This survey has three main aims.  
First, it aims at understanding if we really need representations to account 
for skillful cognitive activities, here conceived as action-perception loops.  
Second, it is an attempt to wonder whether those new approaches to 
representation in cognition are actually able to account for action in 
representation, answering both to the worries of orthodox cognitive sciences, 
which claim that there cannot be cognitive science without representations, and 
to the embodied/enactive view, which suggests cognitive sciences and 
philosophy of mind to seriously go back to action and practice.  
Third, this exam of the role of representations in cognitive process would 
like to be a chance to think about the problem of mind-extension again, 
wondering whether AORs support the development of this theoretical project, 
or if they rather prevent explanations to come to this radical conclusion about 
the nature of the mind.  
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II.3 Cognitive experience is just being there…plus Action Oriented 
Representations. Clark’s approach to AORs.  
 
 
“Ninety percent of life […] is just being there; and we have indeed charted 
lots of ways in which the facts of embodiment and environmental location 
bear substantial weight in explaining our adaptive success. […] [But] we 
should not be too quick to reject the more traditional explanatory 
apparatuses of computation and representation. Minds may be essentially 
embodied and embedded and still depend crucially on brains which 
compute and represent.” (Clark, 1997a: 143; text into brackets added) 
 
Andy Clark, despite acknowledges that most part of our lives is “just being 
there” (that is to say that our lives primarily unfold through the embodied, 
practical and smooth engagement with the world), claims that our “being there” 
has to be explained by making use of some classical concepts of orthodox 
cognitive science: computation and representation.  
His core idea can be put in this way: our cognitive practices are embodied 
and embedded and, precisely in virtue of these features, we should claim that 
cognition unfolds relying on representations that account for embodiment and 
embeddedness. Those kinds of representations are called “action-oriented 
representations”. 
According to Clark, Action-Oriented Representations (AORs) radically 
differ from classic “chunky”, explicit, symbolic representations because, instead 
of 
 
i) being representations whose key contents are tokenable strings of 
symbols, operated upon by a ‘read/write/copy’ architecture (Clark, 
Toribio 1994: 403), 
and instead of  
ii) re-presenting (i.e. mirroring, or accurately describing) properties of 
the world, 
 
AORs simultaneously describe aspects of the world and prescribe possible 
actions. They are neither passive, crystallized pictures of properties of the 
external reality, nor pure control structures. On the contrary, they are poised 
between these two “cognitive slices” (Clark 1997a: 49). Moreover, they are 
described as “local”, “action-dependent”, and as reflecting “the profound role 
of bodily motion […] in shaping and simplifying the information-processing 
problems to be solved” (Clark 1997a: 149). 
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To understand what Clark means by action oriented representations better, 
I think that it is worth to start my discussion trying to understand what 
prescriptive and descriptive functions of AORS are. To consider this point, it 
could be interesting to look at one of the sources that Clark considers in his 
discussion (Clark 1997a: 50; 238, footnote 5): Ruth Millikan’s Pushmi-Pullyu 
Representations.  
Millikan describes Pushmi-Pullyu Representations (PPRs) as 
representations that, despite are not the sum of a descriptive function and of a 
directive function, face both those ways at once. To make this point more clear, 
I give a closer look at the meaning of “descriptive” and “directive”, by 
considering the example that opens Millikan’s article Pushmi-Pullyu 
Representations (Millikan 1995: 185-186).  
Consider a list of groceries. This one can be used for two distinct purposes. 
It might be used as a shopping list, which tells what to buy, or it can be used as 
an inventory list, which tells what has been bought. The list, considered in the 
first sense, has a directive function: it tells us what to do in order to accomplish 
a task. Moreover, it makes a normative claim (in the sense explained in §I.7) 
about the world, according to which the world is supposed to conform to the 
representation: if the shopping list does not match what the grocery bag 
contains, it is what is in the bag that is at fault. On the contrary, if the grocery 
list is used as inventory list, the function the two elements of the normative 
relation have is inverted: the representation is supposed to conform to the 
world, namely if the list does not match what the grocery bag contains, it is the 
list that is at fault. Indeed, the shopping list used as an inventory list describes 
what is the case in the world.  
PPRs have both these two dimensions: they tell us what to do, by saying what 
is the case.  
Another example of PPR is the following one (Millikan 1995: 190-192): the 
food call of a hen to its brood, whose function is to make the chicks coming to 
the place where food is. What is the structure of this very primitive 
representation? The call is evidently directive. It says something like “come 
here and eat”. On the other hand, the representation has in itself the condition 
for the successful performance of the task (coming there and eating food). 
Indeed, when it directs action, it simultaneously says “here’s food now”. It gives 
information about the spatial location of the food, by describing a state of 
affairs. What is interesting is that such a representation does not merely mirror 
external reality, but by saying what is in the world, affords a specific kind of 
action. It connects directly with action because its nature is action-oriented. 
This goal-directedness makes the representation vary as a direct function of a 
certain variation in the environment, “directly translating the shape of the 
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environment into the shape of a certain kind of conforming action” (Millikan 
1995: 190).  
According to Millikan, pushmi-pullyu representations are also interesting 
conceptual tools to explain human cognition. For instance, intentions could be 
considered to be PPRs. Millikan considers intentions as internal states, as 
internal representations that have a directive nature (viz. they cause a certain 
kind of behavior). Nevertheless, she claims that explaining them only as 
directive is misleading. Indeed, it is commonly accepted that a person cannot 
actually intend something without believing that she will do that action. Then, 
if intention implies having a belief that P, then these kinds of representation 
have also a descriptive nature: the representational content of the belief 
describes what will be done. 
Another example of PPRs are perceptual representations. Those ones are 
mental representations that map variations of the agent’s perceived world by 
encoding those variations as possible perceptual actions: they map “variations 
in goals directly onto the represented future world” (Millikan 1995: 192). This 
is to say, perceptual pushmi pullyu representations function as proxies of future 
perceptual situations: they represent how the world will look like when the 
agent will act upon it.  
 
This last example of pushmi-pullyu representation is particular interesting 
for the purposes of this paragraph. Indeed, it seems to me that what Clark calls 
“Action-Oriented Representation” is precisely what Millikan calls “pushmi-
pullyu perceptual representation”. To understand this point, it is worth to have 
a look at the first example of Action-Oriented  
Representation that Clark gives in his book Being there: Maja Mataric’s work 
on mobots.  
At the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Mataric and colleagues 
worked on a project in AI aimed at designing a neurobiologically-flexible spatial 
representational model, which scientists implemented and tested on a physical 
autonomous mobile robot.
52
 Mataric’s mobot works in this way (Clark 1997a: 
47 and ff.). It uses a set of quasi-independent layers, and each one constitutes 
a process route from inputs to outputs. Each layer works on a specific part of 
the environment. One generates boundary tracing (the walls the robot follows 
while it avoids obstacles); another one detects landmarks, registered as a 
combination of the robot’s motion and its sensory inputs, and a third layer uses 
this information to produce a map of the environment. Those representations 
constitute what is called a cognitive map. This one is made of a network of 
landmarks, which are a combination of motor and sensory readings. The nodes 
                                                          
52 See Mataric 1991 for a detailed description of the project.  
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of the map process information in parallel: an active node excites the nodes in 
the area nearby, generating expectations of the next landmarks that will be 
encountered in the map.  
The basic idea of this model is that the cognitive maps the robot makes use 
of are made of nodes that combine descriptive information about the robot’s 
own movement with perceptual information: this makes the map working as a 
controller for the robot’s action. Moreover, by mapping the relation between 
information about the robot’s movement and perceptual information about the 
environment using the propagation of signals among nodes, the cognitive map 
generates plans for real movement, making the robot able to react to real-time 
environmental conditions.  
If I understand the description of Mataric’s robot that Clark gives well, I 
think that it is possible to claim that the robot’s cognitive maps are very similar 
to what Millikan describes by the expression “perceptual Pushmi-Pullyu 
Representations. Cognitive maps have this function: by generating plans for real 
movements, they internally simulate
53
 what should be done by the robot in the 
environmental space, making it ready to cope with changes (e.g. angles, 
obstacles, and so on) in its perceptual real-time space. Then, the idea is that the 
robot successfully copes with its environment because it internally represents 
what it can do during the engagement with the real world, encoding perceptual 
signals as possibilities or “orders” for action. 
Now, action-oriented representations in human cognition, according to 
Clark, are really close to Mataric’s cognitive maps. They are internal 
                                                          
53 It is worth to notice that Clark does not use the concept of simulation here. Nevertheless, it 
seems to me that “simulation” is a concept that fits with the general theoretical frame in which 
Clark discusses representations. For example, in the article he wrote with Grush in 1999 (Clark, 
Grush, “Towards a Cognitive Robotics”, Adaptive Behavior, 7(1), pp. 5-16), which 
foreshadows many of the ideas developed by Clark in more recent publications, the example 
given in order to defend a form of minimal robust representationalism is the emulator one. An 
emulator is a mechanism (circuitry, software routine, and so on) that takes information about 
the starting (or current) state of a system and about the control commands issued as its inputs, 
and then gives a prediction of the next state of the system, by representing it as an output (Clark, 
Grush 1999: 4). This prediction sounds like a simulation of the state in which the system will 
be when it will do something according to the motor commands issued. This interpretation of 
the simulative power of those representations is not aimed at claiming that emulator theories 
and simulation theories conflate the one on the other. As Grush explains (Grush 2004), 
simulation theory and the emulator one differ because the first one usually claims that motor 
commands are just simulated, the latter claims that those controls are executed. Nevertheless, 
it seems to me that in Clark’s explanation there is a simulative aspect: the representations is a 
proxy of states that action in the environment will provide to the system. This interpretation of 
the simulative aspect of those representations can be also supported by considering Clark’s 
more recent work on Predictive Processing. For instance, in Clark 2013b, he talks about action 
planning and action-selection in terms of simulation (“simulations that allow us to explore 
possible course of future action”), and he mentions Clark, Grush 1999 in this discussion (Clark 
2013b: 1-2).  
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personalized representational states, conceived as neural encodings, which map 
idiosyncratic, locally effective features to guide behavior (Clark 1997a: 151).  
Clark considers them to be the most evolutionary and developmentally basic 
kinds of representations (Clark 1997a: 152) because they seem to be at the core 
of humans’ fundamental and primordial cognitive activity: reacting selectively 
to environmental stimuli, which are complex and unruly (Clark, Toribio 1994: 
419). This allows the agent to display the right kind of behavior in a given 
situation.  
AORs are defined as:  
 
a) action-specific because they are tailored to the production of the specific 
behavior required (they are the mental antecedent or a simulation of an action 
performed on-line, in the real world);  
b) egocentric, because they encode features of the environment in a way that 
accounts for the robot’s history of sensorimotor experiences, namely features 
of the environment are represented as intertwined with memories of bodily 
motions;  
c) intrinsically context-dependent, because context is “woven into the 
representation-using mechanism’s basic operating principles” (Wheeler 2010a: 
326). This is to say that AORs co-vary with external states, explaining how 
something inside the agent is about something outside the agent (Chemero 
2009: 50).  
 
Then, AORs seem to be perceptual pushmi-pullyu representations 
“neurally located”. They encode perceptions as motor commands tailored to 
selected features of the environment: they are said to guide action because they 
represent parts of the environment as cognitive maps endowed with a conative 
power
54
. Indeed, like Millikan’s representations, those internal descriptions of 
selected parts of the perceptual array have a “you must do” nature, and they 
are endowed with this feature because of their semiotic structure. They are 
indexical or deictic representations
55
. They are entities that relate specifically to 
the agent and they have a functional value because they play a specific role in 
the activity the agent is engaged in. They are not objective, they are not tokens 
of a symbolic type, but they rather point to different situated objects (adapted 
from Agre 1997: 243). By referring to those specific objects as they are 
perceived by the agent, they make her ready to react, to perceptually engage 
                                                          
54
 This is a liberal use of the expression “conative aspect of pragmatic representations”, found 
in Nanay 2013: 20.  
55  This is my development of Clark’s short explanation of AORs, motivated by the connection 
between AORs, Millikan’s pushmi-pullyu representations and Agre’s deictic representations 
that he individuates (Clark 1997: 152).  
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with those objects without making complex operations of subsumption of the 
singular represented item under the concept that explains it. AORs are 
perceptual in the sense that they represent this or that individual object, with its 
perceptual features, and specific sensorimotor commands, which are 
constrained by the situation in which the object represented is embedded, and 
by the history of the agent’s previous situated experiences.  
That is why those internal representations are said to be embodied and 
embedded
56: “they stand for what’s happening to me, right here, right now” 
(Chemero 1998). They are embodied because they represent perceptual 
stimuli as tied to the agent’s sensorimotor experience, and they are embedded 
because the prescriptive representation of motor commands also encodes 
information about the local, specific environment, where by the expression 
“local environment” I refer to the agent’s peripersonal space. Moreover, they 
are active: the content of those representations activates a disposition towards 
embodied actions.  
 
At a general level, it seems possible to claim that the reason why Clark talks 
about mental representations as embedded, embodied and action-specific is 
the one taken into account at the beginning of my discussion about second-
wave cognitive sciences, in §I.4: the symbol grounding problem. The argument 
pro “grounded representations” was the following one: in order to account for 
cognition as a situated and active process, scientists should i) put action, ii) the 
body, and iii) the specificity of the context in representational mechanisms. In 
doing so, according to Clark’s approach to cognition, representations should 
be also consistent with an extended explanation of the mind, precisely because 
mental representational activities are conceived as dependent on parts of the 
cognitive machinery that are not embedded within the boundaries of the skull.  
More specifically, the way Clark thinks of action-oriented representations 
seems to be an attempt to get rid of any highly intellectualistic and abstract 
conception of cognition, project that characterizes his philosophical 
production.
57
  
Nevertheless, despite this attempt to get rid of the intellectualism of classical 
cognitive sciences, Clark’s endorsement of AORs seems to hide a bit of 
conservationism, whose reasons, to me, are not always clear to understand.  
Indeed, looking at his book Being there, it can be found out that AORs have 
been introduced in Clark’s explanation as a critique to Gibson’s theory of direct 
perception. About this point Clark says:  
 
                                                          
56
 See Rupert 2009: 200 for the expression “embedded representations”. 
57
 See for example Clark 1997 Chapter 2; Clark 2016a Chapter 4; Ward, Roberts, Clark 2011.  
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“A related view of internal representation was pioneered by the psychologist 
James Gibson (1950,1968,1979). This work made the mistake, however, of 
seeming to attack the notion of complex mediating inner states tout court. 
Despite this rhetorical slip, Gibsonian approaches are most engagingly seen 
only as opposing the encoding or mirroring view of internal representation. 
Gibson's claim, thus sanitized, was that perception is not generally mediated 
by action-neutral, detailed inner-world models. It is not mediated by inner 
states which themselves require further inspection or computational effort 
(by some other inner agency) in order to yield appropriate actions. This is 
not, then, to deny the existence and the importance of mediating inner states 
altogether” (Clark 1997a: 50). 
 
If I understand well what Clark says, it seems that AORs should be 
considered to be pervasive epistemic posits, in the sense that any perceptual 
episode should be said to be guided by those internal structures.  
Nonetheless it is not actually clear to me why, according to Clark, we need 
action-oriented representations to account for the relation between action and 
perception. Indeed, Clark only says that the attack to the notion of internal 
representation tout court is just a rhetorical slip, and later he says that the anti-
representationalism of what he calls “Radical Embodied Cognition” (REC) is 
unwarranted and counterproductive, because “it invites competition where 
progress demands cooperation” (Clark 1997a: 149). Later, to provide some 
arguments to justify the claim that anti-representationalism is unwarranted, he 
states that REC rejects representations tout court because:  
 
i) it sticks to a narrow concept of mental representation (i.e. amodal, 
chunky, symbolic and explicit), without considering the possibility of 
explaining cognition as a continuum of representational degrees (see 
also Clark, Toribio 1994);  
ii) it is concerned with cognitive phenomena that are not 
representation-hungry enough (Clark 1997a: 149) - namely cases 
that involve simply physically present and simply specifiable 
parameters” (Clark, Toribio 1994: 412)- and inferring from this that 
cognition, in general, does not unfold through internal 
representations.  
 
Considering the first point, it can be said that this claim could sound true 
only if we consider Being There only. Clark has been one of the first scholars 
to introduce the term “action-oriented representation”. At that time, the debate 
about AORs was not widely developed, so anti-representationalist approaches 
to cognition Clark refers to in 1997 actually reacted to classical views of 
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representations, and not to embodied-embedded representations. Obviously, 
while the debate went on, objections directed specifically against the concept of 
AORs have been raised. I will consider these objections in the following 
paragraphs.  
The second point, namely the idea that REC considers only cases that are 
not representation hungry enough and then endorses an anti-
representationalist approach to cognition is trickier, and it needs to be taken 
into account more seriously.  
As previously said, in Being there, Clark develops the concept of action-
oriented representation to reassess in a representational fashion Gibson’s idea 
that perception is an activity that takes place through the relation between an 
embodied and moving agent and her environment. Hence, as I said before, 
AORs seems to be an occasion to state that perceptual experiences, that is 
cognitive processes usually considered as low-level cognition, always unfold 
relying on AORs. The on-line, real-time, and active cognitive phenomenon of 
perception requires the mediation of internal representations in order to be 
explained. Indeed, according to Clark, the idea that perception is direct (i.e. 
non-representational, non-inferential, not internally regulated) is misleading: 
claiming that perception is direct is just a rhetorical device aimed at dismissing 
the idea that perception lays in the realm of passivity. 
To me, the idea of representation-hunger makes Clark’s endorsement of 
Minimal Robust Representationalism (Clark, Grush 1999) - namely the idea 
that our “being there” should be explained by relying on action-oriented, 
egocentric, and context-dependent representations – unclear.   
Indeed, the idea of representation-hunger seems to implicitly suggest that 
some cognitive situations (although they are probably many, according to 
Clark) require internal representations to be explained; other kinds of 
situations do not.  
According to Clark (Clark, Toribio 1994: 419) representation-hungry 
problems are cases that involve one or both these two conditions:  
 
i) reasoning about absent, non-existent, or counterfactual states of 
affairs (Clark, Toribio 1994: 419) – and these cases seem to include 
phenomena such as imaging and remembering; 
ii) the cognitive task requires the agent to display a “selective 
sensitiveness”, namely to select parts of an environment whose 
physical manifestations are complex and unruly (Clark, Toribio 
1994: 419) or, more roughly, it is a case of “undetermined 
perception” (Mandik 2005: 291).  
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In my discussion, I do not take into account the first kind of cases. This 
because the debate between representationalists and anti-representationalists 
concerning imaging or reasoning about the absent, at present, is not very 
developed (although some anti-representational explanations of those 
phenomena has been offered in Hutto 2015; Degenaar, Myin 2014; Gallagher 
2017; Rooij, Bongers, Haselager 2002), and also and especially because the 
problem I am dealing with now (representational vs. non-representational 
accounts of active perception) does not concern point i) but point ii). 
An example that can be helpful to consider point ii) is that about the role of 
internal cognitive resources that play the function of effective tracking devices
58
, 
namely representations that occur when an agent is continuously coupled with 
the object of her tracking (Clowes, Mendonça 2016: 31) when the physical 
manifestations of the information the cognitive system needs are widely various 
(Clark 1997a: 167) and difficult to detect.  
For instance, think about the cognitive task of picking up all the valuable 
items in a room (Clark 1997a: 167).  
Clark does not discuss this example at length, but I will try to develop it 
further because the case of responding selectively to environmental stimuli is a 
crucial point in the debate about AORs:  it is precisely on this point that 
affordance-based theories of perception work on, discussing the 
representationalist position in a critical fashion. The lack of clarity of the 
arguments offered by representation-friendly explanations, I claim, is an 
obstacle to understand the overall project of action-oriented representations 
because it undermines the construction of a ground of confrontation among 
theories. To put in other words, it seems to me that approaches that endorse 
AORs make objections to eliminativist views, claiming that it is not clear how 
agents react to some perceptual stimuli and not to others in a given context, but 
when they try to offer an alternative view, they are very vague. This makes 
difficult to understand if AORs are good epistemic posits in the case taken into 
account or if they do not play an interesting epistemic role.  
So, suppose that an agent has to pick up all the objects designed for drinking 
in the kitchen. The environment where the cognitive task is complex because 
the room is full of objects designed for different purposes. Moreover, despite 
the agent should focus exclusively on those objects designed for drinking, she 
receives a lot of sensory inputs; therefore she has to discriminate between 
inputs that are valuable for the ultimate aim of the task she is engaged in and 
                                                          
58
  This is close to what Ramsey critically calls “receptor notion”, namely the idea that neural 
structures are said to be representations because they do the job of detecting parts of the 
environement, to the extent that they respond to given environmental or bodily conditions  in 
a reliable manner (Ramsey 2007: 120; Clowes, Mendonça 2016: 31).  
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those that are not primarily interesting. Moreover, the objects designed for the 
action of drinking show up according to different physical manifestations (they 
have different colors, their shape vary a little bit, and so on). In this case, Clark 
would say that, because of the complexity of the environment (the agent’s 
perceptual target of attention is elusive because it is embedded in a context full 
of noisy information), the agent has to internally represent selected parts of the 
environment (all the objects for drinking).  
This would  
 
i) provide the agent with an internal target of attention that will guide 
her behavior, by making her focused on some perceptual stimuli 
only; 
ii) make her ready to act in a certain way (e.g. it would make her ready 
to grab objects for drinking and not ready to throw them) because 
the AORs represent the objects for drinking under the respect of 
“grabbing” or “picking up” and not under the respect of “throwing”. 
The internal action-oriented representation would say something 
like “there/object/for/drinking/-grab/it!”59.  
 
Now, it seems to me that the case considered above is a good example to 
think about Clark’s argument pro AORs. In this example, the environment 
where the task takes place is considered to be informationally unfriendly or 
noisy because it offers the agent a wide variety of perceptual information. This 
is said to make an explanation of adequate action difficult if the explanation 
does not suppose internal proxies of the external objects the action should be 
performed upon.  
To me, it is particularly striking that the situation where the cognitive task 
takes place is defined as unfriendly, and then as “representation-hungry”. 
Indeed, the cognitive task Clark takes into account seems to be just an example 
of what agents do in their everyday cognitive experiences, which do not take 
place in defined “experimental settings”, but in complex and informationally 
varying environments. Thus, if this point is taken into account, and if this 
cognitive task is still defined as “representation-hungry”, it would be more 
                                                          
59 Described in this way, Clark’s AORs (and also Millikan’s PPRs) sound like an attempt to 
find a solution both to the Epistemological Relevance Problem and to the General Relevance 
Problem. Indeed, the prescriptive function of AORs, according to which representations 
prescribe a specific kind of action, selects relevant information in the environment (thanks to 
the indexical or deictic aspect of the representation) and the right kind of skill to display (the 
representation says what should be done) all at once.  
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accurate to say that human action-perception loops always require the 
mediation of action-oriented representations, and this would be consistent with 
Clark’s purpose of reassessing Gibson’s theory of perception in a 
representational fashion.  
Nevertheless, if I understand Clark’s argument well, this is not the case. In 
fact, cases like this are taken to be specific representation-hungry problems and 
the idea of representation-hunger is introduced to demonstrate that 
eliminativist explanations are wrong because they consider problems that are 
not representation-hungry enough (Clark, Toribio 1994: 418). The problem 
seems to be this one: some of the cognitive episodes Clark takes into account 
to demonstrate that they are representation-hungry seem to be the same cases 
he thinks to be not representation-hungry enough when he makes his 
objections against eliminativist approaches to representation.   
Therefore I think that two possible philosophical scenarios can be 
envisioned.  
 
i) We could claim that any cognitive experience requires 
representations in order to be explained, and then we should dismiss 
the concept of representation-hunger. This entails that we should 
find other objections to theories of direct perception, which do not 
entail the concept of representation-hunger. 
ii) Or we could not use the notion of representation to account for 
perceptual experiences, preserving -at least at a provisional level- the 
idea of representation-hunger for the first kind of cases (reasoning 
about the absent or counterfactual) only.  
 
As it will be explained in my exam of other objections against AORs, I am 
prone to think that option ii) is more viable. In the next paragraph, I will take 
into account those objections to AORs. Then, I will make my considerations 
about AORs in the Extended Mind Hypothesis framework more explicit.  
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II.4 Representational criteria. Peircean interventions.  
A useful source to consider the problem of action-oriented representations 
more in depth is Gallagher’s article Are minimal representations still 
representations? (Gallagher 2008a)
60
. To be accurate, it is worth to notice that 
Gallagher’s article focuses more on other versions of action-oriented 
representation that show up in the “4Es” debate, in particular on Wheeler’s 
and Rowland’s ones, and on Clark and Grush’s emulators61. Nevertheless, I 
think that some of the objections to minimal forms of representationalism that 
Gallagher makes can be raised against Clark’s approach to AORs in Being 
there too. Indeed, this approach preserves some of the aspects of the emulator 
notion, critically considered by Gallagher (see §II.3 of this work). Moreover, 
many aspects of the notion of AOR developed in Being there are consistent 
with the notion of action-oriented representation offered by Wheeler in 
Reconstructing the cognitive world (Wheeler 2005). Both versions of action-
oriented representation are said to encode the external world in terms of 
possibilities of action (Wheeler 2005: 197-199; Clark 1997a: 149), to be poised 
between mirroring and control functions (Wheeler 2005: 197; Clark 1997a: 
49), to be the result of natural selection for adaptive purposes (Wheeler 2005: 
198; Clark 1997a: 152), to be heavily context and body dependent (Wheeler 
2005: 197; Clark 1997a: 149), and to be strictly tied to the individual agent 
(Wheeler calls them “egocentric”, Wheeler 2005: 197; Clark calls them 
“personalized”, see Clark 1997a: 149). The most significant point the two 
philosophers disagree on is the spatial location of AORs. In fact, Wheeler says 
that AORs are distributed across brain, body and environment (Wheeler 2005: 
221-222; Gallagher 2008a: 357); on the contrary Clark, in Being there, 
considers those representations to be internal, since he identifies those 
structures with neural encodings. For example, he says that “to the extent that 
the biological brain does trade in anything usefully described as ‘internal 
representation’, a large body of those representations will be local and action-
oriented rather than objective and action-independent” (Clark 1997a:149).  
The philosophical strategy that Gallagher follows to understand whether 
representation is necessary in action, namely to understand if representation is 
a crucial and unavoidable part of action itself (and this means investigating 
perceptual processes too, since in the debate I am taking into account 
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 Notice that this article is just a theoretical reference point for the structure of my 
argumentation, which, later, I develop autonomously.  
61
 For a broader view of those approaches to AORs see Rowlands 2006a; 2006b; 2012;  2015; 
Wheeler 2005; 2008a; 2008b; 2010a; Clark, Grush 1999.  
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perception is considered to be an activity
62
), is particularly interesting. Indeed, 
instead of considering individual cases philosophers refer to, he focuses on the 
concept of representation in itself, in order to understand if AORs meet the 
criteria required to talk about representations. This is aimed at questioning the 
theoretical status of AORs in themselves; that is why Gallagher’s argumentation 
can lead to strong conclusions about AORs. If the comparison between the 
widely accepted criteria to talk about representations in cognitive sciences and 
the concept of AOR will demonstrate that AORs are not actually 
representations, this will show that i) talking about AORs is just an arbitrary 
terminological choice, and that ii) explaining the cognitive phenomena taken 
into account by appealing to AORs is philosophically unwarranted.  
I begin my discussion about AORs by making “representational criteria” 
explicit.  
Although in philosophy of mind and cognitive sciences there are many 
notions of representation, and there is no consensus on their nature (Ramsey 
2007: xi), the majority of scholars seems to agree on some elements that define 
the classical notion of representation. Those criteria are:  
 
i) Internality: representation-tokens exist in clearly identifiable regions 
of space.  In philosophy of mind, the boundaries of those regions of 
space are those of mental images, syntactically structured symbols, 
neural configurations, or any internal configuration of the subject. In 
this sense representations are spatially discrete. 
ii) Genuine duration: representation-tokens have identifiable temporal 
boundaries. Occurrent mental states have representational contents. 
They are activated, namely their status changes from dispositional to 
occurrent, when a representation is tokened, viz. when 
representational contents are brought on-line by some capacity. In 
this sense, representations are temporally discrete.  
iii) Standing-for: Representations are proxies (they stand-for) of 
something else (e.g. perceptual stimuli, objects that fall under a 
category), and they do so because they bear a content.  
iv) Interpretation: representations mean nothing in themselves. In 
order to acquire meaning, they have to be interpreted by someone 
(e.g. an interpreter, in the case of words and sentences) or something 
                                                          
62  As previously sketched out, this is particularly clear and widely developed in sensorimotor 
versions of enactivism (Noë 2004; Noë 2010; O’Regan, Noë 2001); nevertheless, also 
“extended” approaches to perception are aimed at accounting for perception as active (Clark 
2016a, in particular Chapter 4; Clark 2008, in particular §1.3).  
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(e.g. an interpretive function that specifies the place that a 
representation occupies in the subject’s representational economy). 
v) Passivity: classical representations are passive. To the extent that 
they acquire their meaning in virtue of the job of an interpretive 
function, their capacity to stand-for X depends on what is done with 
those representations by the interpretive function. Representations 
do nothing, but something else does something with them. They are 
the media of an activity, not an activity in itself. 
vi) Decouplabiliy: an item is genuinely representational if it is 
decoupleable from its environment, namely from the states of affairs 
that it represents. This means that, if R is a representation and T its 
target, a) R and T are not in constant causal contact; b) R represents 
T when it is absent; c) in doing so, R has an adaptive function.
63
 This 
condition is tied to the epistemic function of representations in the 
explanations of human behavior. In fact, representations have been 
introduced in cognitive sciences to explain the mechanisms that 
guide agents’ behaviors in the absence of the feature they represent 
(Haugeland 1991: 172). If an item is not decoupleable, then it is not 
clear to what extent it plays the role of a mediation function. An item 
that plays a certain function only when it is in contact with the 
immediate environment (Rowlands 2006a: 46) seems to entertain 
just a causal relation with the environment, or with parts of it.   
 
These six conditions to talk about mental representations in a classic and 
orthodox way are not endorsed as a whole by “second-wave” cognitive 
scientists.  
First, considering the broad picture of “4Es”, it can be shown that the 
“internality condition” is sometimes taken more loosely. For instance, consider 
what has been said about external representations in §I.8. The example I gave 
was that of the Tetris zoids, which stand for the bricks of the wall the players 
deal with. This kind of representation -like other kinds of external 
representations, such as tags, material symbols, written words, tokens of 
mathematical notations - is not located within the boundaries of human heads. 
In this sense, to mark the contrast with the classical notion of representation, 
such a representation is said to be external. Nevertheless, those representations 
seem to still meet, to some extent, the criterion of internality, if the word 
“internality” is meant to refer to the fact that representational tokens are 
                                                          
63
  This passage is taken from Chemero 2009: 48.  
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embedded in a representational system
64
 in which, thanks to their relation with 
other representational items, their spatial location (namely their being spatially 
discrete items) is shown.  
Second, the “passivity condition” is sometimes considered to be 
unimportant. As already explained, the idea that representations do not just 
undergo action, but rather “do various things” (Ramsey 2007: 18) is a 
consequence of two more general theoretical points. i) The project of getting 
rid of intellectualism in the explanation of cognitive processes; ii) warranting 
embodied knowledge a special role in explaining cognition, and this means 
accounting for sensorimotor knowledge as the core of cognitive processes. 
Third, the “decouplability condition” is critically questioned. To be 
accurate, it is worth to notice that not all the explanations that make use of 
AORs dismiss the idea of decouplability. For example, Wheeler explicitly 
rejects it (Wheeler 2005: 219), but Clark is not always clear about this point. In 
the article written with Grush (Clark, Grush 1999), the two authors want to 
preserve the decouplability condition. When they describe the job of 
emulators, they talk about the process of anticipation of states or stimuli, and 
they say that those anticipations are decoupled representations, namely 
representations of a future X, that is not there when it is represented. On the 
contrary, in Being there, when Clark talks about Haugeland’s representational 
criteria (Haugeland 1991), he says that the role of decouplability is 
“overplayed” (Clark 1997a: 144). Clark’s idea is that, if we consider the strict 
application of the decouplability criterion as an unavoidable requirement to 
talk about representations properly, we rule out the description of inner states 
as genuinely representational. This “seems unappealing in view of the very real 
explanatory leverage that the representational gloss provides, and it is also out 
of step with standard neuroscientific usage” (Clark 1997a: 145).  
For example, he considers neural populations which are said to encode 
positions of the head. Those encodings are not decoupleable from what they 
represent: they are activated when they are in causal contact with what they 
represent. In this case, Clark claims, explaining this phenomenon by making 
use of a representational gloss helps us to understand how information flows 
within the system. Then, even if those codings do not fulfill the decouplability 
condition, we should describe them by making use of a representational 
vocabulary: “the lack of decouplability does not in itself seem to deprive the 
representational gloss of all explanatory force” (Clark 1997a: 238, footnote 4)65.  
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 Notice that, according to this interpretation, the internality condition conflates with what is 
commonly known as “combinatorial constraint”, namely the idea that an item counts as 
representational when it is part of a general representational scheme (Haugeland, 1991: 62; 
Rowlands 2009: 118).  
65
On the issue of decouplability in Clark, see also Clark 1997b: 472 and ff. 
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To understand whether the notion of action-oriented representation I am 
taking into account here is a genuine representation or not, it is worth to 
consider the set of conditions mentioned above more closely, in order to 
understand whether those criteria are all necessary to properly talk about 
representation. My hypothesis is that some of them are necessary, other 
conditions are not. I suspect that they have been introduced for “consistency” 
reasons, namely to fit with a specific approach to cognition, that is that one 
grounded on the “mind-computer” metaphor. To put it in other words, I claim 
that there are some core conditions that define representation in general, as a 
theoretical object; other conditions are required by some explanations of 
cognitive processes only. 
To show what the conditions I consider to be fundamental to talk about 
representations properly are, I consider the etymology of the word 
“representation”, in order to understand what it means, and to make clear the 
commonsense framework representations in cognitive sciences come from
66
. 
“Representation” comes from the Latin verb re- + praesentō. The word 
consists of the intensive prefix re-, which means “again”, “once more”, “anew”, 
and the verb praesentare, which means “to show”, “to exhibit”, “to display”, “to 
bring something to someone’s mind”, “to stand in place of”67. Therefore “to 
represent” means showing something again, standing in its place. Moreover, 
the verb “to represent” means “to act or speak on behalf of somebody”, “to 
assume or occupy the role or functions of someone”68. Representations act or 
function as if they were the object or subject they stand-for. They do what the 
things they represent do. 
By focusing on this commonsense understanding of representations, some 
core conditions to talk about representations (and notice that some of them are 
the same endorsed by the orthodox representational framework) can be 
individuated. 
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 At first glance, recalling the commonsense understanding of representations can look like an 
unwarranted philosophical move. Indeed, one can say that the notion of representation 
cognitive scientists deal with is a specific epistemic posit, our common use of the word 
“representation” cannot account for. Nevertheless, I think that this first impression is 
misleading, because, as Ramsey says (Ramsey 2007: 8), cognitive scientists seem to assume that 
they are tapping into a pre-theoretical understanding of representations.   
67
  See The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology 
(http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780192830982.001.0001/acref-
9780192830982-e-12741?rskey=fpzCsw&result=12742), and the Online Etymology 
Dictionary (http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?term=represent&allowed_in_frame=0).  
68
  See The Oxford English Dictionary 
(http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/162991?rskey=6i4QWK&result=2&isAdvanced=false#eid).  
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i) Standing-for. Representations are items that, despite sometimes are 
isomorphic with what they represent (i.e. they have the same 
structure of the object represented), are different from what they 
represent. They are distinguishable items: representations are 
proxies of something else.  
ii) Even if in the etymological definition of the word “representation” it 
is not explicitly mentioned, it seems that the “standing-for condition” 
entails the “interpretability” condition. Indeed, “to represent” means 
“acting or speaking on behalf of somebody”. Words and actions 
acquire a meaning because they are words or actions for something 
or somebody, who interprets (even if this does not necessarily mean 
interpreting by means of an intellectual act) what is represented. 
iii) Moreover, the standing-for condition seems to entail what has been 
previously defined as “genuine duration”. In order to stand-for 
something, a representation has to be interpreted, and interpretative 
acts are something that takes place in time. The identity of a 
representation, namely what defines it as this representation and not 
that representation, depends on the meaning that this representation 
acquires, and meaning is acquired by means of an activity that 
happens in time.  
iv) Even if the “decouplability condition” is not always considered to be 
necessary to talk about representations
69
, I think that it is. Consider 
what said in point i) of my list. Representations stand-for something 
else, and this means that they are distinguishable from what they 
represent. The decouplability condition is strictly linked to the 
standing-for condition, central in our commonsense understanding 
of representations, and in scientific accounts as well. If an item or a 
process is not decoupleable from what it stands-for, it is not clear 
how identity boundaries between the two items or processes can be 
drawn (Rowlands 2009: 126).  
 
 
What the commonsense meaning of the word “representation” does not entail 
is the fact that cognitive representations are internal to human heads and that 
they are passive. 
The first aspect has been already taken into account when I discussed 
embedded and extended approaches to cognition. What was shown is the 
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 See Chemero, Eck 1999, and Chemero 2000.  
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fundamental role that those representations play in distributing the cognitive 
load of practice. This demonstrated how those external items shape and 
determine cognitive practices, by playing the same functional role that internal 
representations play in cognition. This demonstrated how the external location 
of representation does not prevent an item to be considered to be a component 
of cognitive processes.  
The second aspect has to be examined more closely. The classical definition 
of representation described them as passive by appealing to the “interpretability 
condition”. Representations were said to be passive because, taken in 
themselves, they mean nothing: they acquire their meanings thanks to 
interpretative acts, namely thanks to the activity of something that lies outside 
of the representation.  As previously said, I agree with definitions of 
representation that endorse the “interpretability condition”. Nonetheless, I 
disagree on inferring the passivity condition from the interpretability criterion.  
Indeed, I claim that interpretability makes representations passive only if a 
specific model of representation is endorsed: the dyadic conception of 
representations.   
Looking at the debate I am examining, it seems to be the case that cognitive 
scientists endorse a dyadic concept of representation. Indeed, they focus on 
two aspects: content and format. Representations bear a content (properties or 
relations of the environment) that is said to entertain a causal relation with 
behavior (behavior is caused by contents mentally represented), and they 
vehicle it in a certain way (e.g. by representing it in a modal or a-modal way). 
Content and format define the theoretical object “representation”. The 
interpretative function is not said to be part of this representational entity in 
itself: that is why representations are said to be passive. What actually does 
something with contents (the interpreter or interpretive function) lies outside 
of the representational entity.  
My point is that there is a viable way to preserve the interpretability 
condition, and to give it a central role in defining representations, without 
entailing passivity: conceiving of representations as triadic relations, as C. S. 
Peirce did in his work in Semiotics.  
So far, this option has not been very popular, and this depends on the fact 
that C. S. Peirce’s thought, and the classical Pragmatist tradition more in 
general, did not receive much attention in philosophy of mind and cognitive 
sciences. This underestimation of the pragmatist tradition in philosophy of 
mind is due to the fact that the core ideas about cognition endorsed by 
pragmatism seemed to preclude the access to philosophy of mind in itself, 
especially if “philosophy of mind” is a label meant to refer to critiques of the 
behaviorist explanatory paradigm (Daddesio 1995). As a matter of fact, the 
philosophical position endorsed by Pragmatism, commonly known as 
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“knowledge externalism” (Meyers 1999) or as “cognitive externalism” (Burke 
2014; Aydin 2015), holds that cognition does not unfold through internal 
representations (namely ideas or concepts we have access to via introspective 
acts – W2: 193-210, from “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed 
for Man”, 1868) but that the whole function of thought is to produce habits of 
action. This is to say that, to explain cognition and mental processes, 
pragmatists look at how and when habit causes us to act. “Mental” is a) the 
stimulus to action derived from perception -that determines the “when” of 
cognition-, b) and the purpose of action that causes a sensible result -and this is 
the how of cognition (W3: 265; from “How to make our ideas clear”, 1878).  
These pivotal ideas of pragmatism lead to describe the mind as something 
that is externally produced or realized by means of practice. This point is 
theoretically very far from what mainstream philosophy of mind and cognitive 
sciences claim. Indeed those ones conceive of the mind as constituted by 
mental contents, and define action just as a non-cognitive effect of mental 
processes. Pragmatism, by defining the mind as an effect of (conceivable) 
actions controlled by habitual practical knowledge, and then developing its 
explanation “out of the black box”, completely knocks over the theoretical 
pillars of mainstream philosophy of mind: it is “Cartesianism read from right 
to left” (Fodor 2008: 12). According to Cartesian philosophy of mind and 
cognitive science, the pragmatist stance is “the worst idea that philosophy ever 
had”, a “bad cold” philosophy should get rid of (Fodor 2008: 9, 11). According 
to “Cartesian philosophy”, the priority of acting on thinking that Pragmatism 
endorses as its fundamental idea (which means holding that the distinctive 
function of the mind is guiding action) seems to be so naïf that it does not 
understand that our ability to act is grounded on a more fundamental level, 
namely on propositional knowledge, which makes action-planning possible. To 
plan an action, the subject should be able to represent how the world would be 
if that action would succeed, according to truth conditions (Fodor 2008: 13). 
Given that the aim of my discussion is not to determine whether Fodor is 
right, neither my task is defending Pragmatism from those objections, I will not 
explore this point further. Nevertheless, my suggestion is to keep this strong 
criticism against pragmatism in mind, and to consider it as one of the reasons 
why it has not influenced cognitive sciences for many years
70
. I claim that this 
                                                          
70 Notice that, in the last years, this trend changed. Indeed, the birth of action-oriented 
paradigms in cognitive science gave birth to interesting research focused on the theoretical value 
of the pragmatist tradition for cognitive sciences. Among others, see Aydin 2015; Burke 2008; 
2014; Engel, Maye, Kurthen, Köning 2013; Fusaroli, Granelli, Paolucci 2011; Gallagher 2009; 
2014; 2017; Jung, Madzia 2016; Menary 2007; 2009; 2016; Johnson 2006; Johnson, Rohrer 
2007; Johnson 2010; Paolucci 2011; Roy 2013; Shook, Solymosi 2014a; 2014b; Skagested 
2004;  Steiner 2008; 2013; Tiercelin 1995.  
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precluded the chance to make some ideas clear in cognitive sciences and 
philosophy of mind: this the case of interpretability and the passive status of 
representations.  
 
To take into account this point, I consider one of the core ideas of Peirce’s 
theory of knowledge. According to Peirce, cognition unfolds through signs (see 
the article “Some consequences of four incapacities”, 1868; W: 211-242). A 
sign is a representation (indeed Peirce writes that “‘representation’ and ‘sign’ 
are synonyms”; CP 8.191), and the word “representation” refers to “an object 
which stands for another so that an experience of the former affords us a 
knowledge of the latter” (Peirce, MS 389, 1873). According to Peirce, 
representations involve three relata: a) a Representamen, which is the first 
correlate of a triadic relation (MS 1345) and that in the contemporary 
terminology would be called “sign-vehicle”, b) its Object, the second correlate, 
c) and a third, which is called “Interpretant” (CP 2.242), or sometimes 
“interpreting act” (CP 2.230).This last one, by entertaining with the object the 
same relation that the sign-vehicle entertains with it, brings forth new knowledge 
about that object. To put it in other words, signs bring forth a relation between 
a First, a sign-vehicle, and a second, the Object, by means of a Third “that looks 
inside of the First through a second” (translated from Fabbrichesi 1986: 97).  
For example, think about symbolic signs, namely general signs (CP 1.558) 
that refer to their objects in virtue of a law (for example an association of general 
ideas; CP 2.249). Take a term (CP 2.25) like “cat”, for instance. The written or 
uttered word “cat” is the sign-vehicle (first correlate), the cat is the object 
(second correlate), and the meaning of the word “cat”, the idea of cat, is the 
Interpretant (third correlate). According to Peirce, the word “representation” 
refers to the dynamics that connects these three relata. Representation is: the 
relation between the object and the sign-vehicle, which is determined by the 
object (MS 793), and the relation between this relation and the Interpretant, 
which is actively determined by the sign vehicle, in the sense that the sign-
vehicle affords an Interpretant (MS 793). The sign-vehicle represents the object 
it stands-for under a certain respect and the Interpretant brings into light this 
relation by representing it. In doing so, the Interpretant shows the meaning the 
sign-vehicle is meant to carry.  
The notion of Interpretant is crucial in this explanation. The Interpretant is 
said to fulfil “the office of an interpreter, who says that a foreigner says the same 
thing which he himself says” (CP 1.553). It should be noticed that, considering 
the broad picture of Peirce’s semiotics, this linguistic description should not be 
interpreted literarily (Deacon 2014: 97). Indeed, not only Peirce distinguishes 
the Interpretant from the human Interpreter, who translates one sign into 
another sign (see the letter to Lady Welby of March 14th, 1909; SS: 109-10), 
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but he also distinguishes different kinds of Interpretants. The meaning of a 
triadic representation (MS 318:163; 37-38), can be a mental effect, an emotion, 
a feeling, an effort (MS 318: 40-1; CP 5.475), an imperative command (CP 
5.473), an affordance for action.  
This variety of Interpretants depends on the situated nature of semiosis (Atã, 
Queiroz 2014; Fusaroli, Paolucci 2011: 18-19; Queiroz, Merrell 2008; Violi 
2008: 252), namely on the temporality (that is on the stage the process of 
semiosis is at; Deacon 2014: 97) and on the materiality of the semiotic relation.  
To explain this point, it is worth to take into account an example offered by 
Peirce between 1905 and 1907, in a letter-article addressed to the editor of the 
journal The Nation. Consider an agent who is listening to a piece of music. The 
piece of music represents iconically (Santaella 2015; Short 2007: 204) –namely 
in virtue of its own internal qualities (CP 2.92)
71
, like perceptual qualities, for 
example- the composer’s musical ideas. Those ones, since they are 
perceptually represented, at first are interpreted by means of the sentiment or 
feeling the piece of music excites in the listener (CP 8.335) when she perceives 
successions of musical notes. This feeling, although it cannot constitute a 
complete and ultimate comprehension of the composer’s musical ideas, is an 
Interpretant, an emotional Interpretant of the sign (CP 5.475). The listener’s 
feelings/emotions at the individual time T, in the context C, are a “first” piece 
of knowledge about the composer’s musical ideas, they are an initial step in the 
process of knowledge.  Those feelings, on their hand, cause some further 
reactions or effects (Short 1996: 509). For example, they can entail a bodily 
effect (CP 5.475, where Peirce talks about “muscular effects”), such as changes 
in the bodily posture of the agent. According to Peirce, this is an energetic 
Interpretant (it is called “energetic” because it entails a mental or bodily effort), 
whose cognitive effect is focusing the agent’s attention (MS 318: 443-45) on that 
individual occurrence of feeling triggered by the piece of music. The 
Interpretant of the sign changed, namely new cognition has emerged by means 
of an energetic Interpretant because the situation of semiosis changed. The 
emotional Interpretant afforded new knowledge about the object, becoming 
the first correlate of a new representational relation, and affecting the energetic 
Interpretant by means of the action of a new sign-vehicle. The new Interpretant, 
the energetic one, is an individual act, hence it cannot work as a sign for the 
generalized experience of music. That is why Peirce postulates a third kind of 
Interpretant, more developed than the others, and able to push forward 
cognition towards a more general level: the ultimate logical Interpretant. The 
ultimate logical Interpretant is the effect of a series of signs, that is the repetition 
of the experience of music.  Thanks to generalizations of acts of response, it 
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changes the agent’s general way of acting (Peirce describes this as “habit-
change”; CP 5.476), namely the habit-based actions performed when that piece 
of music is played. The development of signs produces a modification of the 
experience of music (Eco 1976: 1465-1466). The agent will be ready to act in 
a certain way (for example she will consciously appreciate her feelings for 
music, she will enjoy the structure of the piece of music, focusing her attention 
on it and not on the individual notes, and so on) when she will listen to that 
piece of music again.  
 
What is particularly interesting in this explanation of representations is the 
way Peirce conceives of them as active. The reason that accounts for this active 
aspect of representation is twofold.  
On the one hand, by conceiving of the Interpretant -namely the effect of 
meaning of a representation- as a constitutive part of the representational 
relation itself, Perice’s explanation avoids passivity. Representations stop to be 
entities that should be manipulated in order to achieve meaning, but they are 
defined as the process by means of which sign-vehicle, object and meaning are 
connected. Meaning arises in this relation, and it is internal to the 
representation itself: the activity of the Interpretant is the third correlate of the 
triadic representational relation. Moreover, although Interpretants are 
embodied in the interpreter/receiver of signs, they do not exactly correspond 
with the human agent, conceived as an individual subject that consciously 
interprets sings. The human agent is just the material vehicle of Interpretants, 
I would say. She functions as a constraint for the emergence of Interpretants: 
since those ones are feelings, reactions, generalizable actions, they require that 
somebody, with that body, that history of experience and so on, embodies 
them. By conceiving of the notion of Interpretant in this way, namely by stating 
the logical primacy of the agency of Interpretants on the subject-interpreter’s 
individual interpretative acts, Peirce avoids the dyadic relation subject-object 
the classical notion of representation is built on. There is not an object-
representation interpreted by a subject, but there are Interpretants caused 
within the boundaries of the representational relation. This means that 
interpretative acts do not take representations as the objects of their cognitive 
manipulation. On the contrary, the sign-vehicle determines its interpretation 
(and, according to Peirce, this makes it active; MS 793). This interpretation, on 
its turn, causes some effect on the second correlate and on the way it is 
connected to the first correlate: meaning acquisition takes place in the triadic 
mediation.  
On the other hand, the Interpretant itself is thought to be active. The 
interpretation of representations is no longer thought to be something that has 
the “mental mode of being” (CP 5.473), if “mental” refers to an internal state, 
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such as a mental representation, but it is conceived as something that, passing 
by emotional and bodily effects, leads to the acquisition of a new habit of action. 
This last one, the habit of thought (which is the highest degree of knowledge, 
since it endows the subject with adaptive abilities in her environment), has 
nothing in common with the crystallized propositional knowledge the classical 
notion of interpretability implicitly refers to (i.e. acts of interpretation conceived 
as knowing that this representation is a token of that representation type). On 
the contrary, it has a practical nature. Indeed habit is a “general operating rule 
within the organism” (W4: 249; italics added). Its nature is operative, not 
intellectual, since habit is a “readiness to act in a certain way under given 
circumstances and when actuated by a given motive” (CP 5.480). Habit is as an 
action-schema, it is the context-sensitive
72
 knowing-how to bring forth the 
practical bearings (MS 318: 22) of the object, which is the second correlate of 
the triadic relation. To put in other words, interpretation is the ability to act out 
cognition afforded by a representation. 
 
This approach to representations gives very different insights from those 
offered by representation-friendly cognitive sciences. At this point of my 
explanation, I do not consider the broader implications of Peirce’s semiotics 
for cognitive sciences (to some extent, this job will be done in §II.6). What I 
want to suggest here is that a comparison between the notion of representation 
in cognitive sciences and the way Peircean semiotics conceives of signs can be 
helpful to reassess the representational criteria endorsed by cognitive sciences. 
In particular, by taking into account Peirce’s triadic definition of sign, it can be 
said that:  
 
i) the interpretability condition does not entail the passivity condition 
necessarily (on the contrary, in Peirce’s semiotics it implies activity); 
ii) the internality condition, that is the idea that representations lay 
inside of human heads, is just an arbitrary choice made by cognitive 
scientists. Indeed, in the classical account of representation offered 
by Peirce, representations involve media distributed among the 
agent and the environment (for example, the musical notes, the 
perceived sounds, and the agent’s feelings).  
 
                                                          
72
 The aspect of context-sensitiveness is explicitly expressed in the quotation above, where 
Peirce talks about the activation of habit-occurrences, and in the famous essay “How to make 
our ideas clear” as well, where he states that perception causes us to act (W3: 265).  
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This leads me to think of a reduction of the six criteria endorsed by cognitive 
scientists to four conditions: i) genuine duration; ii) decouplability; iii) standing-
for; iv) interpretability.  
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II.5 Objections against Clark’s AORs: standing-for, Interpretability, 
Decouplability and the problem of activity in representation. Some 
Peircean suggestions.   
 
In the previous paragraph, I discussed the criteria philosophers of cognitive 
sciences endorse to define representations, and I reassessed them, explaining 
why I think that some of them are necessary while others are not. The outcome 
of this discussion has been a reduction of the representational criteria to four 
conditions: i) genuine duration; ii) decouplability; iii) standing-for; iv) 
interpretability.  
To check if Clark’s action-oriented representations meet these criteria, and 
then to determine if they are genuine representations or not, consider again the 
way he conceives of these representations.  
Action-oriented representations are neural states triggered by a given aspect 
of the environment perceived by an agent engaged in an on-line cognitive task.  
Their content is both descriptive and prescriptive: they represent a state of 
affairs in the agent’s environment, by encoding it as the content of an action-
command. To give a propositional description of this action command, it can 
be expressed in the following way: “there is X, perform the action Y upon it”.  
It can be said that those representations 
 
i) have a genuine duration: they are neural states activated in the 
context of a task, at a given moment in time.  
ii) Decouplability: those representations do not meet the criteria of 
strong decouplability (and Clark explicitly says that; Clark 1997a: 
144). Those representations are said to be triggered by a given aspect 
of the environment perceived by the cognitive agent. In the absence 
of this perceived aspect AORs are not tokened. In that case, other 
representations would be activated in the brain, but not those which 
represent what is perceived as an affordance for that individual 
action. Moreover, the indexical aspect Clark ascribes to his AORs is 
not consistent with the very notion of decouplability, to the idea of a 
representation that can be used-off line. Indeed an indexical 
representation is a representation that entertains a relation of 
“correspondence in fact” (W2:56) with what it represents. This is to 
say that we talk about indexes properly when there is a “direct 
physical connection” (W5: 254) between the index and the item 
represented. Then, the semiotic features of Clark’s AORs make 
them tied to an existent, present context.  
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Nevertheless, if one would like to defend Clark’s AORs, she could 
try to see a “little bit of decouplability” by thinking about the 
simulative aspect of AORs. In paragraph II.3, I said that AORs 
simulate what should be done by the agent in the environmental 
space as a response to perceptual stimuli. Given that the action 
command is part of the content of action-oriented representations, 
and given that the action that involves those perceptions has not 
been performed already when the action-oriented representation 
occurs, one could think that this conception of AORs, to some 
extent, entails decouplability. The representation stands for 
something that, when that representation is tokened, is not present 
in the environment, then it is not in causal contact with its immediate 
environment. Nevertheless, I think that this way to think about 
decouplability is too loose. Decouplability refers to the possibility of 
an item X to occur in a cognitive process without being in causal 
contact with the “current context” (Gallagher 2008a: 351). In the 
cases taken into account, “context” means a) the physical 
environment where the task takes place, b) the temporality of the 
task. Since AORs are said to be part of the dynamics of an action-
perception loop, and since actions take time to develop, the fact that 
AORs represent something that is not present in the environment 
when they are tokened does not imply that they are decoupled. If it 
is true that, when they occur, that particular motor movement 
prescribed by the representation has not been performed already, it 
is also true that the action the future bodily movement is part of is 
already there, it has already begun. Indeed the agent did something 
(i.e. she moved her body) in order to give a rough structure to her 
perceptual array. Then Clark’s AORs are not decoupleable from the 
spatio-temporal context of the action they are supposed to explain, 
not even in the loose sense of “decoupleable”. 
iii) Standing-for/interpretability: as said previously, in many passages 
Clark refers to AORs as “neural populations”. The question is 
whether a neural population in itself can be considered to be 
genuinely representational. Usually cognitive scientists claim that 
neural structures are representations because they respond in a 
reliable manner to certain conditions. This is to say, since neuronal 
states lawfully (namely regularly) co-vary with perceptual stimuli, 
they are said to represent/carry information about what caused those 
stimuli, namely an object or feature of the world. What is not clear 
is how this correlation between a neural state and specific stimuli 
entails per se (and not according to the scientists’ second order gaze, 
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which interprets neural states as representations) a mediation 
(Ramsey 2007: 120-121).  
There are many reasons why the use of a representational 
vocabulary to denote the relation between neural states and 
perceptual stimuli is not clear. For example, Hutto and Myin (Hutto, 
Myin 2013: 63-71, and elsewhere again Hutto; Hutto 2011, 2013) 
make an objection to this account of representation by focusing on 
the problem of content. Representations are contents bearers. 
Carrying a content is a condition that, according to cognitive 
scientists, an item should fulfill in order to be called 
“representation”. To talk about content there must be a) specified 
conditions of satisfaction to determine whether or not the content 
an item or process X bears is an accurate or true content; b) this 
entails that there is some X that can potentially understand if those 
conditions are fulfilled or not. In the account of neural activities as 
representational this “understanding X” is missing, at least if we 
consider what supporters of AORs write in a literal way. Indeed, as 
pointed out previously, AORs are usually thought to be dyadic 
representations: the interpretative function is not part of them.  
Also one of Gallagher’s objections against AORs, even if it is not 
focused on the problem of content, looks at the missing third in 
order to demonstrate that AORs are not genuine representations. 
As explained in the previous paragraph, representations are 
relations of mediation: an item X, by standing-for the item Y, carries 
information I about Y. What connects the item X with the item Y is 
an interpretative function. Gallagher, by recalling the interpretation 
of Peirce’s concept of representation that Menary gives in his book 
Cognitive Integration (Menary 2007: 95-102), claims that neural 
populations cannot be considered to be representations because 
they do not have this triadic structure. On the one hand, he claims 
that the experiencing subject is not an interpreter of her brain states 
(then here he conceives of the Intepretant as the human interpreter, 
restricting the more loose concept of consumer that Menary uses
73
). 
On the other hand he says that neither the brain itself is an 
interpreter of its owns states, “unless one is willing to say that one 
process in the brain interprets another process in the brain as a sign 
                                                          
73  Indeed Menary talks about genuine representations as items whose salient features are 
exploited by some consumer X, and he conceives of these elements of the representational 
relation as “established by conscious intention in humans, or by non-conscious and non-
teleological biological function” (Menary 2007: 99).  
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of something happening in the environment” (Gallagher 2008a: 
361).  
Broadly speaking, I agree with Gallagher. Where there is not a 
triadic relation, there is not representation, because an item X, in 
order to stand for the item Y, should be interpretable. The point I 
would like to consider more closely in order to understand if it rules 
out the concept of representation in relation to brain states concerns 
the Interpretant as a human interpreter. As explained in the previous 
paragraph, according to Peirce the Interpretant is not an equivalent 
of the human interpreter. The human subject embodies 
Intepretants, but she is not the Interpretant itself.
74
 As already 
mentioned, according to Peirce there are emotional Interpretants 
(feelings, emotions), energetic Interpretants (reactions, efforts), and 
ultimate logical Interpretants (habit changes). Then, if one aims to 
be faithful to Peirce’s semiotics, she should not claim that, in 
principle, there should be a deliberate act of interpretation to talk 
about representational dynamics properly.  
Nevertheless, it seems to me that Gallagher’s objection can still be 
useful because it points to the right direction. As explained in the 
Peircean example of musical experience, the triad of Interpretants 
can be interpreted in terms of cognitive degrees. The feeling or 
emotion is followed by a reaction or an effort, which, by means of 
experience can become general, changing the experiential habits the 
subject is engaged with her world by. My question is: can brain states 
be interpreted as feelings, and then as the “first” Interpretant of a 
chain of Interpretants? If we follow Peirce’s discussion about the 
modification of Interpretants within the temporality of semiosis, this 
not seems to be the case. Indeed, what follows the emotional 
Interpretant is an energetic Interpretant, which focuses the subject’s 
attention on what she felt. Then, feelings, in this perspective, entail 
a quality the human subject has somehow access to
75
. Therefore, 
                                                          
74
 This point not only can be explained by recalling the triad of Interpretants mentioned here, 
but it is also made clear by Peirce himself. For example, in a letter to Lady Welby written in 
1908, he says that to describe signs as determining an effect (an Interpretant) upon a person, is 
a “sop to Cerberus” (SS: 80-81), and that his semiotic conception concerns the broader activity 
of signs.  
75
 This interpretation is motivated not only by the fact that Peirce says that the emotional 
Interpretant is followed by an energetic Interpretant (that is a mental or physical effort), but it 
is also faithful to the passages where Peirce talks about feeling more in general. For example, 
he writes that “We are immediately aware […] of our present feelings” (CP 1.167), he talks 
about feelings experienced in outwards sensations” (CP 1.308), he speaks about the “vividness 
of a consciousness of the feeling” (CP 1.309), and about feelings as “immediate to 
consciousness” (CP 1.310).  
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although Peirce’s explanation does not entail that Interepretants are 
human Interpreters, it supports Gallagher’s point: there must be a 
kind of “understanding” (even if this does not entail a propositional 
or complete understanding) of the sign-vehicle in order to give 
meaning to it. In this sense, Peirce’s explanation also rules out the 
second option to argue in favor of AORs, namely the idea of 
considering processes in the brain as interpreting each other as signs 
of things or states of affairs in the environment. Brain states can be 
seen by scientists as if they were representations, but, to the extent 
that there is not actually one point within the flow of brain states that 
corresponds to a feeling, an effort or a disposition to act, they cannot 
be considered to be Interpretants of sign-vehicles by themselves.  
This “missing interpretability” is a crucial point, for at least two 
reasons. First, this rules out the possibility of an item X to bear a 
content: according to explanations in philosophy of mind and 
cognitive sciences, this makes an item non-representational. Second, 
“missing interpretability” undermines the first representational-
condition: the ability of the item or process X to stand for the object 
or event Y. Indeed a sign-vehicle cannot stand for Y without an 
“understanding” that sees it as able to stand-for Y.  
 
This exam of the representational criteria applied to Clark’s AORs gives 
reasons to endorse hypothesis ii) about representations in action-perception 
loops formulated in II.3. There I said that I was prone to think that we do not 
need AORs to explain perception. In virtue of the discussion developed here, 
I claim that the use of a representational vocabulary to explain the cases taken 
into account her is unwarranted. The mechanisms Clark refers to when he talks 
about action-oriented representations are not representations because they do 
not meet three of the four criteria necessary to define an item or process X as 
a representation. 
 
What I would like to take into account now is another problem that 
concerns the use of the concept of AOR in the Extended Mind Hypothesis. 
The objections to this approach considered till this moment have been 
developed at a formal level of explanation. The argumentative structure of 
those objections was the following one: action-perception loops are not 
representational because what is called action-oriented representation is not a 
representation. 
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I think that another way to consider the issue of AORs is to look at the role 
they play in the philosophical project of extending the mind. Do AORs play 
any interesting role in the philosophical job of “extending the mind”?  
At first glance, it seems that the very idea of action-oriented representation 
is not consistent with an extensive account of the mind. This because the use 
of this epistemic posit transposes at another theoretical level the problem taken 
into in account in §I.9, namely the weak idea that the mind is “extended”, that 
is the idea that there is something like an internal core starting from which the 
mind blooms towards the outside. The way Clark deals with AORs expresses 
this point hidden in the folds of the Extended Mind Hypothesis: the 
transcendental condition of action-perception loops is the activation of 
something embedded in human heads, a control and directive structure that 
causes action, which, in its turn, influences perception. The mind extends into 
the body and the world -namely the agent performs action-perception based 
situated cognitive tasks- thanks to the job of peculiar kinds of internal structures, 
which allow the agents to display a given kind of skill, and to act in a given 
environmental context adequately. This is to say that not only the EMH general 
ideas entail an internalistic commitment that, I claim, undermines the project 
of extending the mind, but also the individual explanations of certain kinds of 
cognitive processes (i.e. selective responsiveness to environmental stimuli) 
presuppose an epistemic primacy of intracranial resources on the external 
ones.  
This coarse-grained idea about the way action-oriented representations do 
not match the requirements of an extensive and location-impartial theory of 
cognition and the mind can be also supported by fine-grained objections about 
AORs and mind-extension. As already said in the first paragraph of this 
chapter, in many passages of his work, Clark suggests that mind-extension is 
dependent on an active and dynamical account of cognition.  
Then the question I think we should work on in order to understand the 
role played by AORs in the project of mind-extension is this one: does the way 
Clark describes AORs actually account for representational dynamics in 
action? To put in other words, do Clark’s AORs account for action in 
representation?
76
 Are AORs suitable to explain cognition, and then the mind, 
                                                          
76 The way I consider this point, by talking about “action in representation”, is an implicit 
reference to Mark Rowlands’s discussion offered in Body language. Representation in Action 
(Rowlands 2006a), aimed to provide a representational account of action. Broadly speaking, I 
think that the way he deals with the problem of the relation between action and representation, 
if we consider the broader debate on AORs, is partial. Indeed, in order to argue in favor of 
action-oriented representations in cognition, and to undress them from passivity, one should 
first look at very activity of representations in themselves. This because the project of AORs 
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as a continuous process that crosses the bounds of the skull? I claim that AORs 
do not fulfill this job.  
To explain this point, I begin my discussion by considering again what 
AORs are according to Clark. AORs are neural states which are said to bear a 
content that is at the same time descriptive of features of objects and 
prescriptive of motor commands. Because those representations are goal-
directed or action-oriented, they are said to be active. The idea AORs are built 
on is that  
 
“the brain should not be seen as primarily a locus of inner descriptions of 
external states of affairs; rather, it should be seen as a locus of inner 
structures that act as operators upon the world via their role in determining 
actions” (Clark 1997a: 47, italics added). 
 
 Is this enough to claim that there is action in representation? I think that it 
is not, because the way action is involved in representation is too weak and 
loose. Indeed, a command, an invitation for action is just an antecedent of 
action, not an activity in itself. To account for action in representation, action 
should be considered to be one of the correlates of the representational 
dynamics: the dyadic conception of representation Clark’s account of AORs is 
built on does not allow action to be part of the representation itself. Explaining 
the way Clark describes AORs by making use of the semiotic terminology 
previously presented, it could be said that AORs of Being there are the relation 
between a sign-vehicle, that is a neural population, and an object (the item of 
the external world represented under a certain action-respect, for instance as 
graspable, drinkable, and so on). Action, namely what the agent actually does 
upon the external world, falls outside of the representation. It is not part of it, 
but it is rather conceived as an outcome of internal representational dynamics. 
This explanation, instead of getting rid of the cognitivists’ dichotomies such as 
action/cognition, inside/outside, representational structure/world, endorses 
them. More precisely, even if the EMH, at a general level, claims that action is 
part of a cognitive process, and then that cognition is in action, when it deals 
with AORs, it seems to consider action just as a “derivative” mode of cognition, 
I would say. Action, even if it is cognitive, is an output
77
 of an internal 
representational mechanism that is not active by itself.  
                                                          
was first motivated by the necessity to give an active account of cognition and the mind which 
still involves representations.  
77
 Indeed Clark says that action is determined by internal representations (Clark 1997a: 47).  
Chapter II 
140 
 
Moreover, it is not clear how Clark’s AORs point to a useful theoretical 
direction to account for the dynamical and processual features of cognition 
(Clark 2008: 24), namely to the idea that cognition is realized by continuous 
interactions between internal and external structures. Indeed, Action-oriented 
representations are neural states which cause the cognitive agent’s behavior: 
they seem to be just a repetition of the idea, critically considered in §I.9, that 
the mind is a container of mental states, connected to action and embodied 
dynamics just by a causal or functional relation. To explain this point better, I 
would say that, to account for representational dynamics, for the continuity 
between acting, perceiving and representing, the theory should to think of a 
shift from representations as mental items or states to the activity of 
representing. Indeed, by thinking of representations as neural populations, 
Clark seems to end up with reifying representational mechanism: action-
oriented representations are those “things” inside of human brains that cause 
the agent to act in a certain way. The real dynamic and kinetic aspect of 
cognition (acting in a certain way, moving the body, acquiring a certain bodily 
posture, and so on) is out of the representation. The fact that action is said to 
be caused or controlled by internal representations does not make it 
continuous with the representational mechanisms, and this, again, because 
action is not part of the discrete items that Clark calls “representations”. To 
make representations active and dynamical, they should no longer be 
conceived as things or states, but i) as processes by means of which cognition is 
brought forth, and ii) as activities.  
 
A possible way to think of the activity of representing -explaining 
representations not as items or states but rather as active processes that break 
the internal/external divide, or better, that have an “extra-cranial foundation”- 
can be found again in Peirce’s semiotics.  
The theoretical foundations of Peirce’s semiotic account of cognition has 
been sketched out already. Nevertheless, to explain the theoretical value of 
Peirce’s semiotics for the current debate in cognitive sciences better, it is worth 
to make the theoretical consequences of Peirce’s semiotics more explicit.  
Peirce uses the word “semiosis” to refer to any  
 
“action, or influence, which is, or involves, a cooperation of three subjects, 
such as a sign, its object, and its interpretant, this tri-relative influence not 
being in any way resolvable into actions between pairs. [It is] the action of 
almost any kind of sign” (CP 5.484, text into brackets added)  
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“Semiosis” is a word that Peirce uses to refer to signs in actu. The suffix of 
the word points to this active aspect, to the idea that semiosis concerns the 
activity of signs. Indeed, Peirce borrows the word “semiosis” from the Greek 
(in particular, he takes the expression from Philodemus; Fisch 1986: 241; 274) 
“semeiôsis”. The Greek suffix –sis exactly expresses the ideas of activity and 
process: it means “the act, action, activity or process of” (Colapietro 1989: 19).  
The continuous and processual feature of semiosis suggested by the 
etymology of the word and explicitly ascribed to sign-action, is a consequence 
of some epistemic considerations clearly expressed in the so called anti-
Cartesian essays. In particular, in the essay “Questions concerning certain 
qualities claimed for man” and in “Some consequences of four incapacities”, 
both published by the Journal of Speculative Philosophy in 1868, Peirce 
develops an anti-intuitionist, anti-introspectionist (Fusaroli, Paolucci 2011: 17-
18), and anti-psychologist (Calcaterra 2008) theory of cognition according to 
which:  
 
i) Cognitive agents neither have an introspective access to their 
knowledge of X, nor they have the power of introspectively 
distinguish the different items that are part of a set of knowledge
78
. 
ii) Cognitive agents do not have an immediate cognitive access to 
external facts or objects, but their access is mediated by some kind 
of previous, grounding knowledge (W2: 209-211). 
iii) Actual thoughts (namely occurrent thoughts, which Peirce defines as 
feelings) do not have an intellectual value, because they are not 
general. To acquire meaning, thought should be connected to 
subsequent thought by means of a sign, which makes knowledge 
increasing in virtue of the mediation of an Interpretant, in an ever 
receding process in which the ultimate meaning of a thought shows 
up as virtual, as something that will be done or achieved in the future 
(W2: 227). 
iv) Then, cognition is a semiotic “continuous process” (W2: 224), 
namely a continuous relation among triadic relations whose 
Intepretants become the first correlate of new semiotic relations. 
Thanks to these semiotic relations, something new concerning an 
object, a fact, or an event shows up in the “train of thought” (W2: 
224), by taking with it the history of this novelty (knowledge it 
belongs from), and by affording new cognitive acts.   
                                                          
78
 For the argumentation against Descartes and the Cartesian lineage see W2: 193: 200; 207.  
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Figure 4: Chains 
of Triads  
[Picture taken 
from Atã, Queiroz 
2016] 
 
 
 
The semiotic approach to cognition is then, according to the Peircean 
definition, dynamic and processual: cognition emerges by means of signs, and 
signs are part of a process, the interpretative one, which makes them significant, 
meaningful (Deacon 2014: 97).  
 Also, semiosis, namely sing-action, is in principle unlimited (MS 599: 28-
36). Even if a final Interpretant can be said to stop a chain of signs (namely what 
Peirce calls “the train of thought”; W2: 224), and this could make us prone to 
think that semiosis at that moment is in a certain state, this stop should not be 
interpreted in a chronological sense (Eco 1976: 1465), but rather in a logical 
sense. The Final Interpretant, which is a habit-change that modifies and 
enhances the cognitive agents’ experience, is said to be “final” in a teleological 
sense. The  
 
“Final Interpretant is […] the effect the Sign would produce upon any mind 
upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect. 
[The ] Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every 
Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered. […] The 
Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends.” (SS: 110-111, 
Peirce’s letter to Lady Welby, 1909; text into brackets added)  
 
The final Interpretant, which brings into light the whole conception of an 
object, is the habit-change semiotic chains tend to and that would modify 
everybody’s experience79 of that object in the future (CP 2.148; see also Nöth 
2016: 39). This is to say that a clear cut, identifiable with a state in the semiotic 
process, is just envisioned: it is a virtual stop. It is a tendency, a final task, a 
“hoped” achievement, not an actual state of the semiotic process. Moreover, 
the telos semiotic chains tend to is not conceived as a state, but it is itself active, 
                                                          
79
 According to the pragmatist approach to cognition, experience should be understood as the 
actions that can be performed upon and with that object (W3: 266 and ff.).  
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because the final Interpretant is identified with a peculiar kind of practical 
knowledge, namely with knowing-how to act in certain circumstances (habit).  
To put it in other words, if semiosis is taken into account at a macro-level of 
analysis, in its whole development, it can be said to unfold through the 
continuous and reciprocal relation among sings. In this process, which entails 
the growth of knowledge, individual components and agents are not actually 
conceived as individual, discrete units, but they are rather described as 
transitions:  signs, in their being influenced by previous signs and in their 
tending towards other, more developed signs (Interpretants), are “always about 
to start” and “never about to end” (Fabbrichesi, Leoni 2005: 39).  
To explain this point better, as Fabbrichesi suggests in her book Continuità 
e variazione (Fabbrichesi 2005: 39-44), it is worth to take into account an 
example given by Peirce in his essay “Questions concerning certain faculties 
claimed for man” (1868; W2: 193-210).  
 
“Suppose an inverted triangle ▼ to be gradually dipped into water. At 
any date or instant, the surface of the water makes a horizontal line across 
that triangle. This line represents a cognition. At a subsequent date, there is 
a sectional line so made, higher upon the triangle. This represents another 
cognition of the same object determined by the former [...]. The apex of 
the triangle represents the object external to the mind which determines 
both these cognitions. The state of the triangle before it reaches the water, 
represents a state of cognition which contains nothing which determines 
these subsequent cognitions. To say, then, that if there be a state of 
cognition by which all subsequent cognitions of a certain object are not 
determined, there must subsequently be some cognition of that object not 
determined by previous cognitions of the same object, is to say that when 
that triangle is dipped into the water there must be a sectional line made by 
the surface of the water lower than which no surface line had been made in 
that way. But draw the horizontal line where you will, as many horizontal 
lines as you please can be assigned at finite distances below it and below one 
another. For any such section is at some distance above the apex, otherwise 
it is not a line. Let this distance be a. Then there have been similar sections 
at the distances 1/2a, 1/4a, 1/8a, 1/16a, above the apex, and so on as far as 
you please. So that it is not true that there must be a first. […] Say that 
instants and lines are fictions; only say, also, that states of cognition and 
judgments are fictions. The point here insisted on is not this or that logical 
solution of the difficulty, but merely that cognition arises by a process of 
beginning, as any other change comes to pass” (W2: 210, emphasis added)  
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As the quotation above shows, according to Peirce cognition cannot be 
grasped properly by the concept of state: if the word “state” occurs, it should 
be understood in a fictional sense only. “State of cognition” is a metaphorical 
phrase used by philosophers to understand semiotic processes, focusing on 
some of their phases. Cognition can be compared to the lines made by water 
on the surface of a hypothetical triangle dipped into water. The traces left by 
water on the surface of the triangle form a continuum of traces that goes from 
the basis of the triangle towards its apex, which stands for the object that has to 
be known. Every time someone tries to identify the borders of each line, she 
finds herself engaged in the difficult (or impossible, Peirce would say) task of 
moving the beginning and the ending points of that line, because that line keeps 
on transiting towards previous and subsequent lines. The bounds of each piece 
of cognition cannot be identified de facto, because what should be found keeps 
on changing, it continuously flows into what, according to a second order gaze 
aimed at schematizing those continuous transactions
80
, can be said to come 
“before” or “after” that piece of cognition. To put it in semiotic words, since 
according to Peirce signs are the ingredients of cognition, cognition is made of 
the continuous process through which signs of the “semiotic cable” pass the 
one into the others, keeping on being so intimately connected that they cannot 
be distinguished as discrete elements (W2: 213 for the use of the metaphor of 
the “semiotic cable).  
To this conception of the semiotic activity, which accounts for the 
processual/relational ontology of it (Parker 1994; Pape 2014; Atã, Queiroz 
2016), namely for what actually happens with signs, and for their constitution 
as well, Peirce  adds a methodological level of explanation, which is the one 
taken into account in the previous paragraph, namely the description of the 
micro-semiotic level (Atã, Queiroz 2016: 115 and followings) in which the 
phases of the semiotic process are abstracted from the process. Acknowledged 
that semiosis, according to the law of continuity or synechism, is a continuous 
process whose elements or parts are not actually distinguishable as individual 
items, the philosopher can give a formal description of signs, looking at the 
relations that take place in the triads S-O-I (Sign-Object-Interpretant) 
distributed in the semiotic process.  
 
                                                          
80
 This is a very rough description of the cognitive and metaphysical principle of continuity or 
synechism (from the Greek synechismos, continuous; EP 2:1), which is the “doctrine that all 
that exists [for example mind and matter, or thought in consciousness] is continuous” (CP 
1.172; text into brackets added. See also the paper “The Law of Mind”, published by the 
Monist in 1891; W8: 135-157).   
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Figure 5: Micro-level semiosis  
[Picture taken from Atã, Queiroz 2016] 
 
 
 
As already explained -and as Figure 5 shows- a sign, namely a representation, 
is a triadic relation that involves a sign-vehicle, an Object, and an Interpretant. 
Looking at the internal relation that constitutes a sign, it can be pointed out how 
Peirce’s semiotics tries to account for action in representation, or better, of 
signs as the activity of representing. In fact the third element of the semiotic 
relation, the Interpretant, especially if it is conceived as an ultimate Intepretant, 
as the higher stage of the interpretative development, is said to be an action or 
an action-schema (habit). The crucial point of this description of signs consists 
again in the triadic constitution of representations. By conceiving of the 
interpretative function of signs-vehicles as part of the sign itself, and by defining 
the Interpretant as an action or a pattern of action, Peirce “activates 
representations”. Or, better, since the Interpretant is the crucial part of the 
semiotic process -indeed it is what allows interpretability, and interpretability, 
according the representational criteria previously given, is what makes an X a 
representation- this explanation leads to the collapse of the concept of 
representation on the activity of representing. Indeed, the Interpretant is a 
representation too: it is a representation that mediates between the first and the 
second correlate, and it represent their relation by acting upon the external 
world.  
To consider this point better, think again of Clark’s concept of action-
oriented representation seen from the lens of Peirce’s semiotic terminology81. 
In the example given in §II.3 we saw a cognitive agent who was performing the 
task of picking up all the objects designed for drinking. According to Clark’s 
                                                          
81
 It is worth to make clear that in my development of this reworked notion of “active 
representation” I do not take into account the overall project of Peirce’s theory of perception, 
neither I am faithful to his inferential account of perception, whose core idea is “perceptual 
judgement” (MS [3] 881, Telepathy, partially published in the Collected Papers; CP 7.597-
688). This because the aim of my research project does not consist in a systematic comparison 
between Peirce’s philosophy of cognition and contemporary approaches to cognitive sciences. 
My aim is rather more modest, and it consists in showing how some specific concepts of 
Peirce’s philosophy and semiotics can be helpful to understand and to enrich some problems 
of the current debate in cognitive sciences.  
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explanation, the action of picking-up, which was conceived as an outcome of 
an internal representational mechanism, was said to be performed thanks to 
the occurrence of action-oriented representations that have this form: 
“there/object/for/drinking/-grab/it!”. Considering Peirce’s semiotics -a least at a 
provisional and general level
82
- it could be said that the relation between action 
and perception that Clark explains by means of the concept of action-oriented 
representation can be modeled in the following way. There is a representation 
whose correlates are stimuli from the environment (first correlate), an object of 
the environment, namely the object designed for drinking (second correlate), 
and an Interpretant (third correlate), that is the action of grabbing the object for 
drinking. The action of grabbing the object designed for drinking shows (and, 
according to Peirce this means “represents”) the “affordance power” of the first 
correlate: the Intepretant actualizes a possibility of action by performing that 
action.  At the same time, the Interpretant, by means of the mediation of the 
sign-vehicle, communicates the form of the object represented (MS 793: 1; EP 
2: 544; Atã, Queiroz 2016: 110). By making the agent acting in a certain way 
upon the object, it explicates (namely it “spreads out”, “unfolds” from the Latin 
ex, out, and –plicāre, to fold) the meaning embedded in the object, which the 
pragmatist tradition identifies with its practical bearings
83
, and with the form of 
action that actualizes them.  
In this sense, by appealing to the general idea of sign in Peirce, it can be said 
that semiotic representations can be considered to be “an improved version” 
of Clark’s AORs, and this at least for two reasons. First, not only they are 
endowed with a conative power (because the first correlate of the 
representation affords something that can be done, according to the form of 
the object represented), but, thanks to the concept of Interpretant, they are also 
endowed with a genuine active ability. To put it in other words, Peircean signs 
account for the antecedent of action, for the object the action is performed 
upon, and for action too. Second, those representations do not entail the 
internalistic prejudice Clark’s AORs suffer from. In Clark’s explanation AORs 
were internal action-controllers. In Peirce’s semiotics, thanks to its 
entanglement with pragmatism, representations work as controllers of action as 
well, but they do so by operating “out of the head”84.  Indeed, what constrains 
                                                          
82
 An attempt to apply Peirce’s semiotics to the more specific problem of contextual relevance 
will be made in the next paragraph, where I will try to reassess the enactivist proposal by 
integrating it with Peirce’s concept of indexicality.  
83
 See the 1878 essay “How to make our ideas clear” (W3: 257-275).  
84
 Notice that the externality of the mind in respect to the boundaries of human heads does not 
lead to conceive of the activity of signs as non-mental. Rather, by conceiving of cognition as the 
activity of signs constrained by objects of the world and regulated by habits of action, the 
Activating Representations 
147 
 
the action that will be performed is an object of the world
85
, which is the second 
correlate of the semiotic relation (defined by Peirce as “immediate object”; CP 
4.536). Moreover, the overall cognitive process that unfolds through cables of 
semiotic triads is regulated by something that is internal to the semiotic relation 
but that is not inside the human brain: habit conceived as a law-like rule of 
action, which explicates itself when it solicited by certain (actual, or conceivable, 
according to Peirce’s late pragmatism, which he calls “pragmaticism”86) 
conditions.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
Peircean explanation contributes to define the mind as an activity that takes place in the 
interaction between the cognitive agent and the environment, anticipating a theory of the 
“external mind” (Paolucci 2011: 78-86). In this theory, the mind is not thought to be dependent 
on brain structures (Peirce himself writes that “thought is not necessarily connected to a brain”; 
CP 4.551), but is rather explained as “an external sign” (CP 5.313-4) that develops by means 
of semiotic relations.  
85
 See MS 793: 1; EP 2: 544; see also MS 499, where the object is said to be the sign’s 
determinant”, and MS 320:7, where the object is said to be “the cause of the sign”.  
86
 See for example the letter to Mario Calderoni written in 1905 (CP 8.208), “Issues of 
Pragmaticism”, published by The Monist in 1905 (CP 5.438 and ff.), “A Neglected argument 
for the reality of God”, published by The Hibbert Journal in 1908 (CP 6.490).   
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II.6 Enacting salience. Reassessing the enactivist proposal through 
Peirce’s indexicality.  
In the previous paragraph I considered some objections to AORs.  My 
argument was twofold. First, I argued against AORs by developing my 
objections at a formal level. I showed that Clark’s AORs do not fulfill three of 
the four representational criteria I gave in paragraph II.4 as an outcome of my 
comparative analysis of cognitive scientists’ representational conditions and 
Peirce’s concept of sign. Then, I claimed that AORs are not actually 
representations; therefore I concluded that if we buy this epistemic posit, we 
are committed to an unwarranted philosophical argumentation. Second, I 
developed my objections to Clark’s AORs at another explanatory level: I 
showed that AORs do not even play an interesting job in the broader economy 
of the philosophical project of mind-extension. I concluded my discussion by 
suggesting that Peirce’s concept of sign does not suffer from the problems 
Clark’s AORs entail, which make them unable to support the full hypothesis 
of mind-extension. This discussion was meant to be a preparatory stage for 
what will be discussed in this paragraph. 
Here I will take into account the problem AORs were supposed to solve 
form another, non-representational (at least in a “classical” sense) point of view. 
In fact, I will take into account how an explanation grounded in 
Merleaupontian phenomenology and in ecological psychology tries to solve the 
Generalized Frame Problem. This one has been defined as  the problem of 
selecting (i.e. framing) only relevant information distributed in the context of a 
cognitive practice (Chow 2013: 312- 315), by keeping track of relevant changes 
in the environment (Haselager, Van Rappard 1998: 161).  
 I will suggest that this account of selective responsiveness to contextual 
relevance is an interesting response to the philosophical problem taken into 
account. This for at least three reasons. i) It does not build its explanation on 
an epistemic posit that is unwarranted; ii) it accounts for the agent’s 
phenomenological experience (and this seems to fit with 4Es’ broad project of 
accounting for everyday cognitive experience; see §I.2); iii) it is not built on an 
implicit internalistic prejudice.  
Nevertheless, despite I endorse this “radical embodied” or 
“enactive”approach, I also claim that some aspects of the explanation can be 
developed further. If on the hand the fully embodied and anti-representational 
explanation, by focusing on the concepts of affordance and affect, gives a non-
brain centered solution to the Generalized Relevance Problem, on the other 
hand it seems to be too tied to one of the poles of the agent-environment 
relation: the agential one. Hence I suggest that some insights useful to work on 
the role played by the environment in selective responses can be found in 
Peirce’s thought. In particular, I suggest that Peirce’s concept of index can be 
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helpful to explain why “some affordances stand out more than others” 
(Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014: 2), point at the core of the “radical embodied” 
explanation.  
 
I begin my discussion of the non-representational account of the frame 
problem (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014;  Dreyfus 2002a; 200b; 2008; Rietveld 
2008a; 2008b; 2012a; 2012b; Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014) with a very rough sum-
up of some insights form ecological psychology. Indeed, many of the 
contemporary non-representational approaches are inspired by Gibson’s 
theory of perception (Gibson 1979).  
The core idea of Gibson’s ecological approach to perception is that 
perceptual activity consists of the intentional movement of the whole being in 
its environment. Perception, rather than being a pre-requisite for action, is a 
mode of action.
87
  What we perceive is not mentally represented, but is rather 
a direct function of how we act. Knowledge offered by perception is thus 
practical: “it is knowledge about what an environment offers for the pursuance 
of the action in which the perceiver is currently engaged” (Ingold 2000: 166). 
To put it in other words, human and non-human animals do not perceive 
neutral objects, but they directly perceive affordances for action
88
. What is in 
the world invites agents to act in a certain way and not in another one: 
environmental features directly trigger certain kinds of action, which are part of 
the flow of the practical engagement animals’ lives unfold by.  
According to Gibson,  
 
 “The affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal, what 
it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill. […] They are unique for that 
animal. They are not just abstract physical properties. They have unity 
relative to the posture and behavior of the animal being considered” 
(Gibson 1979/2005: 119-120).   
 
Affordances are what the environment invites the (human or non-human) 
animal to do, according to its possibilities of action. In a rough sense, 
affordances can be described as fundamental features of things that determine 
how things can be possibly used by agents: “they provide strong clues for the 
                                                          
87
 For a broader picture of this active account of perception, see the more detailed explanation 
of “enactive perception” given in §II.2. 
88
 Notice the similarity between this idea and Uexküll’s performance-qualities, taken into 
account in §I.7, where I presented the concept of Umwelt. A more detailed discussion of the 
similarity between Uexküll’s theory of Umwelt and Gibson’s affordances can be found in 
O’Neill 2008, Chapter 9.  
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operations of things” (Norman 1988: 9).  For example, a chair is for support, 
and then it affords sitting; a glass is for seeing through and for breaking; flat, 
porous, smooth surfaces are for writing on; plates are for pushing, knobs are 
for turning, slots are for insert things into, and so on (examples taken from 
Norman 1988: 9). And again,  
 
“an elongated object of moderate size and weight affords wielding, […] a 
rigid object with a sharp dihedral angle, an edge, affords cutting and 
scraping, […] a graspable rigid object of moderate size and weight affords 
throwing, […] a hand- held tool of enormous importance is one that, when 
applied to a surface, leaves traces and thus affords trace- making” (adapted 
from Gibson 1979/2005: 125).  
  
At first glance, this “being-for” of objects, which can be also said to constitute 
their “action-orientedness”, seems to be determined by the very materiality of 
things: by the very material they are made of, by their shape, by the ergonomics 
and physiology of things, and so on. Nevertheless, even if affordances are 
sometimes defined as perceivable resources of the environment (Rietveld, 
Kiverstein 2014: 327), Gibson claims that they should not be identified with 
mere physical properties. This because they are thought in tandem with the 
animal’s posture and behavior: affordances are invitations to act in a certain 
way given the embodiment of an agent.  
To explain this point, Gibson, in his book The ecological approach to visual 
perception, offers a simple example (Gibson 1979/2005: 119-120)
89
. Consider 
a nearly horizontal terrestrial surface that is sufficiently extended (relatively to 
the size of the animal), and which is made of a rigid substance (relative to the 
weight of the animal). This surface affords support: for quadrupeds and bipeds, 
it permits an upright posture, therefore is “walk-on-able” and “run-over-able”. 
The same thing cannot be said about a non-stable, fluid and liquid surface, like 
water or a swamp. For heavy terrestrial animals, instead of being “walk-on-able” 
or “run-over-able”, the surface is “sink-into-able”. On the contrary, this same 
surface affords support for insects, for example: “different layouts afford 
different behaviors for different animals, and different mechanical encounters” 
(Gibson 1979/2005: 120). 
This suggests that affordances -as Chemero points out (Chemero 2003; 
Chemero 2009)- are intrinsically relational. Affordances are neither properties 
of the environment, neither properties of perceiving animals, but they are 
rather the relation between animals’ abilities and perceivable features of the 
environment (Chemero 2003: 181). This is to say that, according to ecological 
                                                          
89
 For another example useful to understand the relation between perceived properties of the 
environment and the embodied agent, see my discussion of Uexküll’s example of the rock 
(Uexküll 1982: 27), discussed in §I.7.  
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psychology, there is a direct link between perceived possibilities of action and 
the embodied agent’s capacities (Rietveld 2008a: 341). Affordances are the 
relation between what an agent can do -and implicitly knows how to do, because 
she learnt how to behave in order to perform actions upon aspects of the world- 
and features of the environment that invite the agent to act in a certain way, 
fitting with the agent’s embodied or “sensorimotor abilities” (Chemero 2009: 
150).  
Nevertheless, despite this tight connection between the animal’s embodied 
abilities and resources of the environment that defines the concept of 
affordance, it should be noticed that affordances are not isolated, they are not 
environmental features that invite the agent to perform a restricted set of 
individual actions. On the contrary, according to Gibson, affordances are 
holistically connected and they are said to form ecological niches. Smaller 
affordances units are embedded in lager units, in which smaller units are 
nested. For example, “canyons are nested within mountains; trees are nested 
within canyons; leaves are nested within trees; and cells are nested within 
leaves” (Gibson 1979/2005: 5; 120). To put it in other words, animals are not 
simply exposed to the “climbability” of mountains and trees, to the 
“graspability” and “eatability” of leaves, but they rather perceive a complex 
intertwinement of invitations for action. This is to say that the animal, during 
its engagement with the environment, does not usually perceive singular or 
discrete affordances, but it is rather solicited by “nests of affordances”. This 
nest of affordances determines how an animal lives in its environment (Gibson 
1979/2005: 120), in its being solicited to perform complex flows of actions. 
This suggests that affordances can be defined as the relation between 
perceivable features of the environment and the animal’s “way of life” (Gibson 
1979/2005: 3; 120) or “form of life” (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014: 2; Rietveld, 
Kiverstein 2014: 327-330), namely what is typical of that living being
90
. 
Moreover, it should be noticed that the complexity of ecological niches or 
“nests of affordances” is motivated by the very definition of affordance. As said 
above, affordances have a relational nature: they pertain to the animal’s 
embodied abilities and to the possibility to perceptually exploit environmental 
resources. Abilities are not just mechanical dispositions that solicit an agent to 
act in a certain way in a given situation. Physical dispositions or reactions 
entertain a determined or deterministic causal relation with the situation that 
triggers them: when they are coupled with the right enabling conditions, 
dispositions are guaranteed to become manifest (for example, think about the 
soluble solid sugar that will always dissolve in water in suitable conditions; 
                                                          
90
 See Hunter’s interpretation of Wittegenstein’s Lebensformen in the Philosophical 
Investigations (Hunter 1968).  
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Chemero 2003: 189). A mere disposition “just is”, it cannot be changed or 
improved. On the contrary, an ability is a practical know-how acquired through 
experience and training, its efficacy can change, it can be improved, and so on. 
This means that, during her practical engagement with the world, the agent can 
make her practical knowledge wider and wider, and this always according to 
her body, which constrains not only the actions the agent can perform, but also 
the abilities she can acquire. This possibility to acquire new embodied skills 
and to develop the abilities she has already acquired influences the structure of 
the “landscape of affordances” (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014) the agent is engaged 
with. To the extent that affordances are perceived in virtue of the abilities the 
agent is endowed with, changes in the agent’s practical knowledge (e.g. 
improvements, new acquisitions) are correlated with changes in the landscape 
of affordances practices take place in. An improvement or enrichment of the 
agent’s practical knowledge determines an enrichment of the field of 
affordances: the agent endowed with brand knew abilities becomes sensitive 
and responsive to features of the environment that did not afford certain skilled 
action in the past.  
For example, think about the main character of the thought experiment 
offered in §I.7: the climber. Before her training, mountains, walls, and 
buildings did not afford “climbability” in the agent’s experience. Instead of 
being perceived as things whose “demand character” (Dreyfus, Kelly 2007: 52) 
consists in their being-climbable, those things used to invite the agent to 
perform other kinds of actions, for instance contemplating the natural beauty 
of the mountain or the fine architecture of the building, hanging up pictures to 
the wall, and so on. The acquisition of a new ability, that displays itself  as an 
expertise, as a readiness to act enabled by anatomic and postural modifications 
(e.g. the arching shape of her hands, the strength of muscles and tendons, the 
relocation of the body’s barycenter), modifies the agent’s experience. Every 
time she sees a mountain, a wall or a building, the climber does not only deal 
with their beauty or with their possibility of being used as surfaces for hanging 
up, but she is also solicited by their climbability. Then, if this example is 
generalized, it can be said that the acquisition of new embodied skills can be 
interpreted not only as an improvement or enrichment of the agent’s practical 
knowledge, but also as  an “education of attention” (Ingold 2000: 354). Thanks 
to skill-acquisition, which takes place during embodied interactions with socio-
material scaffoldings (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014: 331; Ingold 2000: 354 and ff.), 
the salient environmental space (namely the field of affordances) is enriched. 
At the same time, the agent becomes ready to be responsive to this brand new 
salience.  
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This short exam of the notion of affordance shows that ecological 
psychology conceives of perception as a direct, non-representational activity, 
which involves an embodied agent with her sensorimotor abilities (and more in 
general her practical abilities) and a non-neutral, but rather action-oriented 
world. This action-oriented world can be said to be a rich “landscape” or “field” 
of affordances, in which each invitation for action is holistically connected to 
other invitations. Therefore, it can be said that the skilled agent is always 
situated in a world that asks her to perform a huge set of actions.  
The question that seems natural to ask at this moment is the one I dealt with 
for the most part of this chapter: the Frame Problem issue. Given that fields of 
affordances are so rich and complex, how can we explain that agents are prone 
to being solicited by certain affordances of their practical field and not by 
others? To put in other words: why some affordances stand out more than 
others (Rietveld, Bruineberg 2014: 2)? Why agents usually cope with their 
environment just by acting adequately (Rietveld 2008a: 241), namely acting 
upon some environmental resources and not upon others? 
To put it roughly, according to some enactive approaches to cognition, the 
phenomenon of skillful coping does not depend on a system of action-oriented 
representations or on a complex internal mechanism of action-planning and 
action-control, but it is rather a matter of attraction, or better, situated attraction. 
Attraction in a spatio-temporal context puts some affordances in the 
background, and turns other affordances into solicitations or affordances that 
are relevant (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014: 342) in that specific situation.  
 
To explain this “matter of attraction”, the affordance-based explanations I 
am considering here recall Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. As already 
pointed out, many passages of Merleau-Ponty’s works (in particular his 
Phenomenology of Perception; Merleau-Ponty 1945/1962) anticipate the core 
ideas of the embodied and enactive approach to cognition (Dreyfus 2005 ; 
Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991 ; Gallagher, Zahavi 2008; Gallagher 2008b; 
2012; 2017). Here I will not take into account the whole story about Merlau-
Ponty and recent cognitive sciences, but I rather focus on two important 
Merleaupontian concepts contemporary cognitive accounts focus on: 
praktognosia and affect. 
By reassessing Husserl’s notion of operative intentionality -according to 
which the agent’s engagement with the world takes place through actions and 
projects non-reducible to mental states (Gallagher, Miyahara 2012: 120)- 
Merleau-Ponty claims that humans’ access to the world is grounded on a 
particular kind of practical knowledge (praktognosia) that is bodily and motoric. 
Instead of being considered as a particular case of knowledge, logically and 
epistemically forerun by a symbolic or sense-giving function based on acts of 
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thoughts, embodied  cognition is original, primary (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: 
162-164). This is to say that agents’ cognitive practices are primarily action-
oriented and goal-directed. They are grounded on a kind of intentionality that 
is “determined by what the agent is doing and what the agent is ready to do [that 
is praktognosia]” (Gallagher, Miyahara 2012: 136, text into brackets added), 
and this kind of doing is performed by means of the body. To explain this point 
by recalling Merleau-Ponty’s words it can be said that: 
 
“My body is the fabric into which all objects are woven, and it is, at least in 
relation to the perceived world, the general instrument of my 
‘comprehension’ […]. My body is the pivot of the world: I know that objects 
have several facets because I could make a tour of inspection of them, and 
in that sense I am conscious of the world through the medium of my body” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: 273; 94-95) 
 
This is to say that agents have access to the world thanks to that general 
instrument of cognition that is the moving and active body, endowed with what 
Merleau-Ponty calls “motor power”, “motor project”, or “motor intentionality” 
(Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: 127). In cognitive practices, instead of thinking that 
the world is like this or like that, we implicitly know what we can do (Merleau-
Ponty 1945/2002: 127), we are “motorically directed” towards the world, which 
is perceived according to our goals.  
For example, think about a girl who is playing football. When the agent is 
performing this activity, to her, the football field is not an object of knowledge. 
She does not speculate about its qualities, but she just acts, she is smoothly 
engaged in the flow of her activity. The football field is not just made of grass, 
it is not just rectangular, and so on, but it is pervaded by lines of forces (e.g. the 
yard lines), and it is articulated in sectors (e.g. the openings between the 
adversaries) that call for a certain mode of action and which guide action as if 
the player were unaware of it. The field is not given to the agent as an object of 
knowledge, but it is rather “the immanent term” of “her practical intensions”.91 
Merleau-Ponty’s motor intentionality is precisely this: the football player’s 
becoming one with the practical bearings of the field and her becoming one 
with her bodily posture. It is the relation between the goal-directedness of the 
agent’s practices and the capacity of the world to afford the agent’s actions.  
Crucially, this pre-reflective “I can”, that is praktognosia, is dynamic: the 
whole organism’s task is redefined constantly, according to the spatio-temporal 
situation of the task. The leading ‘I can’ changes from moment to moment 
(Rietveld 2008a: 342). What the body tends to is always and crucially 
                                                          
91
 Example taken from Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior (1942), as reported in 
Thompson 2007: 313-314. 
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determined in tandem with what the agent perceives and with the momentary 
embodied condition of the agent. In this sense, the practical knowledge 
Merleau-Ponty talks about is highly context-sensitive, and this flexibility is 
precisely what the problem of selective responsiveness is concerned with. 
 
Nevertheless, even if what Merleau-Ponty says about the fundamental ‘I can’ 
seems to support the picture of affordances given above, because it takes into 
account cognitive agents’ motor abilities, the goal-directedness of the perceived 
world, and the relation between these two relata, it is still not clear how selective 
responses occur. To put in other words: what does direct a motoric intentional 
movement to that specific feature of the environment the adequate action will 
be performed upon? 
According to contemporary enactive accounts of selective responsiveness, a 
possible solution to this issue can be found again in Merleau-Ponty, and in his 
way of characterizing motor intentionality as affectively tuned. As Rietveld 
points out (Rietveld 2008a: 345-346), Merleau-Ponty is quite clear about this 
point. Indeed, in Phenomenology of Perception he writes that  
 
“The perceiving subject ceases to be an ‘acosmic’ thinking subject, and 
action, feeling and will remain to be explored as original ways of positing an 
object, since ‘an object looks attractive or repulsive before it looks black or 
blue, circular or square’” (Merleau-Ponty 1945/2002: 28, emphasis added)  
 
Merleau-Ponty says that the way agents have access to the world is not only 
grounded on a fundamental action-orientedness, but also, in its turn, this 
action-orientedness is affectively or emotionally determined (Heidegger 
already noticed; see §II.2). Before being triggered by perceivable features of 
the world, the agent feels attraction or repulsion for those features, according 
to her own concerns. In this sense, the body, described as a “general instrument 
of comprehension”, not only is a skillful body, which, according to its abilities, 
“is designed” to cope with the environment, but it is also a “concernful” body 
(Rietveld 2008a). It cares about what happens, and thanks to this affective 
mode, it is more or less opened to certain aspects of the world. That is why, 
given the embodied agents’ motor abilities, some affordances leave her cold, 
and others attract her. The agent is always and already emotionally directed 
towards some features of the environment and not towards others because what 
she perceives first is an affective situation. This affective situation is constituted 
by her own concerns and affective states, and of the affective tone of the 
perceived environment, which displays attractive or repulsive features. To put 
it in other words, in situated cognitive practices some affordances stand out 
more than others because they matter more, and they do so because they are 
perceived as attractive. In this sense, it can be said that fields of affordances are 
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affectively structured, and they show up in this way because the perceiving 
agent’s behavior is controlled at an affective level before being controlled at the 
level of action. A given affective tone is responsible of the initiation of a 
cognitive act (and then of the agent’s being solicited by certain affordances) and 
for the bifurcation of two cognitive acts. This seems to suggest that agents act in 
an adequate way in a context because their perceptual activities are affectively 
controlled. 
To explain this point better, Rietveld (Rietveld 2008a: 350-351) gives an 
example taken from Varela’s article “The specious present: a 
neurophenomenology of time consciousness” (Varela 1999: 298-299). 
Consider an agent who is writing a paper on her laptop. While writing, she hits 
the control key, and she is shown a message that says “Do you really wish to 
erase this text?”. She find herself in an affective tone of tension, which is 
followed by the awareness of the possibility of making a fatal mistake: if she 
clicks on the “yes” button, what she wrote will be deleted forever. The message 
triggered her attention, and this made the unreflective cognitive practice she is 
engaged in transparent. This awareness, which determines action-planning 
(erasing the text or keep it), is emotionally motivated. The tension she felt when 
the message was shown in the past emotionally tuned her in a certain way in 
the current situation, and made the window showing the message particularly 
interesting at that moment. She was prepared to deal with the emotional 
consequences of her actions, and then to act in a certain way according to those 
emotions and concerns. In this sense, it can be said that relevant affordances in 
a given context are affectively enacted: salience is brought forth by the agent’s 
reactions caused by an affective tone.  
 
This explanation of selective responsiveness is particularly interesting for the 
purposes of this chapter. Indeed, contrarily to Clark’s explanation, it seems to 
have many pros. 
 
i) It is phenomenologically viable. Indeed, it accounts for what agents 
experience in their everyday practices, and it does so by taking into 
account many variables, such as the cognitive agent’s embodied 
condition, emotions, actions, concerns, and so on.  
ii) It is epistemically economic, because it relies on the twofold nature 
of intentionality only. This one is conceived as practical and 
affective.  
iii) It does not make use of unclear and unwarranted concepts (i.e. 
AORs).  
iv) Moreover, it fits with experimental results from cognitive 
neuroscience concerning emotion regulation and impulse control 
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(Frijda, Ridderinkhof, Rietveld 2014). Indeed, it has been shown 
that dopamine
92
 neurons are sensitive to changes in the prediction 
of the “goodness” of ongoing actions. Contrary to what was the 
mainstream account of the role of dopamine in action-control - 
according to which dopamine reinforcement-learning is said to 
mediate feelings of satisfaction experienced by an animal receiving 
a reward (and then dopamine was considered as an “outcome” of 
the emotional appraisal of an action already performed)- recent 
research (Wickelgren 1997) showed that once the animal has 
learned to perform the task correctly, the presentation of rewards 
does not influence the dopamine system. On the contrary, the 
dopamine system becomes active in the anticipation of a 
forthcoming reward rather than on the delivery of the reward itself 
(Holroyd, Coles 2002: 681-682).  
This seems to provide evidence for the hypothesis -formulated in 
Merleau-Ponty 1945, Varela 1999 and endorsed in Rietveld 2008a- 
that emotions work as control parameters for action, and then 
contribute to the goal-directedness of the agent’s practices, in which 
the motivation of selective responsiveness to affordances was 
individuated. 
 
Nevertheless, even if this account of selective responsiveness has many pros, 
and then I claim that is a better explanation than the representational proposal, 
it seems to me that, in order to be more complete, some integrations are 
required. Indeed, this explanation is particularly focused on one correlate of 
the affordance-relation. It explains how some affordances become relevant in 
a given context, and then how they are adequately grasped by the agent, by 
stressing on the agent’s characteristics (her motor and emotional intentionality).  
Obviously, this does not mean that the role of world in this dynamics is 
neglected. As explained previously, Merleau-Ponty’s notion of intentionality 
this non-representational account of selective responsiveness relies on 
considers the world as “the immanent term” of the agent’s practical 
interactions. This means that the world in practices is not an object, an ideal 
                                                          
92 Dopamine is a brain neurotransmitter, identified about fifty years ago, and it is 
correlated to emotions. Indeed, it has been shown that there is a direct evidence of 
dopamine involvement in emotional recognition processes: emotional processes are 
dependent upon many brain structures, the majority of which form part of the limbic 
system, which is subjected to dopamine innervation (Salgado-Pineda, Delaveau, Blin, 
Nieoullon 2005: 228).  
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term that gives rise to an indefinite variety of perspectival views, remaining 
equivalent although the perspective changes, but it is rather a flexible 
component of the intentional relation. Think again about the football player’s 
example. Each maneuver performed by the player “modifies the character of 
the field and establishes in it new lines of force in which the action in turn 
unfolds and is accomplished, again altering the phenomenal field” (Merleau-
Ponty 1942/1963: 168). This suggests that the world is a constitutive part of a 
situated intentional movement. The explanation does not neglect the world, 
but it rather thinks about the way it melts into the cognitive agent’s activities.  
Nonetheless, it seems to me that this explanation does not develop an 
analysis of the changes that the agent’s selective responsiveness produces in the 
affordance landscape itself, nor it focuses on the very role of the world in 
selective, contextual responsiveness. Rietveld and Kiverstein consider this point 
very quickly when they talk about “education of attention”, mentioned by 
Ingold, and they just say that the acquisition of new skills leaves “landmarks” 
that guide the agent’s activities (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014: 331). Or again, they 
write: “it is the world, the soliciting relevant affordance encountered in a 
concrete situation, which motivated an individual agent to do one thing rather 
than the other” (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014: 345), adding that (higher) cognitive 
capacities should be thought “in terms of skillful activities in sociocultural 
practices and the material resources exploited in those practices” (Rietveld, 
Kiverstein 2014: 326). My point is that, despite they acknowledge the 
importance of the socio-material world in their account of selective 
responsiveness, they do not explore this idea further. 
 
In order to develop Rietveld and Kiverstein’s insights about this point 
further, I will try to flesh out the affordance-based explanation of contextual 
relevance by integrating it with Peirce’s concept of indexicality93. To develop 
my explanatory hypothesis, I make the premises of my argumentation clear.  
Recent approaches to cognition (Hoffmeyer 2015; Maran, Kull 2014; 
Morgagni 2012; Nöth 2011; Nöth, Kull 2001; Sonesson 2012; Zlatev 2012; 
Windsor 2004), which integrate semiotics with other disciplines - such as 
theoretical and applied biology, landscape studies, communication studies, 
cognitive sciences, phenomenology, and the humanities more in general-, 
explain cognitive phenomena as unfolding in the relation between organisms 
and environment. This relation is said to be mediated by signs.  
According to this approach, not only cognition is a meaning-making process 
(as Peirce already pointed out) embodied in signs with different features, but 
the environment in which meaning-making processes develops is a semiotic 
                                                          
93
 To understand better the general theoretical link between ecological psychology and Peirce’s 
semiotics at the level of secondness, where indexes lay, see O’Neill 2008: 155.  
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niche (Atã, Queiroz 2016). Semiotic niches are conceived as cognitive niches, 
namely as cognitive spaces or habitats which are the product of human and 
non-human animals’ natural and cultural evolution (Laland, Olding-Smee, 
Feldman 2000). Those habitats are particularly helpful for the development of 
agents’ cognitive practices. Indeed, as explained in my discussion of the concept 
of Umwelt, they work as external cognitive scaffoldings, offering saliences that 
can be externally manipulated by agents. This makes the agents’ internal 
cognitive load lighter.  
A very simple example of cognitive niche is the following one. Think about 
“a novice bartender [who] inherits an array of differently shaped glassware and 
cocktail furniture, and a practice of serving different drinks in different kinds 
of glass” (Clark 2005c: 256, text into brackets added). The novice bartender 
inherits a structured environmental space from the expert bartender who used 
to work at the coffee shop. Indeed, the expert bartender lined up differently 
shaped glasses in a spatial sequence corresponding to the temporal sequence 
of drinks orders. The problem of remembering what drink to prepare next is 
made easier by this organization of the space, because it is translated into a 
simple perceptual problem. In this sense, it can be said that the spatial 
organization of the objects and tools the bartender uses can be seen as a 
cognitive niche. It is something that was created in time, thanks to the practice 
of many bartenders, and it is inherited by the new barman, which learns how 
to be effective in her practice relying on a pre-structured niche, whose efficacy 
was tested in the past. 
Now, the mentioned semiotic approaches to cognition holds that cognitive 
niches are populated by different kinds of signs. That is to say, animals structure 
their environment in a certain way. In doing so, they also learn to see them as 
populated by different kinds of signs (embedded in material artifacts, gestures, 
intersubjective dynamics), which afford a great variety of actions and practices 
(Malafouris 2013: 89-90; 94) in virtue of their semiotic properties. To put in 
other words, in their cognitive practices, agents perceive a landscape of signs 
that functions as a “semiotic interface between resources and organisms” 
(Farina 2008:76; see also Farina, Belgrano 2005). This one allows them to 
exploit the environmental resources in a successful way.  
 
For what concerns the problem I am dealing with in this chapter, namely 
contextual relevance, I think that there is a kind of sign that can be taken into 
account in order to understand why some signs stand out more than others in 
the rich landscape of signs: the indexical sign. My claim is the following one: 
indexical signs, in virtue of their semiotic constitution, are signs that stand out 
in the landscape of signs, they trigger the agent’s attention, and make her acting 
in a certain way. This is to say that the semiotic constitution of these signs 
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explains how and why agents are attracted by some features of the unruly and 
noisy environment and not by other features.  
To explain my point better, I consider Peirce’s definition of index.  
The term “index” shows up in Peirce’s classification of signs in relation to 
the dynamical object
94
 they refer to (CP 8.335). In the Baldwin Dictionary 
(1901), Peirce writes: 
 
“[Index:] A sign, or representation, which refers to its object not so much 
because of any similarity or analogy with it, nor because it is associated with 
general characters which that object happens to possess, as because it is in 
dynamical (including spatial) connection both with the individual object, on 
the one hand, and with the senses or memory of the person for whom it 
serves as a sign, on the other hand. […] Indices may be distinguished from 
other signs, or representations, by three characteristic marks: first, that they 
have no significant resemblance to their objects; second, that they refer to 
individuals […]; third, that they direct the attention to their objects by blind 
compulsion. […]  Psychologically, the action of indices depends upon 
association by contiguity, and not upon association by resemblance or upon 
intellectual operations”. (CP 2.305 – 2.306)95  
 
An indexical sign
96
 is a sign that represents an individual object i) by 
entertaining a dynamical connection with it, and ii) by entertaining a 
dynamical connection with the agent’s perceptions or memories of that 
object, namely it entertains a deictic connection with bodily states
97
 (Stutz 
2014: 5).  
This connection between the object and the agent’s perceptions and 
memories -which, as already said, is a “direct physical connection” (W5: 
254)- is a dynamical connection. In fact, Peirce says that the effects indexes 
produce are compulsory reactions of attention. These reactions i) change 
the agent’s way of being situated in her practices, by directing her attention 
                                                          
94
 Peirce distinguishes between the Immediate Object, “which is the Object as the Sign itself 
represents it […], and the Dynamical Object, which is the Reality which by some means 
contrives to determine the Sign to its Representation” (CP CP 4.536). The Immediate Object 
is the object as it is represented in the semiotic relation, the dynamic object, is an object of 
world.  
95
 For a different discussion of this Peircean citation, see Fumagalli 1995: 338-345.  
96
 Here I use the expression “indexical sign” instead of “index” as an opportunity to make an 
aspect of Peirce’s explanation of indexicality more clear. I talk about “indexical signs” because, 
according to Peirce, there are not pure indexes, but signs whose indexical features are very 
strong (CP 2.306). Therefore, when I will use the word “index”, remember that I refer to signs 
whose indexical features are more predominant than the iconic and symbolic ones.  
97
 Peirce says that Indexes have a “real physiological force over the attention” (CP 8.41; 
emphasis on the word “physiological” added).  
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towards a specific aspect of the practice, and, in doing so ii) they make her 
ready to do something upon that new perceived salience.  
This is to say, an index is a sign that represents its object as an individual 
salience, and it does so by catching the agent’s attention brutally, by pushing 
her to do something. What the agent who reacts to indexes does is exactly 
that kind of action the indexical mark requires. To the extent that indexes 
are in a direct connection (or contiguity) with the object they represent, their 
cognitive effects are tied to the particular context in which they show up: 
they “light up” an object of the semiotic landscape as the individual salience 
the attention has to be directed towards compulsorily.  
To explain this point better, I consider some examples of index given by 
Peirce.  
 
i) The term “here” in the sentence “Within a thousand yards of 
here” (CP 2.305). “Here” draws the speakers’ attention towards 
the ground between them. It is a sign that makes sense in that 
given context, in the presence of that portion of ground. The 
effect it produces is “pointing energetically to the ground”, 
making the agents feeling that portion of ground that was not 
salient in their practice before “here” was uttered. Crucially, it 
does so “brutally”, namely without entailing a “description” of the 
object indicated
98
. It makes the object directly present to the 
agent’s attention.  
ii) A finger that points to the fire (CP 2.305). The finger functions 
as an index because it is dynamically connected to the fire. It is 
like a fire alarm that forces the agent’s eyes to turn that way, by 
producing a rupture in the “normal” flow of signs the cognitive 
agent’s experience unfolds by. The pointing finger entails a 
compulsion to see the hic et nunc (CP 2.336) of the practice the 
agent is engaged in. At the same time, it marks an individual 
element of that practice. 
iii) A “weathercock”, which takes the same direction of the wind (CP 
2.286), and forces the agent to look in the same direction it points 
to. 
 
Now, these examples seem to suggest that there are some “things” in the 
environment (a word uttered during a linguistic practice, a gesture, an object) 
that solicit the agent’s attention more than other things do. As already 
                                                          
98
 See CP 3.361, where Peirce says that Indexes assert nothing.  
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explained, according to a semiotic approach to cognition modeled on Peirce’s 
thought, cognitive practices in general can be said to develop through signs, 
which afford some kind of action. The notion of index seems to suggest that 
agents are prone to act upon certain given signs and not upon others because 
there are signs, namely indexical signs, whose demand character is stronger. 
When I say that their demand character is stronger, I do not want to mean that 
only indexical signs push agents to react or act in the semiotic landscape, or that 
indexical signs are the only ones able to show the practical bearings of an 
externally represented object. Rather, I want to suggest that indexes, in virtue 
of their high degree of context-sensitiveness (that is their being physically 
connected to the individual object represented, and physiologically connected 
to attentional phenomena), and in virtue of their ability to solicit immediate 
reactions, function as markers of salience. They stand out in the landscape of 
signs by forcing the agent’s attention towards what should be done. 
That is why I claim that indexes explain how and why some affordances 
matter more than others, integrating the enactive approach to “contextual 
relevance”.  
On the one hand, because indexes stand out in the landscape of signs, they 
put other signs in the background for a moment. This would explain how some 
features of the world, in virtue of their constitution (in this case, semiotic 
constitution) matter more than others in a given situated practice.  
On the other hand, since they are dynamically connected to the object 
represented in the semiotic relation and dynamically connected to the agent’s 
attention, they are good epistemic candidates to explain how and why agents 
usually perform the right kind of action in perceptually undetermined 
environments. Indeed, in indexical semiotic relations, the agent’s attention is 
brutally triggered, and the agent is forced to do exactly what the indexical 
dynamics ask to do. Indexes ask to react to that individual object (the 
environmental salience) they represent.  
To put in other words, indexes seem to do the job of action-oriented 
representations, without entailing the problems these epistemic posits have in 
Clark’s explanation.  
First, they are tailored to the agent’s attentional experience. They are directly 
connected to the agent’s attentional phenomena because they operate in the 
realm of physiology: they trigger and immediate reaction. 
Second, they account for the action-command aspect ascribed to AORs, 
since the force they have on the agent is brutal: they make her acting in a certain 
way compulsorily. 
Third, they are tied to the present context of the agent’s practice. In 
particular, they explain how that particular individual environmental feature 
marks a salience that will determine how the cognitive practice will develop.  
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Crucially, all the job indexes do is performed outside of the skull. Instead 
of being embedded in internal representational mechanisms, indexes are part 
of a semiotic relation that directly takes place in the flow of the cognitive 
practice. In this sense, indexes not only account for the antecedent of action, 
working as triggers for reactions, but also account for action in indexical 
practices: the agent’s reaction they trigger is part of the semiotic relation itself.  
That is why I said that Peirce’s concept of indexical sign avoids Clark’s 
AORs problems. Indexes are not internal signs primarily, then they do not 
entail an internalistic prejudice. Moreover, they seriously account for action in 
semiotic practices, not conceiving of it as an output of internal representations.  
Furthermore, this externalist, active, and dynamical explanation of salience 
in context seems to be consistent with the general ideas suggested by the 
enactive explanation. Indeed, it does not presuppose the complex internal 
representational mechanism rejected by the enactive approach to cognition, 
and it does not entail conceptualization (Short 1996: 489): indexes are part of 
the agent’s pre-reflective engagement with the world. Moreover, indexicality 
explains the agent’s meaningful “being-in-the-context” as immediate -as the 
enactive explanation does- because indexes are said to trigger the agent’s 
attention directly and immediately.  
Given that the two explanations –at a broad theoretical level, at least99- seem 
to be consistent the one with the other, I claim that Peirce’s indexes are good 
candidates to make the enactive approach to selective responsiveness more 
complete. As already said, the enactive explanation acknowledges the 
importance of the role played by features of the world in explaining how and 
why some affordances matter more than others, but it does not develop this 
point further
100
. Conceiving of relevant affordances as indexically grounded 
would fill this gap. Indeed, it would explain selective responsiveness as 
determined by i) the agent’s affective and practical intentionality, and by ii) 
some aspects and dynamics of the environment which, thanks to their indexical 
nature, stand out in the rich landscape of affordances, controlling action 
immediately and compulsorily (West 2016: 225) “from the outside”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
99
 See Gallagher 2009.  
100
 For a more general semiotic critique of the Enactivist approach to cognition concerning the 
primacy given to human agents in cognitive practices see De Jesus 2014.  
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II.7 Concluding remarks.  
 
This chapter was devoted to discuss the problem of practical knowledge by 
considering the issue of selective responsiveness to stimuli (i.e. the Generalized 
Frame Problem) as a special case of this problem. I showed that both the EMH 
and the Enactive approach to cognition pay particular attention to practical 
knowledge, and they explain agents’ smooth engagement with their world by 
focusing on the concept of activity. Nevertheless, these two approaches to 
cognition disagree on the role played by internal representations in these 
practical engagements.  
The EMH wants to preserve internal representations, and it reassesses them 
in order to make them matching an embodied, active, and extended approach 
to cognition. On the contrary, the Enactivist explanation wants to get rid of 
internal representational mechanisms endorsed by EMH.  
In my discussion, I explained why I think that Clark’s account of selective 
responsiveness is not philosophically viable, and I did this by considering some 
objections to AORs. These ones showed that AORs do not fulfill some of the 
criteria necessary to talk about representations properly. Therefore I claimed 
that the use of a representational gloss in the case taken into account is 
unwarranted.  
Moreover, I pointed out that the way Clark talks about AORs in his book 
Being there offers other reasons to think that the EMH is not as radical as one 
could think. The way this explanation deals with AORs show that the EMH is 
committed to an internalistic prejudice. Indeed, instead of describing the 
agent’s practical engagements with the world by stressing on practice itself, 
Clark’s explanation seems to consider practice as a derivative mode of 
cognition forerun by internal mechanisms, which seem to be considered to be 
the original core of cognitive processes. Furthermore, even if those 
mechanisms are said to be endowed with active features, the way they entail 
action is too weak. Indeed AORs have a conative power, but they are not 
actions in themselves.  
Considered the problems Clark’s explanation entails, I tried to find a 
possible solution to the Generalized Frame Problem by looking at the way the 
enactive approach to cognition deals with selective responsiveness and 
contextual relevance. I claimed that this explanation is more viable than Clark’s 
one because it accounts for phenomenological experience, it is epistemically 
economic, it does not make use of an unwarranted epistemic posit (the concept 
of AOR), and it fits with experimental results from cognitive neurosciences.  
Despite I am sympathetic with the enactive explanation, I also claimed that 
this approach to contextual relevance should be integrated in a broader 
explanatory framework, in order to make it stronger and more complete. 
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Indeed, despite explanations that cross ecological psychology with Merleau-
Ponty’s phenomenology acknowledge the importance of the socio-material 
world in episodes of selective responsiveness to affordances, they not develop 
this point further. This because they do not take into account in detail how 
certain structures of the environment display salient features in virtue of their 
constitution. 
Therefore I suggested to integrate the enactive explanation within a semiotic 
explanatory framework inspired by Peirce’s thought. In particular, I suggested 
that cognitive niches can be seen as semiotic niches, and that saliences in 
semiotic niches can be interpreted as indexes.  
Conceiving of relevant affordances as indexes is helpful for two reasons. 
Firs, at a general level, Peirce’s semiotic account of cognition is suitable to 
explain cognitive phenomena from an externalist perspective, and it does so by 
focusing on the concept of activity interpreted in a semiotic way. This is 
precisely what the non-representational explanation of selective responsiveness 
looked for.  
Second, by focusing of semiotic features of cognitive niches, the theory can 
explain why some affordances matter and stand out more than others, paying 
attention not only to the agent’s abilities and concerns, but also to the other 
parts of the coupled system made of the organism and its cognitive niche.  
Therefore, I suggest that this integrated account of the Generalized Frame 
Problem is able to provide a balanced, non-internalist, non-agent-bounded, and 
active explanation of adequate cognitive performances in context.  
Moreover, this semiotic implementation of the enactive approach to 
cognition seems to be suitable to account for the mind as an extensive process, 
claim endorsed in Chapter I, and that, contrarily to the EMH, is not compatible 
with internalism at all (Hutto, Kirchhoff, Myin 2014: 4). According to this 
explanation, the mind should not be thought to be an internal capacity that just 
exploits external scaffolding, or that sometimes is instantiated by external 
resources. Extensive minds are always and already world-involving (Hutto, 
Myin 2013: 137).  
Peircean semiotics, as showed in my discussion of selective contextual 
responsiveness, fosters this idea. This for two main reasons:  
 
i) As “extensive enactivism” does (Hutto, Kirchhoff, Myin 2014; 
Hutto, Myin 2013), it gives an active account of cognitive processes, 
and it does so thanks to the concept of sign-action (semiosis).  
ii) It offers interesting conceptual tools (e.g. indexicality) to examine the 
way the world is involved in cognitive practices. In this way it helps 
the enactive proposal to flesh out its conception of the mind as 
already world-involving, since it does not conceive of salient features 
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of the world as dependent on the agent’s concerns only, but rather 
as signs that stand out in virtue of their semiotic constitution.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter III 
167 
 
Chapter III 
 
Predictive Processing.  
The problem of representations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictive Processing 
168 
 
III.1 Introduction. Approaching Predictive Coding.  
In this chapter, I will consider Predictive Coding, a contemporary 
explanation of action-perception loops, whose explanatory unit –in particular 
in its classical version- consists in the brain’s anticipatory mechanisms. In my 
exam of Predictive Coding, I will examine the way the EMH and the enactive 
approach to cognition interpret the core ideas of this theory. 
To make my core claim clear, in §III.2,  I contextualize Predictive Coding 
in a broader theoretical frame, explaining why I think that this approach to 
action-perception loops is aimed at discussing the same issues considered in 
Chapter II: anticipatory and recognition processes postulated to explain agents’ 
smooth engagement with their environments. Therefore I formulate a working 
hypothesis, which will guide my argumentation: if a version Predictive Coding 
relies on the same concepts considered in the previous chapter, in particular 
AORs, the explanation will probably entail the same philosophical problems 
considered in my previous discussion about practical knowledge. 
After this brief theoretical contextualization of Predictive Coding, in §III.3, 
I will take into account a strongly internalist version of this approach to 
anticipatory mechanisms: Hohwy’s “Predictive Mind”. The exam of Hohwy’s 
theory has two main purposes: i) introducing the key concepts of Predictive 
Coding, and ii) preparing the discussion of Clark’s approach to this theoretical 
framework. 
In §III.4, I will examine Clark’s approach to the “predictive mind”, and I 
will discuss the way he tries to make this theoretical framework matching the 
philosophical requirements of the EMH. I will claim that Clark’s strategy to 
extend the “predictive mind” is too weak, because it makes use of concepts that 
entail internalistic prejudices (Parity Principle and sampling). 
In §III.5 I will develop my objections further, by taking into account the way 
Clark makes use of the notion of representation in his “Predictive Processing”. 
My exam of the concept of representation will show that the use of notions 
such as “probabilistic representation”, “error representation”, and “action-
oriented representation” is philosophically unwarranted, because the processes 
Clarks wants to explain do not meet the conditions that philosophers of 
cognitive sciences endorse to talk about representation properly. Moreover, I 
will discuss the concept of “action-oriented representation” in more detail, and 
I will claim that the appeal to this notion is a symptom of how Clark underplays 
the role of embodied action in predictive mechanisms. Explaining real 
embodied, contextual action through the notions of “action-oriented model” 
and AOR, Clark fails to meet the requirements of a more enactive account of 
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cognition. This makes the “peace treaty” he suggests enactivists to sign by 
endorsing “Action-Oriented Predictive Processing” unacceptable from an 
enactive perspective. 
Given the problems Clark’s proposal entails, in §III.6, I will take into 
account another way to conceive of predictive processes, developed within an 
enactive framework that couples the already discussed work on the “field of 
relevant affordances” and some insights form “enactive affective science” (e.g. 
the notions of situated core relational theme and enactive appraisal).  
In §III.7, I will sum-up my considerations about the way the EMH and the 
enactive approach to cognition deal with the issue of prediction in cognitive 
processes. Moreover, I will notice that the centrality of the affective dimension 
in the enactive proposal not only helps the explanation to give a more situated 
account of PP, but it is also crucial to prepare the philosophical ground to 
answer an objection against the enactive approach to cognition: the idea that 
enactivism is a new form of behaviorism because it rejects internal 
representations and computations.   
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III.2 Setting out the problem: the theoretical continuity between 
AORs and Predictive Processing.  
In the previous chapters, I took into account the broad project that “4Es” 
approaches to cognitive sciences promote. I pointed out that, looking at the 
broad landscape of those theories, theoretical proposals that fall under the label 
“4Es cognition” or under the umbrella term “embodied cognition” (Violi 2003: 
59-62) point to “mind extension”, or at least they aim to reconsider the way we 
should do cognitive sciences, by reconfiguring or rejecting cognitivism (Menary 
2010d: 459). Indeed, the overall project of those approaches to cognition 
seems to consist in a redefinition of the mind’s boundaries through the 
inclusion of the role of the anatomical, sensorimotor, lived, and affective body, 
and of the natural, cultural, and social environment in cognitive processes. 
Nevertheless, I also noticed that the inclusion of those factors - which I 
previously called “dirty factors” to mark their contrast with cognitivists’ sanitized 
explanations of cognition (see §I.2) - does not guarantee the development of 
the full thesis of “mind extension”. As I explained in chapter I -and as other 
scholars have already claimed (e.g. Fusaroli, Paolucci 2011; Gallagher 2011a), 
the progressive inclusion of those factors in contemporary explanations of 
cognition and the mind gives rise to different pictures of the mind, whose 
departure from cognitivism is more or less radical.  
In Chapter I it has been shown that, despite works in cognitive linguistics, 
“grounded cognition”, and some versions of “embedded cognition” make great 
steps forward in the project of understanding the mind as embodied and 
enhanced by external scaffoldings, those approaches do not seem to explicitly 
draw a systematic picture of cognitive processes aimed at rethinking the very 
ontology of the mind.  
On the contrary, this theoretical project is at the core of two specific versions 
of embodied cognition: the enactive one and the functionalist approach to 
embodiment (Gallagher 2011a; Gallagher 2017: 35) endorsed by Clark in his 
EMH. In my discussion of the two theories I noticed that, despite these two 
approaches share the idea of “mind-extension”, there is a huge theoretical 
difference between them. This not only because they come from different 
philosophical lineages (phenomenology, theoretical biology, ecological 
psychology vs. analytic philosophy and AI)
101
, but also and especially because 
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 Here it is worth to notice that this individuation of the sources of the enactivist approach to 
cognition and the EMH works at a broad level (Gallagher 2017: 48), and it is accurate if we 
consider early works on enactivism, which clearly emphasized their affiliation with the 
phenomenological tradition, in particular with Merleau-Ponty’s work. Indeed, some of the 
more recent enactive approaches to cognition (e.g. Hutto, Myin 2013; Hutto, Myin 2017) are 
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their departure from classical views of the mind (i.e. representational 
approaches, or internalistic views of the mind) is more or less radical.  
Even if both approaches -to different extents- seem to introduce themselves 
as “radical theories” in the contemporary debate (see for example Chemero 
2009; Clark 2008: 68, 105; Clark 2015c; Hutto, Myin 2013; Hutto 2015; 
Gallagher 2011a and Gallagher 2017: 40 for the label “radical embodiment”; 
Varela, Thompson, Rosch 1991: xvii, 150), a more careful analysis of these 
philosophical stances shows that the revolutionary theoretical shifts those 
theories talk about are sometimes just prospected, and not actually developed 
in the practice of their philosophizing. To put in other words: even if both the 
enactive approach to the mind and the EMH, at first glance, seem to radically 
differ from classical cognitivism and internalism, a comparison between these 
two views of cognition shows that one approach is more suitable to develop a 
theory of “mind extension”102 than the other one.  
Surprisingly, the Extended Mind Hypothesis –whose label sounds like is 
meant to be a clear statement of the full thesis of “mind-extension”- still sticks 
to a conservative view of the mind, I claimed.  
This point was briefly taken into account in §I.9. There I expressed my 
doubts about the label “extended mind”, and about the theoretical value of the 
parity principle, explaining why I think that these two points hide an 
internalistic prejudice. Furthermore, I pointed out how the centrality of the 
concept of mental state -at least at a general level- makes the theory unable to 
account for the active process (Gallagher 2011b; Gallagher 2013) through 
which the mind unfolds in the inter-action between agent and environment.  
These considerations were developed further and in more detail in Chapter 
II. There I focused my attention on a specific problem: the way the EMH and 
the enactive approach to cognition account for the agents’ smooth engagement 
with the environment, selectively responding to environmental saliences, and 
then displaying a behavior adequate to the context of the cognitive practice.  
The overall structure of the argumentation was the following one. If it is true 
that at a general level the EMH and the enactive approach to cognition seem 
to point to an “extensive picture” of the mind, if one considers the details of 
their individual arguments about specific problems (namely, if one analyzes 
each theory at work), it can be shown that the EMH still gives a conservative 
explanation.  
                                                          
not committed with the phenomenological approach and with the life-mind continuity thesis 
(Ward, Silverman, Villalobos 2017: 372), and adopt a more analytical philosophical style. 
102
 The idea that the mind is an interactive process made of the transactions between agents and 
their environments.  
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Considering the particular case taken into account, I claimed that the appeal 
to AORs to explain selective responsiveness to environmental saliences -issue 
that is part of the broader topic of practical knowledge, conceived as the ì 
looping of action and perception (see §II.2)- is a special case of “internalism at 
work”. In fact, even if Clark’s broader philosophical project aims at considering 
seriously how cognitive agents are successful at performing cognitive practices 
looking at the way external props shape the cognitive practice, when Clark 
considers action-perception loops claims that those processes are controlled by 
internal cognitive resources: action-oriented representations.  
Those ones, according to Clark, should represent a step forward in our 
philosophical explanations because -instead of being abstract representations 
that have nothing to do with the body in action and with the individuality of the 
environmental feature represented- account for the agent’s body and for the 
specificity of the action that should be performed. Indeed, they are said to 
represent a specific motoric command that anticipates what should be done in 
the context of the cognitive task.  
I suggested that this way of considering action-perception-based cognitive 
practices is an example of a hidden attempt to conceal a conservative attitude 
towards the mind by means of philosophical statements (i.e. AORs radically 
differ from cognitivists’ representations; Clark 1997a: 49)  that are just 
apparently progressive. If one the one hand it is true that Clark actually tries to 
give a body to internal representations, and to put action in representation, on 
the other hand it is also true that the way this philosophical proposal is 
developed is not successful. In fact, a semiotic analysis of Clark’s AORs shows 
that, in his account, action keeps on laying outside representational 
mechanisms. Indeed AORs prepare or anticipate action. This is to say that, in 
Clark’s explanation, action is not a component of representations in 
themselves, it does not actually define the very concept of AOR. On the 
contrary, it is an element considered in the broader economy of the explanation 
and then extrinsically attached to the label “representation”. Moreover, the 
representational mechanism itself is conceived as static in its individual 
components (see the objections considered in §II.5). The explanation deals 
with theoretical entities (AORs) that are similar to unconscious dispositional 
states, namely AORs are identified with internal states that have just conative 
features, and not real active features.  
That is why I looked at the enactive account of selective responsiveness and 
contextual relevance (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014; Rietveld 2008a; 2008b; 
2012a), hoping to find there a better account of the philosophical issue 
considered, namely an explanation that does not entail the problems Clark’s 
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approach suffers form. In those enactive works, I actually found a more 
externalist, active, dynamical and not intellectualistic account of the specific 
problem taken into account, which meets the requirements of a genuine theory 
of “mind-extension”.  
First, considering this proposal at a broad methodological level, it can be 
said that it extends the explanation by introducing factors that Clark does not 
consider (e.g. affects that anticipate or structure action-perception loops).  
Second, the enactivist proposal gets rid of internalistic prejudices, by 
cleaning up its explanation of action-perception loops from internal action-
oriented representations. This idea -I suggest- is a fundamental step for the 
project of mind-extension. Indeed, by substituting AORs with “relevant 
affordances”, the explanation actually gives space to the environment103 in its 
consideration of “meaningful behaviors”. To put it roughly, the core idea of 
this approach- already expressed by James Gibson (Gibson 1979/2015: 215)- 
is that behavior is regular even it is not regulated by complex internal structures. 
Behavior is regular because agents perform their actions in a rich field of 
regularities that triggers agent’s actions.  
Furthermore, contemporary enactive approaches to cognition explain why 
agents usually deploy the correct kind of action in a given context. Thanks to 
their practical and affective intentionality, agents structure their environments 
as disseminated of “attractive saliences”. This allows them to cope with the 
environment smoothly because the affective tone the environment shows up by 
makes some invitations for action standing out more than others. In this way, 
the enactive approach not only accounts for the perceptual mechanisms that 
trigger agents’ actions, but also accounts for the preparatory stages of this 
cognitive activity. Crucially, it does so without making use of concepts such as 
internal model and internal representation (concepts that, for what concerns 
action and perception, has been shown to be philosophically unwarranted). On 
the contrary, it conceives of the non-intellectualistic dynamics that structure 
both the agent and the environment (making them attuned the one with the 
other) looking at the affective dimension. 
 
                                                          
103 Notice that if it is true that the enactive explanation of contextual responsiveness gives more 
space to the environment than Clark’s one does, it is also true that it does not give a detailed 
account of features of the environment this phenomenon of selective responsiveness depends 
on. That is why, in II. §6, I suggested that a semiotic integration of this explanation grounded 
on the idea that relevant affordances have indexical features can help make this account 
stronger.  
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What I will do in this chapter goes in tandem with what I did in the previous 
one. As a matter of fact, the structure of my discussion will be nearly the same. 
I will consider another specific point these two approaches to cognition 
disagree on, in order to understand if the ways these theories deal with that 
specific problem promote or do not promote a genuinely “extensive” account 
of the mind. The problem I will consider in my discussion is the way the 
enactive approach to cognition and the EMH deal with a contemporary model 
of the brain: Predictive Coding.  
I chose to talk about this new approach to brain functions for at least three 
reasons. 
First, both supporters of the EMH and enactivism are showing a huge 
interest in this new approach. According to contemporary approaches to 
cognitive sciences, Predictive Coding is an appealing theory that can be 
discussed and integrated in their philosophical projects. Indeed, not only it 
provides a detailed account of how the brain works, but it also offers 
philosophical suggestions useful to think of “a meeting point for the best of 
many previous approaches” to cognition (Clark 2016: 10) or  of a “mature 
science of the embodied mind” (Clark 2015b: 16). Indeed, a theoretical 
discussion of this neuroscientific model of explanation can be useful to think 
about open questions in philosophy and theoretical cognitive science.  
At a general level, looking at how the brain works can offer chances to 
rethink about “the form and structure of the human experience itself” (Clark 
2016: 3), philosophical issue at the core of second wave-cognitive sciences’ 
project (see §I.2). 
Moreover, Predictive Coding deals with more specific issues at the core of 
the contemporary debate in cognitive sciences. Above all, it offers the 
opportunity to question the status of perceptual mechanisms, putting on the 
table an old issue about the nature of perception: is perception inferential or 
direct? This problem, as implicitly suggested in Chapter II, was at the core of 
Gibson’s project of ecological perception. Ecological accounts of perception, 
according to which perception is direct, inspire many contemporary 
approaches to cognitive sciences, in particular the enactive one. Predictive 
coding, widely relying on the concept of inference in its explanation of 
perception, seems to offer neuroscientific objections against this direct 
approach to perception. Given this difference concerning the core concepts of 
the two theories, is it possible to think of an integration of this scientifically 
accepted model of perception and philosophical explanations such as 
enactivism (Clark 2012; Orlandi 2016)?  
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This philosophical question about perception and inference, I suggest, asks 
us to look back at the problem of action-oriented representations: this is the 
third and main reason why I think it is worth to consider Predictive Coding 
right after an exam of the problem of AORs. My hypothesis is that there is a 
strong philosophical connection between philosophical discussions of 
Predictive Coding (i.e. perception as inference) and the debate between 
representational and non-representational accounts of action-perception loops, 
in which the concept of AOR is pivotal.  
I think that there are two reasons that motivate this connection. 
First, as explained in Chapter II, the debate about AORs concerned 
different ways of explaining action and perception. Minimal 
representationalists claim that action and perception are mediated by internal 
action-oriented representations. This is to say, the core idea of (minimal) forms 
of representationalism is that perception and action are mediated by internal 
representational entities. Predictive Coding, with its inferential account of 
perception, seems to point to the same idea of “mediated perception” 
(Gładziejewski 2016), while enactive and strongly affordance-based accounts of 
perception suggest a radically different story.  
Second, the core ideas of Predictive Coding -and, as I will explain later, of 
philosophical reassessments of this theory- seem to be already present in the 
debate about AORs. 
Basically, according to this approach rooted in neurosciences, our mind’s 
ability to perceive the world -that is the ability of making sense of the manifold 
sensory inputs coming from the senses- can be explained looking at predictive 
mechanisms of the brain (Hohwy 2013: 1). The core idea of this theory is that 
agents smoothly and quickly (Clark 2015b: 21) engage with their world by 
means of perception (that is continuous with action and attentional 
mechanisms; Hohwy 2012; 2013; 2014) because evolution and 
neurodevelopment endow brains with hierarchical statistical models of the 
causes of sensory inputs (Howhy 2014: 4; 63). Those statistical models allow 
the brain to successfully predict or anticipate its sensory states. Instead of just 
passively receiving sensory inputs, the brain builds up perceptual data by 
matching what it already “knows” about the world and the cognitive agent’s 
body (Clark 2013a) with the novelty coming from the senses. This suggests that 
perception and action are shaped by expectations derived by previous 
knowledge and that the more this set of cognitive priors is accurate (i.e. the 
more prediction errors are minimized), the more cognitive performances will 
be successful. The more the brain’s anticipations of its own states are successful, 
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the more the agent’s behavior will be attuned to the environment where the 
cognitive practice takes place.  
This description of our brains as “pro-active prediction systems” (Clark 
2015b), I claim, is not that far from some explanations of action-perception 
loops taken into account in Chapter II. Indeed, the core idea of this approach 
to perception and action seems to be this one: agents are able to engage 
successfully with their worlds because action-perception loops are guided by 
internal models that have an anticipatory power. Action-oriented 
representations –at least in Clark’s version given in Being there (Clark 1997a)- 
seem to have the same function: they are said to guide behavior by representing 
features of the environment as contents of an action-command. Then, what is 
represented is i) an anticipation, or a simulation (Clark, Grush 1999) of what 
the agent is supposed to do in the environment in the proximal future, and ii) 
an anticipation of the sensorimotor states that will occur during action
104
.  
 
This theoretical similarity between Predictive accounts of our brains and the 
problem of AORs is particularly striking in Clark’s latest book: Surfing 
Uncertainty. Prediction, Action, and the Embodied Mind (Clark 2016). Clark’s 
book aims to integrate the Predictive Coding model in a broader perspective, 
consistent with his EMH. To do that, he basically works on Predictive Coding 
models to make them matching the requirements of an extended and more 
active view of the mind. Clark’s argument is twofold.  
First, he states that “nothing in the PP [Predictive Processing] framework 
materially alters […] the arguments regarding the possibility of genuinely 
extended cognitive systems” (Clark 2016: 260, text into brackets added). This 
because the agent’s body and the world -namely biological and non-biological 
external resources- provide additional strategies to minimize the brain’s 
prediction error mechanisms, which are at the core of good anticipation 
strategies. Long-term material and socio-cultural environmental structures, and 
the actions we perform in this structured world, minimize prediction-error and 
improve the anticipatory power of cognitive systems. By structuring the world 
in a certain way -that is in a way suitable for the distribution of the cognitive 
load among different resources- we make our sensory predictions coming true 
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 Notice that Clark himself draws a comparison between AORs and Predictive Coding models 
in his article “Whatever the next? Predictive brains, situated agents and the future of cognitive 
science”, when he says that Grush’s “emulator theory of representation” (Grush 2004) shares 
many features with the predictive processing story (Clark 2013a: 18; 24, footnote 44).  
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(Clark 2013a: 21), allowing the brain “to do as little as possible while […] still 
solving the problem” (Clark 2015c: 12).  
Second, he takes into account the role of action in prediction by talking 
about something that recalls his previous work on AORs. In fact, Clark defines 
his way of conceiving of PP as “Action-Oriented Predictive Processing” (Clark 
2013a; Clark 2016). At the core of this view of Predictive Processing there is 
the idea that the job the brain does (i.e. predicting its own states and reducing 
mismatches between top-down predictions and bottom-up flows of 
information) is about “selection and control of world-engaging action” (Clark 
2016: 250). This talk about selection and control of world-engaging action –I 
claim- clearly echoes what has been considered in Chapter II, namely the 
Frame Problem, to which action-oriented representations were supposed to 
find a solution. Indeed, as previously explained, AORs are conceptual entities 
that are supposed to help philosophers to explain  
a) why agents display that right kind of action in a given context (selective 
function), and  
b) they work as internal controllers for action (control function).  
This is to say, Action-Oriented Predictive Processing and Clark’s Action-
Oriented Representations, although they are presented as distinguished 
theoretical entities, seem to be introduced in Clark’s explanation to account for 
the same problem: explaining how behavior is controlled, and how and why 
agents display the correct kind of behavior in a given context.  
Furthermore, the way Clark talks about this function of selection and control 
performed by Action-Oriented Predictive Processing seems to be consistent 
with the general terms in which the debate about AORs is developed. Clark 
describes this problem talking about “affordance competition” (Clark 2016: 
251; see also Cisek 2007 for Clark’s primary reference). The idea is that agents’ 
brain continuously computes multiple probabilistic inflected possibilities for 
action to make conscious experience successful in the environment. It seems 
to me that this is a new way (where the novelty is the introduction of the 
probabilistic nature of internal mechanisms) to talk about the problem of 
relevant affordances taken into account in Chapter II, where I discussed the 
enactive approach to selective openness to the world
105
.  
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 A connection between these two proposals is explicitly suggested by the authors of the 
enactivist proposal considered in Chapter II (Kiverstein and Rietveld 2012), in the article 
“Dealing with context through action-oriented predictive coding. A commentary in Clark’s 
‘Whatever the next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science’”, 
Frontiers in Psychology, 3, pp. 1-2.  
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This assonance between Predictive Processing and the concept of AOR 
solicits me to formulate the following working hypothesis about Clark’s more 
recent work: Clark’s Action-Oriented Predictive Process is a neuroscientifically 
based and implemented version of his AORs. My general idea is the following 
one: in Clark’s 1997 book, the brain fitted with his picture of AORs just 
because action-oriented representations were identified with neural 
populations. Now, anticipatory and control aspects of the brain, which were at 
the core of Clark’s concept of AOR, are taken into account in great detail.  
The philosophical point that this working hypothesis entails is this one. If a 
test of my hypothesis will demonstrate that Clark’s Action-Oriented Predictive 
Processing still sticks to the problem of AORs, then Clark’s project of building 
a “mature science of the embodied mind” (Clark 2015b: 16), which lies on the 
same ground of so-called enactive accounts (Clark 2016: 235, 291), is not 
successful.  
This idea of pulling out again the philosophical worry about representations 
is not only motivated by the fil rouge of my research -which draws a comparison 
between the EMH and the enactive approach focusing on the problem of 
representations- but it is also connected to the very reason why Clark talks 
about Action-Oriented Predictive Processing. Indeed, Clark clearly states that 
Action-Oriented PP “sets the scene for peace to be declared between the once-
warring camps of representationalism and enactivism” (Clark 2015a: 2, 
emphasis added).  
Considering what Madary notices in his article “Extending the 
Explanandum for Predictive Processing” (Madary 2015), Clark says that 
enactivist approaches to cognition and Action-Oriented PP are engaged in the 
same project: “depicting the organism and the organism-salient world as bound 
together in a process of mutual specification” (Clark  2015a: 3). Clark’s point 
is the following one: since Action-Oriented PP and enactivism are engaged in 
the same project, and since Action-Oriented PP does not make use of classical 
versions of representational mechanisms and internal models rejected by the 
enactivists (see also Williams 2017), we can set the ground for an integrated 
science of the mind that finally puts an end to “representations wars” (Clark 
2015a). Therefore, to understand if the peace treaty signed by Action-Oriented 
PP is effective or not, one should investigate Clark’s proposal in detail, by 
paying attention to concepts that recall internal representations, in particular 
AORs.   
                                                          
 
Chapter III 
179 
 
As previously said, the huge theoretical similarities between Action-
Oriented PP and Clark’s previous work lead me to suspect that AORs are still 
there. The fact that in Surfing Uncertainty Clark does not give space to an 
explicit and detailed discussion of a possible theoretical relation between AORs 
and his new theory does not guarantee that AORs disappeared. As Daniel 
Hutto says in his article “Exorcising action oriented representations: ridding 
cognitive science of its Nazgûl” (Hutto 2013), “AORs are not easy to kill off. 
[…] Like the Nazgûl – the undead monsters of Tolkien’s The Lord of the Rings 
– they (and their contents) are able to survive by finding new shapes to wear 
and new vehicles to ride” (Hutto 2013: 145).  
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III.3 An internalistic version of Predictive Coding: Hohwy’s 
proposal.  
 
In this paragraph, I will consider some of the core ideas of Predictive 
Coding. This discussion is meant to be a preparatory stage for what will be done 
in the following paragraphs, where I will discuss Andy Clark’s approach to 
Predictive Coding, and enactive approaches to that model.   
Here I do not want to offer a complete and detailed discussion of Predictive 
Coding models of the brain
106
. On the contrary, my aim is more modest. I will 
focus on the broad idea of the mind that this approach to the brain suggests, 
and I will discuss some core concepts of this model, philosophical 
reassessments of this neuroscientific model make use of in their explanations.  
 
Predictive Coding -whose theoretical roots can be individuated in German 
physiologist von Herman Helmholtz’s work on perception (Helmholtz 1866; 
Friston 2012; Hohwy 2013: 5) - holds that the brain is an inferential machine. 
The core idea of this approach is that perception is anchored to the world by 
means of inference -causal inference in particular.  
To explain this Hohwy says: 
 
“States of affairs in the world have effects on the brain— objects and 
processes in the world are the causes of the sensory input. The problem of 
perception is the problem of using the effects—that is, the sensory data that 
is all the brain has access to—to ﬁgure out the causes. It is then a problem 
of causal inference for the brain, analogous in many respects to our 
everyday reasoning about cause and effect, and to scientiﬁc methods of 
causal inference.” (Hohwy 2013: 15) 
 
As the citation shows, the idea promoted by Predictive Coding is that agents’ 
interaction with the world is guaranteed by the logical job done by the brain.  
At the core of this approach to perception there is a particular conception 
of the brain, which entails metaphysical consequences about the mind. 
Hohwy’s Predictive Coding model argues in favor of a “neuroscientific 
seclusion” (Clark 2017: 2): the brain is secluded from the body and the world 
(Hohwy 2014: 7). To put it in philosophical terms, this means that the world 
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 For a more detailed review and explanation of these models see Bruineberg, Kiverstein, 
Rietveld 2016; Friston 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2012; Gallagher, Allen 2016; Gallagher 2017; 
Hohwy 2012; 2013; 2014; Macpherson 2017; Menary 2015; Rao, Ballard 1998; Spratling 
2015). 
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and the body are not “always and already there” for the brain-mind’s cognitive 
mechanisms, but, on the contrary, they lay “beyond the veil of sensory inputs” 
(Hohwy 2013: 238). Sensory inputs, instead of being conceived to be an open
107
 
point of contact for the brain and the environment, are rather described as a 
veil that divides information from its hidden causes. This veil is usually called 
“Markov Blanket”108. 
Given this separation between the brain, the body, and the world where the 
agent consciously perceives objects, the core idea of Hohwy’s discussion is the 
following one. Since the brain is not in direct contact with what caused the 
stimuli it receives from the senses, the brain is always engaged with the task of 
guessing the sources of its own states. This operation of guessing -which is 
performed at the sub-personal level, within the boundaries of the Markov 
blanket (Hohwy 2017: 4)- aims at making sense of pieces of bottom-up 
information. To make sense of sensory information, the brain does something 
that has the same structure of inference, in particular inference to the best 
explanation (Hohwy 2014: 5). 
The idea that lies at the core of this neuroscientific account of perception, 
is motivated by the observation of a general experiential fact.  
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 Notice that this is my interpretation of the concept of evidentiary veil in Hohwy’s Predictive 
Coding. Here I claim that the evidentiary veil is like a wall that demarcates the brain and the 
world because I conceive of openness in a more phenomenological or enactive sense. Indeed, 
to me, “being opened to” refers to a kind of direct contact of the agent with her subjective 
world, guaranteed by the constitutive coupling of the agent’s states of action and perceptual 
readiness with possibilities of action distributed in the world. I think that Hohwy would not 
agree with my interpretation of “openness”. In fact, when he deals with this problem, he says 
that his view “does not conceive of the mind or the brain as causally insulated from the world 
around it. Indeed, this view must conceive of the mind and the world as causally linked, through 
the causal interface of the Markov blanket” (Hohwy 2017: 13). To me, this way to conceive of 
openness is misleading. Saying that mind and world are linked by means of a causal and 
inferential interface logically entails that the causes of what is inside the brain have to be 
inferred, then they are hidden. If objects that cause states of the brain are hidden to the brain, 
then world and mind are not connected by a relation of constitutive openness. 
108
 This concept has been developed by the mathematician Andrey Markov, who explored 
abstracts systems able to remember their past trajectories only insofar they store a single current 
value. In these systems, the next state depends on the current state only. The notion of Markov 
blanket has been developed in the cognitive sciences to describe sets of nodes such as that, for 
a given node X, the behavior of X can be predicted by knowing the states of the other nodes. 
This means that to predict the state of a given node, all you need to do is to look at what is 
inside the Markov blanket, namely other states of the nodes of the blanket (Clark 2017: 1-2).  
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Figure 6: Markov Blanket  
[Picture taken from Gallagher, Allen 
2016] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In our complex world, there is not a one-one relation between causes and 
effects, different causes can cause the same kind of effect, and the same cause 
can cause different kinds of effect” (Hohwy 2013: 13). This is to say that objects 
or features of the world can give rise to similar effects on sensory organs, and 
this means that, to the brain, the information conveyed by the senses can be 
consistent with many causes.  
For example (Hohwy 2013: 13), think of the potentially identical sensory 
inputs caused by a bicycle or by a picture of a bicycle. The information 
channeled by the senses is very similar: in both cases, senses inform the brain 
about the color, the shape, and other features of the object perceived. That is 
why the brain should perform inferences to the best explanation. This means 
that it has to explain away the occurrence of some evidence (the brain own 
sensory state), by providing evidence by itself (Hohwy 2014: 5). It has to 
provide evidence for the degree of probability that the set of sensory 
information entertains with its hidden cause (the object of the world), which is 
represented by the brain as a prior belief. In this sense, the brain provides 
evidence by itself: the prior (namely the hypothesis about the hidden cause of 
the sensory stimuli) explains evidence (information channeled by the senses), 
and evidence, on its turn, gives an explanation to the hypothesis.  
The postulation of such a mechanism of evidence to the best explanation is 
theoretically connected to the idea that the brain is a hypothesis testing machine 
and a Bayesian engine. Hohwy’s idea is that, in order to explain how the brain 
succeeds in its job of guessing operated by means of inferences, we should 
individuate a kind of normative dimension. We should find something that not 
only explains what the brain does when it is engaged in predictive perceptual 
mechanisms (i.e. when it links bottom-up flows of information with top-down 
informational flows, sometimes called “prior beliefs”; Hohwy 2013: 15), but 
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that also explains what the brain should do in order to get the world right 
(Hohwy 2013: 14). To put in other words, the theory should individuate 
normative principles or rules that explain why some signals are computationally 
more relevant than others (Heilbron, Chait 2017) in the operation of getting 
the world right.  
Hohwy finds this normative dimension of perceptual mechanisms of the 
brain in probability theory, in particular in Bayesian epistemology. To put it 
roughly, his idea is that Bayesian epistemology offers Predictive Coding insights 
about the rules that the brain follows when it makes its inferences to guess the 
hidden causes of its current states. Looking at Bayesian epistemology, 
Predictive Coding can explain why the brain “thinks” that that flow of bottom-
up information is consistent with that prior belief concerning the hidden cause 
of sensory information and not with other priors.  
To explain the role of Bayes’ rule, and then to explain the idea that the brain 
is like a scientist who makes discoveries through hypothesis testing (Hohwy 
2017: 4), Hohwy begins its argumentation considering a very simple case of 
everyday perception (Hohwy 2013: 15 and ff.).  
An agent is in a house with no windows and no books or internet. She hears 
a tapping sound. To make sense of this perceptual episode, she needs to ﬁgure 
out what is causing that noise. The agent starts to wonder about the cause of 
the noise, and she makes a list of the possible causes of the input. It could be 
a woodpecker pecking at the wall, a branch tapping at the wall in the wind, 
music from her neighbor’s house, and so on. It could be also that her house 
has been launched into space overnight and the sound is produced by a shower 
of meteorites. The list of possible causes is endless. Those possibilities are 
hypotheses concerning the cause of the noise: that is why Hohwy states that 
“the problem of perception is how the right hypothesis about the world is 
shaped and selected” (Hohwy 2013: 16).  
The first criterion the agent follows in order to test her hypothesis and to 
choose the hypothesis that bests explains the perceptual episode is likelihood. 
To assess likelihoods, the agent relies on assumptions about causal regularities 
she observed in the world, for example typical effects of woodpeckers, her 
neighbor’s habits, and so on. Looking at her previous experiences, the agent 
can rank hypotheses according to their likelihood, namely according to their 
closeness to the effects they should explain. Likelihood explains the way the 
agent judges the “goodness” of each hypothesis, and the way she ranks the 
predictive power of her hypotheses (namely how much a hypothesis is good at 
predicting its effects, which are what the agent gets from the senses). This 
explanation grounded on the concept of likelihood suggests that the problem 
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of perception can be simplified by making sets of hypotheses progressively 
smaller and smaller, giving more weight to hypotheses with a high degree of 
likelihood.  
 
To Hohwy, the problem of perception in the brain follows the same logic 
of this everyday perceptual task. The brain is like the agent of the thought 
experiment, the house without windows is the agent’s skull, the tapping sound 
is the sensory input, and the agent’s previous experiences are the repeatable 
patterns according to which sensory inputs show up in the brain.
109
 Crucially, 
inferences to the best explanation the agent consciously makes are like the 
brain’s unconscious perceptual inferences, and the ranking of hypotheses 
according to their likelihood is like the brain’s operation of weighting its top-
down predictions (priors) according to Bayes’ rule (Hohwy 2013: 18).  
Basically, Bayes’ theorem is a statistical law that describes the probability of 
an event by relying on previous knowledge that can be related to the event taken 
into account. More precisely, the rule tells to update the probability of each 
hypothesis (e.g. “the tapping sound is caused by a woodpecker”) i) given some 
evidence (e.g. hearing some tapping sound), ii) and by considering the prior 
probability of the hypothesis according to criteria of likelihood, which is an 
estimation of how probable that hypothesis is independently from the effects 
currently observed (Hohwy 2013: 17).  
According to Predictive Coding models, the brain embodies such a 
probabilistic rule because the explanation holds that the brain works by 
representing “the statistical structure of the world at different levels of 
abstraction”, and it does so “by maintaining different causal models that are 
organized on different levels of a hierarchy, where each level obtains input from 
its subordinate level. In a feed-backward chain, predictions are made for the 
level below” (Blokpoel, Kwisthout, Rooij 2012: 1; emphasis added).  
The concept of hierarchy is pivotal in this model, because it accounts for 
the very predictive feature of perceptual mechanisms, or unconscious 
perceptual inference. According to explanations offered by Predictive Coding, 
the models embodied by the brain are stored according to a hierarchical 
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 Notice that the metaphorical connection between the agent’s previous experience and 
repeatable sensory patterns is not mentioned in Hohwy’s 2013 book. Nevertheless, this 
connection seems to be motivated by what the author says in his 2012 article “Attention and 
conscious perception in the hypothesis testing brain”, Frontiers in Psychology, 3, pp. 1-14, 
where he links repeatability of sensory inputs to the formation of expectations (Hohwy 2012: 
2). 
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structure, which organizes statistical regularities. Looking at conscious 
experience one can observe that regularities come at different time scales. 
There are fast time-scale regularities, which include things like how shadows 
change as you move an object in your hands, and slower regularities, such as 
those which concern the trajectory of a balloon the agent is trying to catch. 
Those regularities can be also analyzed looking at their degree of detail. Fast-
time regularities are more detailed, slower regularities are more abstract. 
Moreover, regularities can be organized from faster to slower, from more 
detailed to more abstract.  
The hierarchical order of those regularities is recapitulated by the cortical 
structure of the brain (Hohwy 2013: 28). Faster timescale regularities are 
represented in low levels of the hierarchy, slower regularities are represented 
in higher levels. Since regularities are not only organized according to their 
position in a given timescale, but also according to their degree of abstraction, 
it can also be said that lower levels of the hierarchy represent variants of 
experience (e.g. as the agent’s “eyes or head move or objects of perception shift 
around, the brain needs to process fast causal regularities for very basic sensory 
attributes such as contour, shading, and orientation”; Hohwy 2013: 29), higher 
levels represent invariant aspects of experience (e.g. the perception of objects 
as enduring).  
The intertwinement of those levels is crucial to understand perceptual 
experience. Indeed, the core idea of Predictive Coding is that correct guessing 
is given by the right match of general expectations about the hidden causes of 
the signal and the variables of experience represented by the incoming signal. 
The hierarchical structure of this model is said to explain this phenomenon 
because it postulates that, in the process of perceptual inference, there is a 
cascade of predictions that are constantly redefined and made more “concrete” 
when they descend along the hierarchical structure. As a matter of fact, each 
level takes information from the level below as its input. This helps the higher 
level choose the best explanatory hypothesis, given the evidence provided by 
bottom-up cascades of information.  
 
The philosophical point this hierarchical approach to information 
processed by the brain suggests is that perception, rather than being a bottom-
up process in which the brain simply receives a rich signal conveyed by the 
senses, is an active or generative process.  Indeed, the way Predictive Coding 
describes flows of information in the brain suggests the following story: the 
brain generates its own perceptual states. It does so by formulating hypothesis 
about the hidden causes of perceptual stimuli, and by testing them with sensory 
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evidence coming from lower levels of the cortical hierarchy. Instead of just 
receiving information from the senses, the brain generates information, by 
representing predictions at different levels of the hierarchy, and predictions are 
states in which the brain is at different time scales. That is why the brain is said 
to generate its own states. 
Now, even if at first glance one can think that this model -to the extent that 
it gives a lot of space to concepts such as prior, belief, model, hypothesis, and, 
crucially emphasizes generative aspects of the brain- offers a picture of the brain 
(and then of cognitive processes) that gives more weight to top-down effects 
than to the bottom-up ones, a closer look at the explanation shows that the aim 
of the model is slightly different. As a matter of fact, Predictive Coding states 
that, in order to offer a successful explanation of cognitive mechanisms, the 
theory should account for the balance between bottom-up and top-down 
(Hohwy 2013: 67).  
The way the theory accounts for this balance can be explained if we consider 
in more detail the function of signals coming from lower levels of the hierarchy. 
The crucial function of bottom-up signals is to give feedbacks on the internal 
model of the world (Hohwy 2013: 47).  
Pivotal in this process of perceptual inference and tracking of the brain’s 
own causal structure is one particular kind of feedback: prediction error. 
Prediction error is a signal that “says” that top-down predictions do not match 
signals from the lower level of hierarchy; it gives information about the 
difference between the actual current signal and the predicted one (Clark 
2013a: 2).  
This difference between the current signal and the predicted one is said to 
give rise to an effect surprise, or surprisal, to use a term that is less experientially 
loaded (Hohwy 2013: 52; Clark 2013a: 3). To some extent, “surprisal” is close 
to experiential surprise. A person experiences surprise when she finds herself 
is in a state she did not expect to be in, because the occurrence of that state had 
been judged to be not that probable in the past (Howhy 2013: 52). Similarly, 
when prediction error occurs, the brain finds itself in a state of surprisal (or 
“self-information”;  Friston 2010: 2), where surprisal is the “sub-personally 
computed implausibility of some sensory state given a model of the world” 
(Clark 2013a: 6, who cites Tribus 1961). Suprisal is a declining function of 
probability: “as the probability goes to zero the surprisal goes up, as the 
probability goes to 1 the surprisal goes down” (Hohwy 2013: 51).  
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Surprisal and prediction error are linked to the pivotal concept of Prediction 
Error Minimization (PEM) and to that of Free-Energy
110
. The point that lies at 
the core of PEM is twofold.  
First, it is theoretically connected to the idea that the brain, instead of 
dispersing information and energy through a large set of states (Hohwy 2017: 
2), self-organizes itself in order to occupy a limited range of states, namely to 
maintain its homeostasis; Friston 2011b: 92). This self-organization allows the 
brain to protect itself from entropic disorder (Hohwy 2013: 191), and then to 
be in a state of equilibrium. Basically, the idea is that the brain works in order 
to prevent the organism from finding itself into states where the organism is not 
expected to be found in the long run. “For any given organism, there is a set of 
states where it is expected to be found, and many states in which it would be 
surprising to find it” (Hohwy 2015: 2).  
To maintain its equilibrium, the brain has to minimize what is called “free-
energy”. According to information theoretical terminology, free-energy is a 
quantity given by a system’s average energy minus its entropy or disorder 
(Friston, Stephan 2007: 421; Friston 2011b: 93-94; Howhy 2013: 180). The 
free-energy principle “says that any self- organizing system that is at equilibrium 
with its environment must minimize its free energy” (Friston 2010: 127). To 
minimize free-energy, and to guarantee itself a state of equilibrium in which the 
occurrence of unexpected or surprising states is minimized, the brain should 
find itself within its expected states. Expected states are estimated in prediction 
error minimization (Hohwy 2015: 4). Therefore, PEM mechanisms constitute 
a great source for “the life of the brain”, because they allow it to find an 
equilibrium. 
PEM has also another very important function, which concerns the 
epistemological points sketched out previously: it allows the brain to have a 
high probability to get the world right. To explain this with the concepts at the 
core of Predictive Coding mentioned above, it can be said that PEM gives 
bounds to the brain’s job of guessing the hidden causes of its own states 
performed via perceptual inferences by creating a close fit between predictions 
and actual sensory inputs. 
Hohwy says that there are two main ways to minimize prediction errors 
(Hohwy 2013: 43; Hohwy 2015: 4), which have different directions of fit.  
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First, the brain can work on its own models by revising their parameters, 
namely by revising hypotheses to make them more suitable to explain sensory 
evidence. This way of conceiving of PEM lies in the realm of perception, 
explained in terms of hypothesis to the best explanation, as previously said, and 
basically accounts for PEM in terms of optimization of internal models (Hohwy 
2015: 2; 2017: 2).  
Second, prediction errors can be minimized by sampling more carefully, 
namely by trying to keep the model parameters stable and using them to 
generate predictions. This second way to minimize prediction errors, Hohwy 
says (Hohwy 2015: 4), is action. Action provides proprioceptive predictions, 
which are delivered to the reflex arcs and fulfilled there until the expected 
sensory input comes.  
This way to conceive of action as a behavioral fulfillment of expectation is 
very specific: it is compared to the job of a scientist which retains hypotheses 
(which correspond to the brain’s prediction) by controlling the environment 
until the expected evidence occurs. Moreover, since prediction error 
minimization by means of action, in the long run, approximates Bayesian 
inference, action can be said to be inferential (Hohwy 2017: 2). That is why this 
way of conceiving of action in PEM is labeled “active inference” or “embodied 
inference” (Friston 2011b).  
At first glance, phrases such as “active inference” and “embodied inference” 
seem to suggest a less internalistic view of Predictive Coding.  
At the beginning of my discussion of Hohwy’s Predictive Coding, I pointed 
out the emphasis that this model puts on neuroscientific seclusion, that is the 
idea that the brain is isolated from the body and the world. I said that this 
isolationistic conception of the brain justified the inferential nature of the 
model. Since the brain is isolated from the world, it has to infer the causes of 
its own states, which represent object or features of the world. The role given 
to active inference seems to challenge this isolationistic view. That is why -as it 
will be explained in the following paragraph- extended and enactive 
conceptions of Predictive Coding precisely stress on this point in order to make 
their theory matching the core assumptions of their philosophical proposals.  
Nevertheless, this openness to the world that active inference would 
guarantee to the guessing brain is not accepted as a good philosophical point in 
Hohwy’s model, which defends its internalism at many explanatory levels.  
On the one hand Hohwy acknowledges that PEM in terms of active 
inference gives a key role to the body in perception. As a matter of fact, the way 
sensory inputs are sampled by means of action is shaped by the bodies we have 
(for example, think of an occurrence of active inference where an agent figures 
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out how sensory inputs will change according to the way an object is 
manipulated using hands). On the other hand, he says that in the cognitive 
mechanism of Predictive Coding the agent’s body really matters only to the 
extent it is represented in the brain’s models, as a parameter for PEM. What 
matters to Predictive Coding systems is not the “lived” and “motoric body” that 
performs actions in the world, but the functional role of the body in the 
economy of the parameters of PEM, parameters the brain is said to have access 
to through representations.  
Moreover, Hohwy clearly states that both perceptual inference and active 
inference are performed by the brain, within the boundaries of the Markov 
blanket, where evidence is provided to the system. The distinction between 
inner and outer of the evidentiary boundary or veil is strict: inference is done 
by the inside of the mind, and external action just provides the brain with inputs 
that will fulfill its expectations represented in the model (Hohwy 2014: 7; 10; 
16-17).  
Therefore, the philosophical point at the core of this approach can be 
expressed in this way. Agents’ engagements with the world are usually smooth 
and successful because those worldly engagements are guided by anticipatory 
mechanisms. Those anticipatory or predictive mechanisms, in order to work 
well, need some kind of evidence. Since those predictive mechanisms are 
internal mechanisms of the brain, and given that the brain is isolated from the 
body and the environment, evidence, namely what guarantees the system 
epistemic efficiency, is internal to the brain’s mechanisms themselves (namely 
it is given within the boundaries of the Markov blanket). Since what actually 
guides the epistemic efficiency of anticipatory mechanisms is internal to the 
brain, and since anticipatory mechanisms of the brain guide smooth action-
perception loops, then what actually explains action perception-loops is internal 
(brain-bounded).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Predictive Processing 
190 
 
III.4 Clark’s approach to anticipatory mechanisms: extending 
Predictive Processing? 
In the previous paragraph, I briefly sketched out the core ideas of the 
Predictive Coding theory, and I emphasized that Hohwy’s version of this theory 
is explicitly and strongly internalistic. In this paragraph, I will consider Clark’s 
approach to Predictive Coding, which he calls “Predictive Processing” (PP)111 
or “Radical Predictive Processing” (Clark 2017; 2016; 2015b; 2015c; 2013a; 
2012). In particular, I will focus on the way he tries to make this explanatory 
framework matching the EMH. 
To do that, I will develop my discussion of Clark’s approach to Predictive 
Processing by taking into account four key concepts: Markov blanket(s), 
productive laziness, Parity Principle and Predictive Processing, and active 
inference. 
 
i) Markov blanket(s) 
As pointed out in the last pages, Hohwy’s internalistic claim is dependent 
on a specific conception of the brain -which I called “neuroscientific seclusion” 
following one of Clark’s recent articles (Clark 2017: 2)- according to which 
there is a clear and strict demarcation between the brain and the world. This 
peculiar conception of the brain -which is at the core of the justification of the 
inferential conception of cognitive processes- finds its place in the explanation 
of Predictive Coding by means of the concept of Markov blanket.  
The core claim of Hohwy’s Predictive Coding is that states of the sensory 
system determine a Markov blanket. The Markov blanket defines the 
boundaries of the mind. Hohwy’s idea is the following one. In the same way 
the behavior of nodes of abstract systems can be fully predicted by knowing the 
states of other nodes of the system, states of the brain can be predicted checking 
other states of the brain. That is why the brain is said to be a self-evident engine: 
to discover the hidden causes of its sensory inputs, the brain just has to know 
information about its own states, which are the bricks of generative models. 
This makes what is outside of the Markov blanket (the body and the world) 
uninformative once the states of the blanket are known.  
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 Notice that Clark’s terminological shift from “Predictive Coding” to “Predictive Processing” 
aims to emphasize the difference between these two views of anticipatory mechanisms. In 
particular, the phrase “Predictive Processing” is said to be expressive of a more dynamical view 
of anticipatory mechanisms. As it will be explained in this paragraph, Predictive Processing is 
said to be more dynamical than Predictive Coding because it emphasizes more the role of 
action in predictive mechanisms (Clark 2013a: 22), and it conceives of the boundaries of the 
predictive mind as flexible boundaries (Clark 2017: 16-17).  
Chapter III 
191 
 
Such a consideration entails an interalistic and narrow conception of the 
mind: if the mind should be individuated where there is information interesting 
to explain the animal’s behavior, and if the explanation takes into account 
information processed by the brain only, then the mind is individuated in the 
anticipatory machine instantiated by the brain. To put in other words, the mind, 
conceived as a cognitive machine, knows something about the world by 
providing evidence from its own hypothesis. The evidence that the mind 
provides by itself is evidence about its internal models: what the mind knows is 
a proxy of the world, and all parts of cognitive processes, since all the inferential 
guessing is performed by the brain, are internal. Then the mind is internal in 
two senses. First, it is internal because its object of knowledge (the model) is 
internal; second, what is cognitive (i.e. inference) in those anticipatory 
processes is performed within the boundaries of the mind, namely in the nodes 
of Markov blankets.  
 
Since the concept of Markov blanket and the concepts it entails (above all 
that of epistemic evidence) are pivotal in the internalistic definition of the mind, 
an explanation aimed at redefining the boundaries of the predictive mind has 
to reconfigure the concept of Markov Blanket (Clark 2017; 2016).  
The idea of reconfiguring the concept of Markov blanket is crucial in the 
project of extending PPs not only because of the theoretical implications that 
will be discussed here, but also because advocates of internalistic versions of 
Predictive Coding say that embodied, enacted and extended approaches to 
cognition and the mind “seek to obliterate the Markov blanket” (Hohwy 2017, 
as cited in Clark 2017: 6); therefore they cannot be consistent with the core 
ideas of Predictive Coding. A plausible way to conceive of the Markov blanket 
in a more extensive way would be a step towards classic views of Predictive 
Coding, without entailing internalistic consequences. 
Clark’s core idea is that one can think of extended predictive minds 
preserving the concept of Markov blanket if this one is considered in its 
mutability and multiplicity. Contrary to Howhy’s position, Clark claims that we 
should not think of an individual, self-evidencing system bounded by an 
unchanging Markov blanket. Rather, Clark’s idea is that PP is bounded by 
many Markov blankets that change over time.  
The theoretical point that lies at the core of this way of conceiving of the 
Markov Blanket is the idea that the Markov blankets boundaries we choose 
depend on the explanatory purposes of our theory. For example, if the aim of 
an explanation is to consider a system stable over time, bounding the system by 
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an individual, unchanging Markov blanket offers a theory that is explanatory 
enough.  
The problem is that what Predictive Processing seeks to explain is not a 
stable and unchanging system. This theory aims to explain predictive 
mechanisms that guide animals’ action-perception loops. Animals are beings 
that change over time. For instance, think of the human ontogenetic 
development. Not only bodies change over time, but also, and crucially, human 
beings are “mentally metamorphic” (Clark 2017: 13). This suggests that the 
boundaries within which cognitive processes (i.e. Predictive Processing) take 
place change over time, and this motivates the idea of thinking of the Markov 
blanket as a fluid or changing veil, which expands its boundaries in tandem with 
mental development
112
. 
Moreover, Clark suggests that mental development is fostered by the use of 
sets of tools, strategies and devices (neural, bodily and extra-somatic). The use 
of such devices not only produces dramatic alterations in the human brain
113
 
(and this suggests the idea of a changing Markov blanket), but it also produces 
changes in agents’ cognitive experiences over time. The more an agent 
becomes skillful in her use and manipulation of such devices, the more her set 
of cognitive possibilities will extend.  
As already explained, the EMH explains this augmentation and 
improvement of cognitive possibilities by appealing to the concept of coupling, 
which describes the human agent and cognitive external tools as a unitary 
system. The notion of organism-environment system challenges the idea that 
cognitive activities are bounded by an individual Markov blanket. Indeed, in 
Clark’s EMH, coupled systems are created every time an agent engages with an 
external cognitive device that allows the cognitive load of a task to be distributed 
between the biological agent and an extra-somatic resource. This suggests that 
wherever new technologies interface with bio-systems a new Markov blanket 
can be individuated. For instance, think of an agent using Google-glass (Clark 
2017: 12). The agent plus Google-glass is a new cognitive system, which 
performs cognitive activities within a certain kind of bound (that one defined 
by the coupled system). This does not mean that “old” Markov blankets, such 
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 Here I consider an example that concerns human knowledge, but other striking examples 
concerning non-human animals can be found. For example, think of animals such as 
metamorphic insects, which undergo dramatic changes during their metamorphoses. Those 
dramatic changes are examples useful to question the idea that the Markov blanket is static, 
since metamorphoses change the terms of living systems, while living systems still maintain 
their life-unity (Clark 2017: 11-12).  
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 For example, think of Clark’s discussion about the structural changes that language 
development and use produce in the brain (Clark 1998).  
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as that one which bounds the self-sustaining activity of cellular organelles, are 
erased. Markov blankets produced in experiences of coupling constitute layers 
of self-maintaining processes. The demarcation of each Markov blanket 
explains each self-sustaining process, by individuating the boundaries of interest 
that define a cognitive practice performed at that time t.  
This idea of flexible and multiple Markov blankets allows the theory to think 
of a porous demarcation between the predictive mind and the environment 
(Clark 2016, in particular Chapter 8), challenging the isolationistic view of the 
brain offered by Hohwy, and providing the theoretical ground for a theory of 
the Extended Predictive Mind. At the same time, Clark’s approach to Markov 
blankets given in his 2017 article, meets the philosophical requirements of 
classical views of Predictive Coding, which seek to find a clear definition of the 
boundaries of the predictive mind. As a matter of fact, Clark’s multiplication 
of Markov blankets, which works in tandem with the idea of coupling, 
guarantees a closure to cognitive systems, and closure is precisely what classical 
approaches to Predictive Coding look for.  
The important philosophical point of Clark’s closures consists in the way 
Markov blankets are individuated, namely in the idea of thinking of Markov 
blankets as the boundaries of extended self-sustaining systems constituted by 
the agent and external cognitive devices, which shape and structure cognitive 
practices.  
 
ii) Productive laziness 
Clark’s idea of redefining the boundaries of the predictive mind by thinking 
of a multiplicity of Markov blankets that define coupled predictive systems is 
supported by the consideration of a recurrent theme in works in embodied and 
environmental situated cognition: the value of the brain’s “productive laziness” 
(Clark 2015c: 9-12; 2016: 244- 245). 
As pointed out in the previous paragraph, Hohwy’s theory of Predictive 
Coding is focused on a detailed account of the predictive powers of the brain, 
explained through the concepts of generative model, hypothesis formation and 
hypothesis testing, and self-evidence in processes of inferences to the best 
explanation. This account of Predictive Coding describes the brain as an 
intrinsically active engine, which has all the means for its self-sustainment and 
for deploying veridical cognition inside of itself.  
The picture of the brain that Clark’s PP offers is similar, because Clark too, 
faithful to the core ideas of Predictive Coding, puts strong emphasis on active 
powers of the brain, stressing on the idea of models that are self-generated and 
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that actively shape perceptual data by means of top-down predictions (Clark 
2013a; 2015b; 2016). 
Nevertheless, by taking into account “productive laziness”, Clark’s theory 
points to an explanation of the active, productive, and pro-active brain, which 
is said to be consistent with embodied and extended views of the mind.  
“Productive laziness” is an expression that Clark borrows from Herbert 
Simon (Simon 1956; Clark 2015c: 9), and that has been coined to explain 
economical but effective strategies in fast-time problem-solving tasks. An 
example that explains productive laziness in cognitive tasks is the following one 
(Clark 2015c: 9). An agent has to choose a restaurant for a special occasion. 
Instead of reading all the reviews and menus for every restaurant within a 5 
mile radius, the agent chooses a restaurant that a trustworthy friend suggested 
her. The cognitive strategy the agent chooses is the faster and simpler one: it is 
a solution that allows her to waste a minimum amount of energy and time, but 
at the same time, it is a successful heuristic, because it actually helps the agent 
get the result expected. 
This idea of productive laziness can be extended to many cognitive 
practices, and it can be applied to an explanation of how the brain works. 
Indeed, the idea the concept of “productive laziness” suggests is that the brain 
mandates parts of its job to the body and to environmental props.  
A core strategy for the distribution of the cognitive load of a task between 
brain, body, and world is the ecologically efficient use of senses in action. 
 To explain this point, which can be described in terms of “ecological 
balance” (Clark 2016: 245), and that theoretically goes back to general ideas of 
ecological psychology, Clark considers the outfielder’s example (Clark 2015c: 
11; 2016: 190, 247, 256). The example is about a baseball player who should 
run so as to catch a “fly ball” in baseball. Old-fashioned explanations of 
perception would try to account for this cognitive episode talking about the 
complex job done by the visual system, engaged in the transduction of 
information about the current position of the ball. The outcome of this job of 
transduction is said to be an internal representation of the future trajectory of 
the ball. This internal representation would allow the agent to be successful in 
her practice because it would provide the internal reasoning system with the 
cognitive means to predict its future perceptual states.  
One of the problems of this explanation is the complex and theoretically 
obscure internal system it postulates in order to account for cognitive efficiency. 
A different explanation can be formulated looking at the way agents, during 
their conscious experience, structure their perceptual fields in order to make 
predictions about future perceptual states faster and less cognitively 
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demanding. This environmental structuration is provided by action, seen as a 
fast and cheap heuristic. According to this explanation, the baseball player, 
instead of accurately representing sensory stimuli in the brain, and transmitting 
these data to another distinct reasoning system, directly acts upon the world: 
she runs in a way that seems to keep the ball moving at a constant speed through 
the perceptual field. The movements performed by the player predict the 
future position of the ball (and the agent’s sensory states as well) because the 
outcome of the agent’s own movement is a cancelation of apparent changes in 
the ball’s optical acceleration: this will allow the agent to end up in the point of 
the field where the ball will hit the ground.  
This simple example -which is just one of the many cases in which the lazy 
brain mandates its cognitive job to the body- is crucial to understand Clark’s 
account of PP because it emphasizes two key features of Clark’s reassessment 
of classical Predictive Coding account.  
First, the football player’s case illustrates the core claim of Clark’s PP: “real-
world prediction is all about […] selection and control of world-engaging 
action”. That is why the predictive machines Clark talks about are “Frugal 
Action-Oriented Machines”, aimed at “helping animals achieve their goals 
while avoiding fatally surprising encounters with the world” (Clark 2016: 250). 
This point is particularly important for the consideration of the philosophical 
consequences of Clark’s PP. Indeed, on the one hand, the very strong emphasis 
that Clark puts on predictive mechanisms in action-control and action-selection 
is a theoretical shift from classical views of Predictive Coding. In fact, even if 
also classical views deal with action, those explanations are more focused on 
hypothesis-testing operations performed by the brain. This makes them really 
internalist accounts of predictive mechanisms. On the other hand, Clark’s 
interest in “Frugal Action-Oriented Machines” confirms the working 
hypothesis formulated in §III.2, namely the idea that Clark’s PP and the 
concept of AORs developed in Being there seek to explain the same 
phenomenon: on-line, context-sensitive action control and action selection.  
Second, the football player’s example, and the way it accounts for the brain’s 
“productive laziness”, is suitable to introduce another key concept of Clark’s 
PP: Parity Principle in the explanation of predictive mind. Indeed, it seems that 
the story about productive laziness previously described -which says that, since 
the brain is productive but lazy, it mandates parts of its cognitive load to the 
body and the world, adopting “mix and match strategies” (Clark 2016: 252)- 
seems to be just a different way to express the idea of cognitive impartiality.  
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iii) Parity Principle 
Even if when Clark discusses PP he does not mention the Parity Principle 
(Clark, Chalmers 1998) explicitly, implicit occurrences of this this concept are 
frequent, especially when he deals with the broad philosophical implications of 
PP (Clark 2016).  
For example, he writes: 
 
“Actions that engage and exploit specific external resources will now be 
selected in just the same manner as the inner coalitions of neural resources 
themselves.[...] Invoking a bio-external resource, and moving our own 
effectors and sensors to yield high-quality task relevant information are here 
expressions of the same underlying strategy, reflecting our brain’s best 
estimates of where and when reliable task-relevant information is available” 
(Clark 2016: 260, italics added).  
 
This citation has two core points. First, it suggests that the cognitive system 
selects external and internal resources in the same manner. This means that 
resources the system relies on for its predictions are not selected according to 
their spatial location or their material substrate. Second, Clark says that bio-
external resources, sensorimotor activities, and neural resources are part of the 
same cognitive strategy; they have this constitutive role in the cognitive system 
because both channel information that is relevant in the economy of the 
cognitive task. These two points clearly recall the Parity Principle, pivotal 
concept of Clark’s extended functionalism. Indeed, what seems to allow extra-
neural and extra-somatic resources to be part of the predictive system is the 
relation of similarity their functions entertain with brain functions, and this 
relation of similarity is individuated in their capacity of providing informational 
contents to the system (Kirchhoff 2015: 3).  
Even if at first glance the introduction of the Parity Principle in the PP 
framework can sound like an appealing strategy to extend PP, I claim that this 
is not a good philosophical proposal. As already discussed in §I.9, the Parity 
Principle is a tricky concept. Indeed, it implicitly entails an internalistic 
prejudice, because it allows extra-neural resources to be part of the cognitive 
system because they are similar to internal processes, which are considered to 
be the first term of the comparison that the principle draws. The Parity 
Principle, by giving a cognitive primacy to neural resources –primacy that 
depends on conceiving of internal resources as models for external cognitive 
processes- implicitly puts the cognitive specificity of extra-neural resources in 
the background. Therefore, since the Parity Principle is implicitly applied to 
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the PP framework, the “extended” explanation of anticipatory processes seems 
to suffer from the EMH’s disease, which I would call “concealed internalism”.  
Moreover, the informational conception of cognitive processes that the 
Parity Principle entails is a challenge for a fully embodied account of PP. If 
extra-neural resources play an interesting role in anticipatory cognitive 
mechanisms only because they function as information carriers, what about the 
role of the actual “sensorimotor body”, the body that does things in the 
environment? And also: what does the job of information processing? The 
body or the brain?  
Saying that the body is crucial in predictive processes because it carries 
information relevant to the system is different from claiming that the body, 
thanks to its situated actions, is crucial for the process of prediction. In order 
to predict peace between extended and enactivist approaches to cognition 
(Clark 2015b: 16), PP should account for this aspect of the embodiment as 
well. Moreover, if it was the case that information carried by the body was said 
to be processed by the brain only, then the explanation would give the body an 
important, but still secondary role in PP, because this would entail that core 
control functions would be individuated in neural resources.  
To explore these issues, now I consider the main way Clark accounts for the 
role of the body in his PP framework: active inference. 
 
iv) Active inference  
The concept of active inference has been already introduced implicitly in 
my discussion when I considered Clark’s outfielder’s example, aimed at 
explaining the contribution offered by embodied action to predictive 
mechanisms. Indeed, to Clark, action coincides with active inference, namely 
the combined mechanisms through which perceptual and motor systems work 
together to reduce prediction errors (Clark 2016: 122). 
The idea that lies at the core of active inference is that we can think of the 
brain as always engaged in finding neural states that best accommodate 
incoming sensory signal. The concept of active inference accounts for this 
capacity of the brain in terms of world-engaging action (Gallagher 2017: 17-18): 
when the agent moves her body in a certain way, she generates the sensory 
consequences expected by the brain (Clark 2013a: 6). This helps the lazy brain 
to minimize the cognitive load it has to deal with. 
One of the problems of Clark’s account of active inference is precisely 
connected with the distribution of the cognitive load active inference is said to 
allow. Indeed, even if Clark actually emphasizes the very role of embodied 
action, describing cognitive episodes in which agents actually do something in 
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the world in order to foster prediction, when he has to account for the way 
information provided by the senses is processed, he seems to ascribe this job 
of information processing to the brain, conceived as the center where 
information is manipulated (see Gallagher 2017: 18 for this critique). Indeed, 
Clark says that “action serves to deliver fragments of information ‘just in time’ 
for use, and that information guides action” (Clark 2016: 250); later he says that 
action control is guaranteed by the brain’s continuous computations of 
possibilities for action (Clark 2016: 251). 
The problem of this explanation obviously does not rest in the fact that 
Clark gives importance to the job of the brain -also enactivists widely consider 
the role of the brain in cognitive processes-, but rather lies in the centrality 
ascribed to brain, and to the concept of computation. This seems to be a 
problematic point in Clark’s project of “putting predictive processing, body, 
and world together again” (Clark 2015b: 11). If one the one hand it is true that 
Clark’s PP actually gives theoretical space to the world and the body, on the 
other hand it is also true that the body and the world play just a vicarious role 
in the explanation. It is not the real, material world or the anatomical, 
sensorimotor and lived body that are crucial for PP. What is central in the 
explanation is information that what is outside of the brain conveys, and the 
computational job the brain does on this information.  
This centrality of the brain’s computational abilities justifies Clark’s 
conception of action as inference -namely the idea that action provides the 
internal system with information crucial for its inferences-, and it is also 
connected to another misleading concept (see Gallagher 2017: 19 for this 
critique) crucial in Clark’s account of active inference: sampling. 
When Clark takes into account active inference he describes the outcome 
of action as a sample of the world (Clark 2016: 121; 251). To explain this point 
Clark writes that  
 
“the simplest way in which a PP-style organism might be said to actively 
construct its world is by sampling. Action here serves perception by moving 
the body and sense-organs around in ways that aim to ‘serve up’ predicted 
patterns of stimulation. […] The agent, by exposing herself to the varied 
stimulations predicted by the generative model, actively contributes to the 
world as sampled. Since it is only the world as sampled that the model needs 
to accommodate and explain, this delivers a very real sense in which (subject 
to the overarching constraint of structural self-maintenance i.e. persistence 
and survival) we do indeed build or ‘enact’ our individual […] worlds.” 
(Clark 2015c: 19, emphasis added)  
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If I understand well what Clark claims here, action is said to be crucial in 
predictive mechanisms because it exposes the agent to stimulations predicted 
by the internal generative model and, in doing so, it contributes to the world as 
sampled. To Clark, the operation of sampling action is engaged in is pivotal to 
understand the way agents bring forth (enact) their world: by acting in a certain 
way, agents sample their world in a way that is suitable for their cognitive 
expectations.  
At first glance, this explanation sounds promising, in particular in relation to 
Clark’s project of a mature embodied cognitive science that integrates 
computational accounts with the enactivist approaches to cognition. 
Nonetheless, I suspect that this first impression is misleading. This because 
saying that agents enact their world in the appropriate enactivist sense entails a 
conception of enaction that is fully non-representational (Varela, Thompson, 
Rosch 1991). On the contrary, Clark’s way of conceiving of enaction here 
seems to hide a representational commitment (Clark 2016: 293), and this 
precisely because of the concept of sampling.  
Clark’s point consists in claiming that generative models should 
accommodate the world sampled by action, and they do so because they are 
endowed with representations that have the epistemic function of “sampling 
the world in ways designed to test our hypotheses” (Clark 2016: 251). This 
suggests that, in the PP framework, action is crucial because it offers the brain 
samples of the world that become contents of the brain’s representational 
mechanisms. To put in other words, what is crucial in this explanation is not 
the very cognitive effect that action produces in the world, structuring it as a 
space where cognitive practices unfold smoothly, but rather a sample of the 
environment that the internal PP mechanism represents in order to control 
action  (Clark 2016: 251). What matters is not action in itself (namely what the 
agent actually does in the external world) but the product of action, which Clark 
considers to be an internal representation of the sampled world.  
The fact that this representation is said not bearing richly reconstructive 
contents, but to “spot the context in which some frugal, action-involving 
procedure will work” (Clark 2016: 191), seems not being able to rescue Clark’s 
representation of the sampled world from some philosophical problems.  
To me, this way of conceiving of the epistemic role of action in terms of 
sampling, and not as a “doing”, as an “enactive adjustment” (Gallagher 2017: 
19), is unproductive if considered in the broad economy and aim of a “radical 
PP”. Indeed, it seems to hide the same problems considered in my previous 
chapter, namely a weak account of the epistemic role of action. This is not 
acceptable in the economy of an enactive approach to cognition, which gives a 
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cognitive primacy to world-engaging action. Moreover, Clark’s explanation, by 
drawing a systematical connection between action and the brain’s mechanisms, 
ends up with depriving embodied action from its core features: being a process 
done or performed by an agent in the environment, thanks to the possibilities 
offered by her body. When an explanation circumscribes the epistemic power 
of action to what it offers to the brain’s mechanisms, it is not actually taking into 
account action itself, but rather internal mechanisms that undergo action, and 
that have the function of controlling embodied action and perception. 
These problems will be taken into account in the following paragraph, where 
I will offer some considerations about the role of representations in Clark’s PP, 
in order to understand whether his account is actually suitable to extend PP or 
if it still sticks to an internalistic description of anticipatory processes. 
Moreover, this excursus about the concept of action and representation in 
Clark’s PP is useful to consider the relation between Clark’s PP and enactive 
accounts of predictive mechanisms. As a matter of fact, some advocates of the 
enactive approach to cognition, although they are critical of some concepts 
Clark makes use of in his PP (i.e. action as active inference, action as sampling, 
PP as entailing informational content; e.g. Gallagher 2017; Hutto 2017), they 
somehow seem to find good philosophical points for a non-representational 
view of PP in Clark’s proposal.  
For example, Gallagher emphasizes one of Clark’s philosophical statements 
(Gallagher 2017: 17), in which Clark sounds open to the possibility to think of 
the PP’s story in entirely non-representational terms (Clark 2016: 293). This, 
Gallagher says, would allow Clark’s explanation to avoid not only rich internal 
representations, but also minimal forms of representationalism, such as 
AORs
114. I suspect that a closer look at Clark’s proposal will be demonstrative 
of the opposite theoretical situation: PP is a new way to rethink of AORs. 
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 Notice that at this point of his argumentation, Gallagher seems to accommodate Clark’s 
account of PP. Nevertheless, at other stages of his argumentation, he seems to point to the 
direction of my working hypothesis, according to which Clark’s PP hides AORs. Indeed, he 
notices that Clark goes back to the notion of pragmatic representation, in particular when he 
talks about active inference (Gallagher 2017: 19, footnote 4).  
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III. 5 Clark’s Predictive Processing: representational flashbacks.  
 
In the previous paragraph, I begun to sketch out of the problem of 
representations in Clark’s approach to PP. I pointed out how representations 
are introduced in the PP framework, and I suggested that the representational 
talk is “furtive”, at least if the explanation is taken into account at a broad 
theoretical level (i.e. by considering general statements about the nature of the 
predictive mind).  
This idea of considering representations as epistemic posits that get into the 
PP framework in an unclear way is motivated by a “textual fact”. Indeed, as 
noticed by Bruineberg, Kiverstein and Rietveld (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, 
Rietveld: 2016, footnote 29), there are many passages in which Clark seems to 
talk about a process that is non-representational.  
For example, he states that  
 
“we should resist the claim that what we perceive is best understood as a 
kind of hypothesis, model or virtual reality. The temptation to think so […] 
rests on two mistakes. The first mistake is to conceive of inference-based 
routes to adaptive response as introducing a kind of representational veil 
between the agent and the world. […] The second mistake is a failure to take 
sufficient account of the role of action” (Clark 2016: 170)  
 
Or again, he says that “the PP story does not depict perception as a process 
of building a representation of the external world at all” (Clark 2015a: 2). 
To me, statements like those ones sound like a good starting point to draw 
a picture of the predictive mind that no longer relies on representations. 
Indeed, what Clark says seems to suggest a non-representational story in two 
senses.  
First, the brain is said not perceiving its own internal models (or 
representations of the world, I would say): this seems to suggest that there can 
be a non-representational account of the relation between the brain and the 
world (i.e. it could be a relation of mere co-variance, or of causality; Orlandi 
2016; Ramsey 2007).  
Second, inference (in particular active inference, since Clark refers to 
inference when he talks about “routes of adaptive response”; Clark 2016: 170) 
is said not creating a representational veil between the agent and the world. As 
said in the previous paragraph, I suspect that we cannot avoid representations 
if we endorse an inferential account of cognition like that one offered by Clark. 
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As a matter of fact, his conception of inference has been shown to entail a 
representational commitment, because inference is said to be performed on 
representational contents processed by the brain. Nevertheless, considering 
what Clark says in a literal sense, it can still be said that he seems to promote a 
non-representational proposal, by saying explicitly that the evidentiary veil is 
non-representational. 
The problem of Clark’s PP framework is that it cannot fulfill these non-
representational expectations. Indeed, Clark actually makes huge use of a 
representational vocabulary, and he does so at many explanatory levels. 
First, when he speculates about the relation between the brain’s Predictive 
Processing and the world, he emphasizes that hierarchical models are not 
aimed at drawing a relation of mapping between environmental and inner 
states; rather, they aimed at inferring the nature of the source of the signal from 
variations of the input signal itself. Later, when he deals with the Bayesian 
structure of these inferences, he appeals to the concept of probabilistic 
representation
115
 (Clark 2013a: 3).  
Probabilistic representations are neural representations that encode 
probability density distributions that are part of probabilistic generative models 
(Clark 2013a: 6;  2016: 39). This makes them different from traditional internal 
representations because, instead of merely representing given features of the 
world, they represent the amount of uncertainty of an internal model. To put 
in other words, they are said not mirroring the external world because their 
representational content is not about a state of affairs of the world, but it is 
about a probability density. For example, those representations do not simply 
represent “CAT ON MAT”, but they reflect the relative possibility of this state 
of affairs (Clark 2016: 41). According to Clark’s PP framework, this would 
make those representations suitable to overcome one of the problems classical 
notions of representation entail (see §I.2): the idea that our minds, because 
they are in contact with the world by means of propositional or picture-like 
representations, are like “mirrors of nature”. This idea of the mind as a “mirror 
of nature” (Rorty 1979; Clark 1997a: 47; Clark 1995) is problematic, because 
it presupposes a strict demarcation between mind and world, which is not 
consistent with the EMH.  
Moreover, Clark’s account of the relation between the mind and the world 
in his PP makes use of a representational vocabulary when it gets to consider 
the epistemic strategies that the brain deploys to get the world right: PEM. Here 
(Clark 2016: 39) he talks about error signals in terms of “error neuros” and he 
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 For a critical discussion of the probabilistic nature of these representations see Nanay 2012.  
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says that those ones can be considered to be a variety of representation 
neurons, which encode sensory information that has not been explained yet. 
Those two points, namely the concept of probabilistic representation and 
that of error representation neurons, offer a representational description of the 
core structure of Predictive Processing. Obviously, one can say that this claim 
about the representational nature of Clark’s PP mechanisms should be taken 
cautiously, because when he deals with probabilistic representations and error 
representations he is offering an exam of the literature about Predictive Coding. 
This might entail that his own proposal is not representational, or “less 
representational” than those approaches. Nevertheless, it seems to me that here 
Clark is not making use of a representational vocabulary just in order to be 
faithful to Predictive Coding accounts along his excursus about those models. 
In fact, after this explanation of the core ideas of Predictive Coding, he 
considers a commentary to Rao and Ballard’s seminal work on Predictive 
Coding (Rao, Ballard 1998) by Koch and Poggio (Koch, Poggio 1999), where 
the two authors express their worries about a non-representational turn in 
Predictive Processing. Koch and Poggio say that, since well-predicted elements 
of the signal are explained away within the predictive system, it seems that the 
explanation substitutes representations with silence. Clark answers to this anti-
representational worry saying that it is unjustified (Clark 2016: 48), and he 
focuses on the “more and more complex representations used in processing”, 
and he emphasizes the ubiquity of the representational information flow in the 
system.  
This seems to be a good confirmation of a representational understanding 
of Clark’s PP. 
 
The problem with this interpretation of PP not only consists in the use of a 
representational vocabulary to denote neural populations (problem taken into 
account in Chapter II of this work, discussing the “standing-for” and 
“interpretability” conditions), but it also rests in an implicit claim according to 
which, since PP relies on a Bayesian account of perception, then the processes 
it accounts for are fully representational (Orlandi 2016).  
As Orlandi points out, it is not clear why we should call probability density 
distributions (i.e. likelihoods) “representations”, and why we should conceive 
of errors signals as representations. This for many reasons. 
First, both notions of representation do not do the job representations in 
cognitive science are supposed to do: guiding action (Clark, Toribio 1994; 
Clark 2008; Clowes, Mendonça 2016; Haugeland 1991; Wheeler 2005).  
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As Orlandi notices (Orlandi 2016: 346), what is called “probabilistic 
representation” in PP -unlike in the Helmholtizian account of perception- does 
not serve as a premise for visual inference, but it simply marks the probability 
of hypotheses. Therefore, if we think of perception as guiding action, and if 
“probabilistic representations” do not play the role of premises in perceptual 
inferences, then they play no role in action-guidance.  
The same thing can be said about error signals. Error signals tell the brain 
whether a current hypothesis is plausible or not (Orlandi 2016: 344). Unless 
we consider action in a very narrow and specific sense (namely as error 
reduction; Gładziejewski 2016), what is called “error representation” does not 
sound like a good candidate to guide action. Error signals just have advantages 
(or an “adaptive function” in a broad sense) in the inner economy of the brain, 
because they basically ask the brain to adjust its own states, in order “to reach 
an error-free equilibrium” (Orlandi 2016: 345).  
Moreover, both probabilistic representations and error representations do 
not fulfil all the representational criteria endorsed by philosophers of cognitive 
sciences to determine whether an item or process X is genuinely 
representational or not
116
. 
Most cognitive scientists state that, in order to be considered to be a 
representation, an item or process X  
 
i) should bear a content (= “standing-for” + “interpretability” 
conditions); 
ii) should have accuracy conditions; 
iii) should be able to misrepresent (= expressive of the “standing-for” + 
“interpretability” conditions); 
iv) should be decoupleable from what it represent (Haugeland 1991; 
Orlandi 2016: 346; Gallagher 2008a; Hutto, Myin 2013; Rowlands 
2006a; 2012). 
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 The list of representational criteria considered here is slightly different from the list offered 
in Chapter II. For example, here I do not consider the “passivity”, “internality”, and “genuine 
duration” conditions, and I introduce the “accuracy” condition, taken into account implicitly 
in Chapter II when I considered Hutto’s objections to AORs focused on the problem of 
content (§II.5). I made this choice because here I follow Orlandi’s argumentative structure, 
even if I develop some points independently (e.g. I deal with the relation between content, 
misrepresentation, and accuracy more explicitly).   
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Likelihoods, namely what has been called “probabilistic representations”, 
do not fulfill these criteria. Indeed, they do not bear contentful states
117
 (even if 
Clark’s explanation suggests that those states are contentful; Clark 2016: 6; 21), 
but they rather measure a probability density. This entails that they do not fulfill 
the misrepresentation and accuracy conditions, because i) what can be 
inaccurate or accurate is content, ii) misrepresentation is given when the 
content of an item or process X does not match what it is the case in the external 
world.  
The application of the three criteria mentioned above to “error 
representations” shows problems in this representational conception of error 
signals as well, even if in a slightly different sense. Indeed, “error 
representations” seem to have an informational content (“there is a mismatch 
between high-level predictions and the incoming sensory signal”) that causes 
the brain to adjust its own states. Nevertheless, it is not clear how this content 
is able to misrepresent something and to be inaccurate. Indeed, error signals 
occurs when there is a mismatch between high-level predictions and the 
incoming sensory signal. It is not clear how error signals can misrepresent this 
mismatch, by giving false information about this state of affairs of the brain. 
Mismatches just occur, and when they occur “error neurons” are activated: this 
means there is a direct relation of causality between mismatches and error 
signals. Since those neurons do not fire when mismatches do not occur, then 
they cannot give the brain false information: they do not misrepresent. 
Therefore, also “error representations” do not fulfill the representational 
criteria taken into account.  
The last representational condition, namely “decouplability” or 
“detachability” –like Orlandi calls it- needs to be considered more carefully. 
In Chapter II, I considered one sense in which this concept is understood. 
There I defined decouplability as the possibility of an item or process X to 
guide cognitive processes off-line, namely when what is represented is not 
present in the context of the cognitive practice. 
If this sense of “decouplability” is taken into account, it seems possible to 
claim that “probabilistic representations” partially118 fulfill this condition, 
because they are used in the agent’s off-line processes. The same point seems 
to apply to “error signals”, which occur when the agent’s full conscious 
experience of perception has not taken place yet.  
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 For more objections against the description of the brain’s PP as contentful processes see 
Hutto 2017.  
118
 Here I say “partially” because, as already said, “probabilistic representations” do not guide 
action.  
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The problem with this generous application of the decouplability condition 
rests in the fact that it entails a misleading interpretation of the context those 
items should be detachable from. In fact this interpretation of “decouplability” 
considers being off-line in relation to the agent’s conscious experience. This 
interpretation is not actually accurate in PP, because if we look at the so-called 
contents of those representations, we can see that those items are not actually 
detached from what they are said to represent
119. Neither “probabilistic 
representations” nor “error representations” are about something the cognitive 
agent consciously experiences. Rather, they are about the brain’s internal states 
and models. Therefore, it is not clear why we should consider those items as 
detached from what they represent or as “being used off-line”. If we consider 
the very context in which the process takes place, the neural one, it seems 
possible to claim that those items are used by the brain on-line, because what 
those items are said to represent is not absent when the brain does its job. Error 
signals occur when something happens in the brain (mismatches between top-
down and bottom-up flows of information), and “probabilistic representations” 
concern something (probabilistic generative models) that is there (the model), 
in the brain, when the cognitive process occurs.  
Therefore, given that “error signals” and “probabilistic representations” do 
not fulfill the representational criteria listed above, the use of a representational 
vocabulary to account for those core concepts of PP is unwarranted.  
 
I claim that analogous points apply to another way to conceive of 
representations in Clark’s PP120, namely representations that I previously said 
being a reassessment of Clark’s previous work on AORs (Clark 1997a; Clark, 
Grush 1999; Clark, Toribio 1994). 
To introduce this way of conceiving of representations, I consider a passage 
from Clark’s article Radical Predictive Processing (Clark 2015c), where he 
explains why he thinks that his conception of representations in PPs can predict 
peace between enactive and extended approaches to cognition.  
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 This is a second way to conceive of “decouplability”, which Orlandi somehow considers 
independent from the first one (Orlandi 2016: 343). To me these two notions are 
interdependent, because they both refer to the possibility of an item X to play a cognitive 
function when what the so-called representation is about is absent in the context of the cognitive 
process.  
120
 Here I talk about another way to conceive of representations (different from probabilistic 
representations and error representations) because Clark himself seems to distinguish between 
representations considered till this moment and representations of information conveyed by 
action. Nevertheless, this distinction, in Clark 2016, is not always clear. Indeed sometimes he 
conflates “action representation” with “probabilistic representation” (Clark 2016: 133).  
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“PP […] deals extensively with internal models […], whose role is to 
control action by predicting complex plays of sensory data. This, the 
enactivist might fear, is where our promising story about neural processing 
breaks bad. […] [Nevertheless,] the remaining distance between PP and the 
enactivist may not be as great as that bald opposition suggest. […] PP, 
although it openly trades in talks of inner models and representations, 
invokes […] representations that are fundamentally in the business of serving 
up actions within the context of rolling sensorimotor cycles. Such 
representations aim to engage the world […] and they are firmly rooted in 
the patterns of organism-environment interaction” (Clark 2015c: 20-21; text 
into brackets added) 
 
As the citation shows, Clark’s appeal to internal representations in Action-
Oriented Predictive Processing depends on the same explanatory need AORs 
were supposed to meet in Clark’s previous work on action: serving up action 
in the context of rolling sensorimotor cycles, in order to allow the agent to active 
engage the world.  
Moreover, the nature of those representations, I claim, is similar to that of 
AORs described in Chapter II. Indeed, to describe the structure of the 
epistemic entities considered in the citation above, Clark cites (Clark 2015c: 
21) Lauwereyns’ book Brain and the Gaze: On the Active Boundaries of 
Vision. In the passage quoted by Clark, Lauwereyns says that those 
representations are not “actual re-presentations or duplicates of objects in the 
world but […] incomplete, abstract code that makes predictions about the world 
and revises its predictions on the basis of interactions with the world” 
(Lauwereyns 2012: 74). 
To me, the overall sense conveyed by this passage has a lot to do with the 
broad theoretical context of AORs. Indeed, saying that PP’s representations 
“are not actual representations” while preserving the concept of representation 
seems to be a clear endorsement of what Clark previously called “minimal 
robust representationalism (MRR)” (Clark, Grush 1999: 6-8), of which action-
oriented representation is the core concept.  
In the 1999 article, Clark and Grush talk about MRR to explain how real-
world, real-time actions, like skilled reaching for example, are performed 
successfully. 
The two authors start to consider this problem saying that the success of 
smooth, world engaging actions depends on the brain’s ability to respond to 
proprioceptive feedbacks (concerning the position and trajectory of the hand 
system, for example). After having noticed that often those feedbacks are 
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required faster than they are available (they are required before the minimum 
delay has elapsed), and having suggested that the system needs something more 
than those feedbacks to engage with the real-time action quickly, Clark and 
Grush draw a comparison between the human proprioceptive system and 
emulator mechanisms to explain this phenomenon.  
Emulators are mechanisms that  
 
i) take information about the current state of a system and about 
control command issued as input,  
ii) and give a prediction of the next state of the system as output. 
 
This mechanism is said to be crucial for the success of a system’s task, 
because it “allows the system to mock feedback signals available ahead of the 
real-world feedback, and hence allows rapid-error correction and control” 
(Clark, Grush 1999: 6).  
Anticipatory mechanisms described in Clark and Grush’s 1999 article are 
said to rely on a particular form of representationalism: minimal but robust 
representationalism. This form of representationalism, similarly to what 
noticed in the quotation from Clark’s “Radical Predictive Processing” (Clark 
2015c), is said to be minimal because, in contrast to full-blooded 
representations, representations computed by the system are not fully 
decoupleable, and do not offer a rich description of the external world (Clark, 
Grush 1999: 6-7). Nevertheless, those representations are said to be robust 
because they are internal states that do a great job in guiding action, are 
scientifically identifiable, and serve as stand-ins for specific extra-neural states 
of affairs (Clark, Grush 1999: 10).  
As previously said, those representations are said to play a central role in 
guiding action because  
 
i) by mocking feedback signals available ahead of the real-world 
feedback, they guarantee the action-perception based cognitive 
performance to be smooth and quick; 
ii) they allow rapid error control.  
 
This description representations in emulator-like systems is theoretically 
really close to anticipatory mechanisms Clark considers in his PP. Indeed, like 
what happens in the description of emulator mechanisms, PP it said to 
guarantee a smooth engagement with the world because the brain’s internal 
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system represents anticipations of feedback signals, and it widely relies on 
mechanisms of error minimization (PEM). 
 
To me, the crucial point here is the way Clark extends the seminal idea of 
error control described in the 1999 article in his work on PP. 
As explained in the previous paragraph, by means of the concept of active 
inference, Clark strongly emphasizes how action contributes to PEM 
mechanisms. Nonetheless, despite this strong emphasis on embodied action, 
the body and its possibilities of action are taken into account in an indirect way. 
Indeed, as pointed out in §III.4, action is considered to be crucial in the PP 
framework because it delivers fragments of information that the brain uses to 
control subsequent action (Clark 2016: 250).  
My philosophical point consists in claiming that the way Clarks thinks of 
these fragments of information delivered to the brain by action, and the way 
this information fits in generative models is the same suggested by MRR by 
appealing to the concept of AOR. This is to say, AORs Clark talks about in his 
PP are the same kind of representation he talked about in 1994 (Clark, Toribio 
1994), 1997 (Clark 1997a), and 1999 (Clark, Gursh 1999). 
At a general level, this is confirmed by Clark’s definition of the brain’s 
generative models as “context-sensitive generative models that simultaneously 
prescribe recognition and action” (Clark 2016: 125). This sounds like a clear 
reassessment of Clark’s first approach to AORs, offered in his 1997 book. 
Indeed, there (Clark 1997a: 49), recalling Millikan’s idea of Pushmi-Pullyu 
representations, he said that AORs are neural populations that simultaneously 
describe aspects of the world (= recognition aspect) and prescribe possible 
actions.  
Moreover, he described AORs as “action-dependent”, and as reflecting “the 
profound role of bodily motion […] in shaping and simplifying the information-
processing problems to be solved” (Clark 1997a: 149).  
Also this second aspect, namely AORs’ action-dependence, reflection of 
bodily motions, and simplification information is consistent with Clark’s broad 
idea of generative models in relation to active inference. Indeed, he states that 
PP is action-oriented (Clark 2016: 111), he accounts for bodily motions in 
internal models by focusing on the epistemic role of feedback signals conveyed 
by the senses while agents perform world-engaging tasks (Clark 2016: 190, 247, 
256), and he says that action is important because it makes the brain’s 
informational load lighter, fostering predictive mechanisms and PEM. 
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Furthermore, Clark himself -even if sporadically- makes use of the phrase 
“Action-Oriented Representations”, and he does so when he deals with active 
inference. For example
121
, he says that  
 
“many of the probabilistic representations inhering the generative model 
will now be […] ‘action-oriented’. They will represent how things are in a 
way that, once suitably modulated by the precision weighting of prediction-
error, also prescribe (in virtue of the flows of sensation they predict) how to 
act and respond. They are representations of affordances” (Clark 2016: 
133; italics added)  
 
Later, he defines those representations as “pragmatic representations”, 
borrowing the expression from Cisek and Kalaska’s article “Neural 
mechanisms for interacting with a world full of action choices” (Cisek, Kalaska 
2011). The way Clark describes these pragmatic representations is the following 
one: 
 
“representations tailored to the production of good-online control rather 
than aiming for rich mirroring of an action-independent world. Those 
representations simultaneously serve epistemic functions, sampling the 
world in ways designed to test our hypotheses and to yield better 
information for the control of action itself” (Clark 2016: 251)  
 
Taken together, those passages suggest a well-known philosophical story 
about action: the epistemic role of action (and the control of action too) should 
be individuated in the way possibilities of action are represented by the brain.  
As explained in the previous paragraph, Clark says that action contributes 
to PEM because it produces samples of the world. The second passage from 
Surfing Uncertainty cited above makes this story about action more complete, 
individuating the nature and the location of those samples of the world. Indeed, 
pragmatic representations embedded in the brain’s generative models are the 
result of the job of sampling active inference is said to do. Then, it is not action 
in itself that is central in anticipatory processes that control the agent’s 
engagements with the world, but again action-oriented representations 
(samples) provided by action.  
To Clark, the fact that those representations are pragmatic (or action-
oriented) would allow his explanation to close the distance between his PP and 
enactivist approaches to cognition (Clark 2015c: 20), and, crucially, this would 
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 See also Clark 2015c: 21.  
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put an end to representation wars (Clark 2015a). Given that representations he 
makes use of in his PP have the same nature of representations he described 
in his previous work on action-perception loops, and considered the objections 
against this kind of representation developed in the “enactivist literature”, the 
“peace treaty” Clark suggests enactivists to sign seems not being acceptable.  
This not only because Clark’s PP does not account for action as a “doing”, 
and this is what enactivism thinks we should focus on (Gallagher 2017: 19), but 
also because the epistemic posits Clark relies on to explain the role of action in 
predictive processes has been shown to be philosophically unwarranted. As 
AORs of Being There, pragmatic representations of Clark’s PP do not fulfill 
the representational criteria usually endorsed to talk about representations 
properly. In fact,  
 
i) neural populations do not fulfill the standing-for and the 
interpretability condition; 
ii) pragmatic representations are not decoulpleable from what they 
represent, because they are said to occur in on-line control (Clark 
2016: 251).  
 
Therefore, the use of a representational vocabulary in Clark’s PP, 
considering “probabilistic representations”, “error representations” and 
“pragmatic representation”, is unwarranted (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, Rietveld 
2016; Gallagher 2017; Orlandi 2016). This not only makes Clark’s project of 
moving away from the classical representational paradigm (Clark 2015a;  
2015c; 2016) unsuccessful, but it also undermines his claim about the 
possibility an “extended” account of predictive mechanisms (Clark 2016; 
2017).  
In fact, the appeal to internal representations, in particular to AORs or 
pragmatic representations, is expressive of an internalistic prejudice, namely 
the idea that embodied action matters in predictive processing because it is 
encoded in the brain’s generative models. This prejudice -which is also hidden 
in the implicit appeal to the Parity Principle- prevents Clark’s explanation from 
actively extending predictive processing in the real-world. Clark’s explanation, 
like in his minimal robust representational proposal developed in the 90s, 
underplays the epistemic power of real-world embodied action (namely world-
engaging cognitive practices). If one the one hand it is true that both Clark’s 
ways to conceive of action-oriented representations (that of the 90’s and that of 
PP) are attempts to describe what representations do in cognitive processes 
(Ramsey 2007: 18; i.e. prescribing and controlling action), and this seems to 
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point to an active account of representations, on the one hand it is also true that 
this way to conceive of action is weak. In fact, action prescription and action 
control, as claimed in §III.4, §II.5, and §II.7, account for conative aspects of 
cognitive experience and not for action itself.  
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III.6 The enactive approach to Predictive Processing: an alternative 
proposal.  
 
In the last two paragraphs, I considered Clark’s approach to Predictive 
Processing, examining the main points of his proposal, aimed at reassessing 
predictive mechanisms in order to make them meeting his EMH. In particular, 
I noticed that the way he tries to extend PP relies on some core concepts: 
multiplicity and flexibility of Markov blankets, Parity Principle, and centrality 
of action conceived in terms of active inference. My discussion has shown the 
interdependence of those concepts, which are grounded on an informational 
account of cognitive processes. In Clark’s proposal, this informational 
conception of cognition is said being able to extend PP because it allows the 
explanation to individuate Markov blankets’ boundaries where there is 
information processing, independently to the internal location of information. 
Moreover, it allows action to be a crucial part of anticipatory cognitive 
mechanisms because action is said to provide the cognitive system with 
fundamental information for prediction error minimization.  
I suggested that, even if at first glance this way to think of PP sounds like an 
appealing strategy to extend this explanatory framework the explanation does 
not actually succeed in its project of extending the predictive mind. This not 
only because Clark still sticks to a philosophical principle that hides an 
internalistic prejudice (Parity Principle), but also because a careful exam of 
Clark’s PP at work shows the centrality of the concept of representation in his 
explanation.  
 An analysis of concepts such as “error representation” and “probabilistic 
representation” shows that the use of these concepts is unwarranted, because 
the mechanisms Clark talks about do not fulfill the necessary conditions to 
identify representations properly. This is philosophically problematic, but what 
is even more problematic is the use of the concept of “action-oriented 
representation”. Indeed, not only those items or processes are not genuinely 
representational (because of the same reasons why “error representations” and 
“probabilistic representations” are not representations), and then the use of a 
representational vocabulary to describe them is not justified, but the very idea 
of “action-oriented representation” is particularly dangerous in the PP 
framework. In fact, Clark claims that PP is suitable to combine the EMH with 
the enactive approach to cognition because it explains anticipatory mechanisms 
by widely focusing on action. Given that in Clark’s PP action is explained 
through the concept of AOR, this philosophical project seems unsuccessful. In 
fact, as claimed previously, AORs i) do not actually account for action in itself, 
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and ii) they “crystallize” action in internal cognitive mechanisms, to which an 
epistemic primacy is implicitly given. Therefore, instead of extending the 
predictive mind -claim that entails that the mind extends beyond the brain by 
means of embodied action- this explanation explains the mind just as enhanced 
or scaffolded by external action: this suggests that cognitive mechanisms have 
an internal core, plus external parts.  
To extend the predictive mind, a crucial role to the very cognitive processes 
that take place outside the head should be given. Moreover a stronger emphasis 
on the very relation between internal and external dynamics is required. To do 
that, since the notion of representation, and in particular the concept of AOR, 
has been shown to entail internalistic consequences, the explanation should not 
give AORs “new vehicles to ride” (Hutto 2013: 145). On the contrary, it should 
get rid of them, and focus on embodied action in a stronger sense. The enactive 
account of Predictive Processing
122
 precisely aims to tell this story. 
In this paragraph, I will discuss this approach to Predictive Processing 
(sometimes called “Predictive Engagement”; Gallagher, Allen 2016; Gallagher 
2017). This discussion aims to offer an alternative story of cognitive anticipatory 
processes that puts an end to representation wars (Clark 2015a), avoiding this 
epistemic posit when it is not necessary, namely in the explanation of action-
perception loops, in which anticipatory mechanisms play a key role.  
 
The main philosophical point at the core of the enactive explanation of PP 
concerns the place that the brain occupies in anticipatory dynamics (Gallagher, 
Bower 2014; Gallagher, Allen 2016; Gallagher 2017). As explained in §III.3 
and §III.5 -to different extents- both Hohwy’s Predictive Coding and Clark’s 
Predictive Processing account for anticipatory mechanisms of cognitive 
processes starting from an analysis of the brain’s functions. Both the 
explanations conceive of the brain as a pro-active machine that, anticipating its 
own sensory states thanks to the job of internal models, and engaging in 
operations of prediction-error minimization, allows the cognitive agent to act in 
her environment smoothly and quickly. 
The story about the brain enactive approaches to PP draw is similar but 
different. As briefly noticed, also enactivism emphasizes the role of the brain 
in anticipatory processes. Nonetheless, contrarily to what happens in the two 
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 Notice that there is not a unitary enactive account of PP, even if enactivist scholars focus on 
the same theoretical points (e.g. the centrality of action in prediction, the non-representational 
nature of PP). Here I sum-up the core ideas suggested in some enactivist papers (Bruineberg, 
Kiverstein, Rietveld 2016; 2014; Gallagher, Bower 2014; Gallagher, Allen 2016; Hutto 2017) 
in order to illustrate the broad enactive account of PP.  
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explanations already considered, it does not give an epistemic primacy to those 
internal mechanisms. This because the epistemic primacy ascribed to the brain 
hides an internalistic and conservative prejudice, and it usually leads to conceive 
of predictive processes as representational. In fact, if the brain is thought to be 
the central part of these mechanisms, it usually follows that 
 
a) the overall description of anticipatory processes implicitly or 
explicitly entails that cognitive success depends on internal models, 
where the idea of internal model (also when models are said to be 
“frugal” and “action-oriented”) suggests a demarcation between the 
brain and the environment that sounds not suitable to account for 
the situatedness of anticipatory mechanisms; 
b) internal anticipatory and PEM mechanisms should make use of 
representations of some sort, because the brain, in order to 
“communicate” with the body and the world, has to process 
information conveyed by the senses by working on the contents of 
these fragments of information, and it has to give motor commands 
to the body, by representing what should be done upon aspects or 
features of the world.  
 
A different way to think of the role of the brain in anticipatory mechanisms 
is offered by Gallagher and Bower (Gallagher, Bower 2014) and by Gallagher 
and Allen (Gallagher, Allen 2016). By generalizing the “Interactive Brain 
Hypothesis” developed by Di Paolo and De Jaegher (Di Paolo and De Jaegher 
2012)- which has been formulated to explain the brain’s mechanisms for social 
understanding- the enactive approach conceives of the brain just as one of the 
components of a process of dynamic attunement (Gallagher, Bower 2014: 
233). This kind of dynamics involves the brain, the body, the physical, social, 
and cultural environment. As the phrase “Dynamic attunement theory of 
brain” suggests, this process is aimed at settling each component of the system 
in the right kind of attunement with the others. This right attunement 
guarantees the brain-body-environment system to be in a state of equilibrium 
that, if considered at the cognitive level, allows the agent to acquire a grip on 
her environment. 
Considering this point at an evolutionary level, it can be said that the brain 
can be considered to be just one of the components of the larger system. This 
not only because the environment and the body do a great job in cognitive 
processes, and function as its enabling conditions (i.e. they determine the 
functionality of the cognitive performance; Di Paolo, De Jeaegher 2012: 5), but 
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also because the brains we have do what they do and function in the way they 
function because they have been shaped during evolution by the bodies we 
have. The fact that humans have hands ready to grasp, and eyes structured to 
focus determines the way our brains evolved, and this shapes the way they work 
in tandem with our bodies (Gallagher, Bower 2014: 240).  
According to the enactive perspective, this is the crucial starting point a 
theory of PP should be grounded on in order to overcome the problems the 
accounts previously examined entail. Even if at this point of the explanation it 
can seem that saying that the brain is part of a larger system is not enough to 
really account for the role of the brain in anticipatory processes, I think that 
this suggestion is crucial to consider one of the main problems of the PP 
framework: the appeal to internal representations embedded to the brain. 
Indeed, the way this perspective on the organism rethinks of the fundamental 
explanatory unit of the theory (the whole organism-environment system; 
Gallagher, Allen 2016) lays the foundations of a non-representational account 
of the brain. If the brain is thought to be just one of the components that work 
in tandem in the same system, the explanation can avoid to recall the notion of 
representation, and taking circular causality as the explanans of the process 
(Gallagher 2017: 129; Bruineberg, Kiverstein, Rietveld 2016). To put in other 
words, an explanation that gives an epistemic primacy to the brain, and 
considers it as an individual system implicitly entails that the brain is ruled by a 
different kind
123
 of law than that of the body and the world. It follows 
compositional and interpretative rules that allow it to represent what is outside 
of its system, namely the world and the body, and then to have a cognitive grip 
on the other systems. Conceiving of the brain as part of the same system of the 
body and the environment allows the explanation to appeal to the same rules 
to explain how different components of the larger system function. In the case 
I am taking into account, this means explaining what the brain does saying that 
its activity is affected by changes produced in the environment and the body, 
which are part of the same system, guided by the same law (causality). On its 
turn, changes in the brain affect the body, and the agent’s possibilities of action, 
which allow the agent to achieve a grip on her world. To put in other words, 
conceiving of the explanatory unit of the theory as an integrated system made 
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 This does not entail that explanations that give a pivotal role to the brain in cognitive 
processes deny a causal explanation of the brain’s mechanisms. Nevertheless, when they get to 
explain the cognitive contact of the brain with the world, they are drawn to appeal to 
representations, because they have to account for the mediation between two systems different 
in their nature: the body-environment, and the neutral system. For this point, see also the 
discussion about the problem of representation developed in §I.7.  
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of the brain, the body, and the environment, where no epistemic primacy is 
given to one of the components, means thinking of the components of the 
system as undergoing processes that co-vary the one with others (Bruineberg, 
Rietveld 2014: 7)
124
. Given this relation of reciprocal causality that links the parts 
of the fully embodied system, it no longer makes sense to postulate that the 
brain needs to infer the causes of its owns stimuli, or that it works on internal 
samples of the world in a way that is suitable to test its own hypothesis. Rather, 
anticipatory processes are explained as the co-variance, adjustment, or 
attunement (Gallagher, Allen 2016; Gallagher 2017: 163) of the parts of the 
larger system. The brain, as the other parts of the system, just attunes itself to 
the other components, and, on its turn, allows the body and the environment 
to be attuned the one with the other
125
.  
 
What the “Dynamical attunement theory of the brain” entails -namely the 
idea that the brain is part of a larger system- can be reassessed by considering 
the way the enactive approach to predictive mechanisms interprets one of the 
key concepts of the Predictive Coding theory: model.  
As explained in the previous paragraphs, Predictive Coding in Hohwy’s 
version, and in Clark’s one as well, widely relies on the concept of internal 
model. Howhy’s proposal emphasizes the ability of the brain to embed the 
probabilistic structure of the causes of its own states, and Clark’s approach 
focuses on the action-orientedness of these models, which simultaneously serve 
a function of recognition and a prescriptive function. What those approaches 
share is the point where the boundaries of those models are individuated: in 
different cortical areas. 
The enactive approach to PP suggests that, in order to avoid the internalistic 
consequences others explanations of anticipatory mechanisms entail, we 
should think of the boundaries of those models in a different way. In the same 
way the “Dynamic attunement theory of the brain” suggests that the explanatory 
unit of the theory should be individuated in the brain-body-environment 
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 Notice that the notion of covariance is also discussed by Hutto (Hutto 2017) in order to give 
a non-representational account of information processing, which allows the explanation to 
avoid a description of the brain as processing representational contents. Indeed, covariance 
explains the job of the sensory system as being set up to respond to aspects of the world that 
track specific kinds of states.  
125
 Such a dynamics can be also explained by making use of the concept of “intrinsic activity of 
the brain”. The idea is that what the brain requires at any given moment depends on its self-
generated activity, which is supported by the whole activity of the life-sustaining system 
(Thompson, Cosmelli 2011: 169-170; 172).  
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system, the enactive approach to PP claims that the model PP relies on is 
constituted by the organism itself, which embodies “the longer-term regularities 
between action, environment and the state of the organism” (Bruineberg, 
Rietveld, Kiverstein 2016) in its own structure. This means that, instead of 
individuating different generative models at the levels of the hierarchical 
structure of the brain, the model PP makes use of a larger model, which 
encompasses the brain and the body. Moreover, this model does not need to 
represent what lies outside of it. Indeed the organism is not said to have a model 
of the external world, of its causal structure, or regularities. But, on the contrary, 
it is said to be the model of the way those regularities are connected to 
experiential regularities: the organism is a model of its Umwelt because it enacts 
it. When it acts upon its environment, the organism enacts regularities of the 
subjective world, and it does so according to its possibilities of action 
determined by skills, which model what can and should be done in the world 
in order to preserve the life-continuity of the organism.  
This broader interpretation of the concept of model not only recalls the idea 
of coupled system (agent + Umwelt) offered by Varela, Thompson and Rosch 
in the milestone book The Embodied Mind, but it is also consistent with one 
of Friston’s ideas. Indeed, Friston himself says that “an agent does not have a 
model of its world, it is a model” (Friston 2013; Bruineberg, Kiverstein, 
Rietveld 2016). Therefore, he acknowledges the possibility of making use of 
the concept of model in a broad sense, thinking of the fully embodied agent as 
modeling its econiche, namely as embodying its subjective world, the organism 
itself is constitutive of.  
It seems to me that this represents a great shift from Hohwy’s conception of 
model, and from Clark’s one too. As a matter of fact, even if Clark, by 
postulating multiple and flexible Markov blankets that encompass the 
boundaries of the skull, extends the components of the PP system, he does not 
endorse the full claim according to which models PP makes use of are neural 
and extra-neural, namely that models coincide with the whole organism. Also 
when he takes into account the problem of sampling, which is a product of 
embodied action conceived as active inference, Clark thinks of samples of the 
world as parts of action-oriented anticipatory and probabilistic models, which 
are said to be located in the brain. 
Clark’s narrow consideration of the concept of model seems to depend on 
the lack of attention he pays to the philosophical implications of the notion of 
free-energy, and on the underestimation or on a misleading interpretation of 
concepts related to that of free-energy, above all that of action.  
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The enactive account, by emphasizing the philosophical implications of the 
concept of free-energy, is able to endorse the premises of a more extensive 
account of PP.  
 
The enactive approach to PP (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2016; Bruineberg, 
Rietveld 2014) begins its discussion about free-energy noticing that this 
principle -which other theories of Predictive Coding interpreted in relation to 
the brain’s dynamics, saying that the brain always tries to maintain itself in 
limited sets of states in order to minimize the dispersion of free-energy- can be 
applied to the whole dynamics of the organism. To me, this makes a lot of 
sense, considering the cognitive phenomenon Predictive Processing aims to 
explain. In fact, this theory wants to explain how agents acquire a grip on their 
worlds in on-line cognitive practices (as Clark clearly points out; Clark 2016). 
On-line cognitive practices are situated in a context in which the agent, thanks 
to her body and skills, does something upon features of the world. Then, the 
state of equilibrium the theory should account for is not the state of equilibrium 
of internal dynamics alone, but the equilibrium between internal and external 
dynamics.  
According to the enactivist approach to PP, free-energy is exactly the 
measure of the disattunement between internal and external dynamics: it 
measures energy dispersion in exchanges between the activity of the brain and 
the body, which, together, constitute and integrated system.  
Crucially, the concept of free-energy is strictly tied to the embodiment of the 
system. Indeed, for a given system, being in a state of equilibrium depends on 
the survival needs of the organism. Those needs are defined by the way the 
living body determines the “best” situation of the organism in the environment.  
For example (Bruineberg, Kiverstein, Rietveld 2016), think of a whale in 
deep sea. In this case, the whale finds itself in a state of equilibrium, or low 
suprisal, because it is situated in the habitat where it is supposed to be, namely 
in a habitat suitable for the preservation of its life and for the performance of 
its life-sustaining activities. If the organism in deep sea is a human, the situation 
is different. The human organism’s conditions of equilibrium are different, 
then in that situation, the degree of free energy would be higher; the organism 
would find itself in a state of high surprisal. This not because the human’s 
internal models give a wrong internal representation of the causal structure of 
the world, but because the broad model (that is the whole organism) is not 
attuned to the present environmental conditions.  
This disattunement can be formalized in terms of surprisal, as the classical 
version of Predictive Coding does, namely in terms of probability distributions. 
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Nevertheless, as the enactivist proposal I am considering suggests, there is a 
another way to think of this disattunement, which can be helpful to consider in 
the economy a theory that seeks to account for what an organism actually does 
in order to keep itself in a state of equilibrium (and this means minimizing free-
energy). The concept this approach to PP appeals to is that of embodied 
surprisal. As previously explained, in the Predictive Coding theory, suprisal is 
different from conscious surprise. Suprisal is not experienced, but it is rather a 
state of the brain, which signals and measures mismatches between predictions 
and incoming signals. The point is that, if we have to consider the overall 
predictive dynamics of the organism, the subpersonal conception of surprisal 
seems to narrow. This not because it is not explicative at all, but because it does 
not account for the very connection between a neural phenomenon and a 
cognitive and personal-level phenomenon, namely the activation of strategies 
aimed at reducing the disattunement between internal and external dynamics. 
It is not clear how the embodied, experiencing agent can have access to 
fragments of information about a neural state of disequilibrium, knowledge that 
would dispose her to display strategies (i.e. action) for the minimization of 
disequilibrium. Therefore, the enactivist proposal suggests to integrate this 
crucial notion of surprisal with “embodied surprisal”, namely with what the 
agent consciously experiences when her predictions are not fulfilled by what 
happens in the on-online engagement with the world.  
 
This mismatch between predictions and sensory experience is interpreted 
by the enactive explanation in terms of affective tension. The idea that lies at 
the core of the concept of affective tension is theoretically connected to the 
authors’ previous work on perception and affordances (Kiverstein, Rietveld 
2012; Rietveld 2008a; 2012a; Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014), discussed in Chapter 
II. There I explained that these enactivst scholars conceive of perceptual 
experience and action as always and fundamentally affectively caractherized, 
and this depends on the crucial concept of an afefctive-pragmatic intentionality, 
which is said to pre-reflectively guide the agent’s engagement with her 
environment.  
This approach to action and perception relates to this enactivist work on PP 
because the generative models PP is said to rely on are through to be a nest of 
states of action-readiness. These patterns of action readiness are the agent’s 
internal states that, according to her sensory states and abilities (skills), prepare 
her to achieve a grip on the environmental situation. Action-readiness - 
according to this perspective that integrates a neuroscientific explanation within 
a phenomenological framework- is affectively connoted. In fact, even if this 
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explanation does not say that action and perception are always forerun by goals, 
it accounts for the directedness of action and perception in terms of needs and 
concerns, namely in terms of what the agent cares about.  
This is to say that the agent is ready to do something upon an aspect or 
feature of the environment because she cares about those aspects of the world, 
which perceptually appear as attractive and salient. This affective phenomenon 
of caring about the world, in Chapter II, has been described by referring to the 
needs, projects, or interests that move the organism in the changing situation of 
its environment (Rietveld 2008a: 342). I suggest that this phenomenon can be 
explained in terms of what Colombetti calls “primordial affectivity” 
(Colombetti 2014: 11), reassessing Heidegger’s concept of Sorge (Heidegger 
1927). Primordial affectivity, rather than being a conscious emotion, is a 
property of a  
 
“specific organization that sets up an asymmetry between the living system 
and the rest of the world, which consists in a perspective or point of view 
from which the world acquires meaning” (Colombetti 2014: 2)  
 
Primordial affectivity is the basic affective tone the agent’s encounter with 
the world is structured by. It structures experiences and dispositions to act 
according the point of view of meaning, where meaning is basically understood 
in terms of “life values” (e.g. well-being) of the organism. 
 This suggests that there is a tension, a “directedness” toward a certain, 
expected and predicted grip on the environment, aimed at producing the 
organism’s well-being. This grip on the environment is expected in the sense 
that it is affectively anticipated by the perceptual system, which is open to or 
attracted by certain saliences of the environment in virtue of this basic 
primordial affectivity or care (Rietveld 2008a). Moreover, the agent’s grip is 
also said to be predicted by the brain itself in an affective way (Rietveld, 
Kiverstein 2014). Indeed, as anticipated in the previous chapter, recent 
research (Holroyd, Coles 2002; Barrett, Bar 2009
126
) show that the brain, thanks 
                                                          
126
 For a more detailed explanation (and for a non-representational interpretation) of Barrett 
and Bar’s research see Gallagher 2017: 19 and ff., 166 and ff. Notice that also Clark, in his 
latest work on PP, considers Barrett and Bar’s “affective prediction hypothesis”, but he draws 
conclusions that differ from the enactive approach to the role of affects in PP. Indeed, even if 
Clark acknowledges the crucial role of the affective dimension in anticipatory cognitive 
mechanisms, he does not question the representational status of affect (Clark 2016: 165), which 
Barrett and Bar seems to take for granted when they talk about “affective representations” of 
the brain (Barrett, Bar 2009: 1325). As it will be discussed later, the way the enactive approach 
to PP describes affects is non-representational, and it is phenomenologically characterized.  
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to its ability to recall the affective impact of sensations of the past, makes 
predictions about the meaning of visual sensations in the present. This allows 
it to “anticipate and prepare to act on those sensations in the future” (Barrett, 
Bar 2009: 1326). 
When states of action readiness do not allow the agent to achieve the 
expected grip on her environment, namely when the agent’s states of action-
readiness do not encounter environmental conditions suitable for the 
performance of the expected action, the agent experiences an affective tension: 
she feels that something has to be improved.  
 
Even if Bruineberg, Rietveld and Kiverstein (2016) and Rietveld and 
Kiverstein (2014) do not explain affective tension exactly in this way, it can be 
helpful to flesh out their argument by considering one important concept in the 
affective sciences: appraisal, namely the “process that detects and assesses the 
significance of the environment for well-being” (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, 
Frijda 2013: 120). 
According to standard cognitive theories of emotions (e.g. Lazarus 1991; 
Smith, Lazarus 1993), emotions contain evaluative judgments (appraisals) 
about their formal objects (Prinz 2003: 54). Formal objects of emotions are 
sometimes defined as “core relational themes”. Those ones -as Lazarus 
explains in his Emotion and Adaptation- are recurring topics that express 
“ongoing relationships between persons and their environments” (Lazarus 
1991: 22); they are “things that are of value to the organism” (Hufendiek 2017: 
4459). Such relationships are expressive of the personal harms and benefits of 
the relation between the agent and the environment (Lazarus 1991: 39). To 
appraise core relational themes means -for example- explaining fear as the 
judgement “there is danger”, then fear is thought to be dependent on the harm 
that characterizes the relationship between the agent and her environment.  
Appraisal of emotions, because it is an assessment of the relationship 
between the feeling agent and her environment, has an adaptive function. Since 
the agent knows something about her own emotions, she is prepared to cope 
with the situation of harm, for example, minimizing or alleviating the appraised 
harm. Crucially, the appraisal of an emotional circumstance depends on the 
agent’s goals and beliefs. In this sense, appraisal mediates between internal 
states of the agent, and states of the environment, preparing the agent to change 
her environment in order to maximize the benefits of her relation with it 
(Smith, Lazarus 1993: 234).  
As Colombetti points out, standard theories claim that emotion appraisal 
takes place in the agent’s head (Colombetti 2007). It is considered to be a 
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process that operates on a wide range of representations (conceptual, 
propositional, perceptual, embodied, and so on), whose contents are appraised 
values (Moors, Ellsworth, Scherer, Frijda 2013: 120-121; Prinz 2004, Chapter 
3). Nevertheless, some contemporary views on emotion appraisal affiliated to 
the enactivist lineage (Colombetti 2014; Colombetti 2007) challenge this 
internalistic and representational conception of appraisal. Instead of 
considering appraisal processes as taking place in the head, and as just 
interacting with the body, conceived as a means of appraisal thanks to its 
capacity of being emotionally aroused, the enactive theory of emotions 
conceives of the body as a constitutive part of the appraisal process. According 
to this explanation, the activity or behavior of the organism is an activity of 
appraisal by itself (Colombetti 2014: 101), and the aim of this activity is to 
maintain the equilibrium between the agent and its Umwelt.  
According to Colombetti (Colombetti 2007), emotion appraisal is 
constituted of many factors: the physical systems that underpin perception, 
physical processes that take place in the brain, proprioceptive and kinetic 
experiences, felt arousal, and action orientation. This suggests that the appraisal 
of emotions -which, considering what Lazarus says, pertains to basic relations 
between the agent and the environment (e.g. harm or benefit)- takes place in a 
larger system. The activity of this system is distributed between a body aroused 
by emotions, a body kinetically connoted, and that does something in the 
environment according to this “corporeal feeling”, and the environment itself, 
which displays affective features. 
This means that, in this perspective, “core relational themes”, which 
affectively inform the agent about her relation with the environment, do not 
acquire a cognitive status in virtue of their being represented or judged by the 
agent. On the contrary, basic emotions that trigger the agent’s behavior are 
enacted, namely, they are brought forth by the encounter between the world 
and the embodied organism (Colombetti 2014: 110-111).  
 
This embodied and enactive description of appraisal offered by Colombetti, 
is helpful to make clear what Bruineberg, Kiverstein and Rietveld (2016) and 
Rietveld, Kiverstein (2014) mean what they describe embodied surprisal as an 
“affective tension” or as “the feeling that something has to be improved”. 
Indeed, the phenomenon they talk about concerns something that is very 
similar to what the notion of “appraisal of core relational themes” expresses: 
the basic affective situation of which the constituents are an embodied organism 
and the environment. Moreover, the consequences the notion of “affective 
tension” entails and the appraisal of core relational themes, in particular if 
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appraisal is conceived in the way suggested by Colombetti, seem to be the same. 
The embodied appraisal of the affective tension the agent feels draws her to act 
in a certain way in the environment, in order to minimize the situation of 
disequilibrium between internal and external dynamics, affective tension 
conceived as the appraisal of a core relational theme is expressive of. To put in 
other words, the affective tension is an enacted response (appraisal) to core 
relational themes (Hutto 2012: 179; Colombetti 2014: 110-111), and this 
response entails: i) bodily feelings and changes; ii) dispositions to act, which will 
form part of coping-strategies.  
 
What is particularly interesting in thus enactive approach to PP is the way 
the explanation accounts for the consequences of the embodied and situated 
appraisal of affective tension.  
The authors (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014), by recalling the notion of “field of 
affordances” (Rietveld, Kiverstein 2014), give a lot of theoretical space to the 
role of the “affectively tuned” econiche to explain how action, crucial for 
predictive error minimization, takes place. They claim that what draws the 
agent to improve her grip upon the context of the cognitive practice -namely to 
minimize the disequilibrium between her states of action-readiness and what 
she can actually do in the environment- is not a reassessment of the hypotheses 
represented by the brain’s models (Hohwy’s proposal), or, like in Clark’s 
account, an embodied action guided by internal action-oriented 
representations that “say” what to do and how to do it. Rather, the world itself 
-conceived as a rich field of relevant affordances- fulfills this epistemic function 
(Bruineberg, Kiverstein, Rietveld 2016; Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014). To 
minimize embodied surprisal – which is expressive of the disattunement 
between states of action-readiness and contextual possibilities of action– the 
agent is solicited by environmental affordances to perform actions that will 
provide the sensory system with the right kinds of perceptual states, and this 
means making internal states of action-readiness attuned with on-line 
contextual action.  
At first glance, this point of the enactivist proposal sounds similar to Clark’s 
account of action, because this philosophical proposal seems to suggest that 
action minimizes embodied surprisal. Nevertheless, a closer look at this 
proposal shows that there is a very important difference between these two 
accounts, and this difference -I claim- makes the enactive proposal more 
interesting than Clark’s one. Indeed, in Clark’s account, since active inference 
is said to rely on AORs, the direction of the process aimed at establishing the 
equilibrium between internal and external dynamics goes from the internal 
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mind towards the world
127
, and only later from the world towards the mind. As 
already claimed, this undermines Clark’s proposal of an extended predictive 
mind, because the concept of AOR entails that the role of real, embodied and 
contextual action is underplayed.  
The enactivist explanation, thanks to the emphasis on the idea of the field 
of relevant affordances, avoids this problem. Indeed, this approach to PP 
claims that “we can learn something about the brain [namely its anticipatory 
mechanisms] by investigating the structure of the econiche” the organism acts 
upon (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014: 9, text into brackets added). The very 
structure of the landscape of affordances triggers patterns of action that shape 
the agent’s action-readiness, namely the organism’s anticipatory mechanisms. 
Crucially, the field of relevant affordances shapes anticipatory mechanisms in 
an affective way. Indeed, as explained in Chapter II, econiches not only offer 
the agent the perceptual substrate that affords skillful action, in the sense that 
they offer possibilities of action perceptually conveyed, but they provide 
affective features crucial for action-anticipation and action-selection.  
 
Even if the enactivist work I am considering does flesh out this point by 
connecting affordances, affect, and core relational themes, I think that if this 
this theoretical connection is taken into account, the affordance-based 
argument about PP can be understood better.  
As explained in the discussion of the enactive interpretation of the concept 
of appraisal, when the enactive affective science conceives of core relational 
themes tends to “externalize” them (Hufediek 2017: 4456; Hufendiek 2015: 
106). By emphasizing the adaptive function of core relational themes, it 
conceives of them not just as felt emotions or as representations of occurrent 
emotions, but rather as the enactment (appraisal) of a basic emotion in virtue 
of an embodied action performed in the environment (Colombetti 2014: 110). 
In this sense, core relational themes do not seem to pertain to the agent’s 
private emotional experience, but rather the relation between an affectively 
tuned environment (e.g. an environment expressive of loss, harm, danger, and 
so on
128) and the agent’s response to that environment. This leads to think of 
basic emotions (such as the feeling that something has to be improved) as 
situated in a cognitive practice, where the cognitive and practical nature of 
                                                          
127
 Notice that Bruineberg, Kiverstein and Rietveld (2016) raise this objection against Hohwy’s 
Predictive Coding. Nevertheless, considered what said about internal action-oriented predictive 
models, which are said to prescribe action, I think that this critique applies also to Clark’s 
proposal.  
128
 For more examples of “core relational themes”, see Lazarus 1991: 122, table 3.4.  
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emotional experience depends on the adaptive function of emotions and on 
their ability to trigger some kind of action or behavior.  
This way to conceive of core relational themes, or of “affective tension”, as 
situated, is particularly interesting to understand Bruineberg and Rietveld’s 
affordance-based explanation (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014). Indeed, if we 
conceive of core relational themes as situated, we can integrate one of the 
authors’ core insights: action is guided by features of the environment that 
afford an emotional response, crucial for action selection, action guidance, and 
the anticipation of action(see also Rietveld 2008a). Core relational themes, in 
virtue of their situated nature, support this affordance-based explanation 
because: since core relational themes are situated patterns of reactions, they 
sound like affordances affectively connoted, or “affective affordances”.  
This is crucial for the enactive explanation, because it accounts for 
preparatory and anticipatory aspects of action from a non-internalist 
perspective. The enactive explanation claims that action, which in the PP 
framework is crucial for PEM, is prepared by affects, which are triggered by 
relevant affordances, namely affordances that stand out in the field of 
affordances because they are “affectively attractive”. Conceiving of core 
relational themes -namely the affective tension the authors talk about when they 
discuss embodied surprisal- as situated explains the affective relation between 
anticipation, emotion, and rich the field of affordances better. The claim 
according to which an optimal grip on the field of affordances, which allows the 
agent to act as “surprisallessly” as possible (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014: 10), is 
guaranteed by anticipatory mechanisms that have to do with affects and 
emotions (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014: 10; 11) can be fleshed out in this way. 
The landscape of affordances triggers emotional responses that shape the 
agent’s action-readiness patterns (namely anticipatory mechanisms) because 
this landscape is structured around core relational themes, namely recurrent 
relations between the agent and the environment expressive of basic emotions 
connected to the “good” or “ill” of an organism-dependent situation. This is to 
say that the anticipatory strategies followed by the agent in her cognitive 
practices are shaped by an affective landscape of affordances because  
 
i) the whole organism, thanks to evolution, “is set up to be set off by 
core relational themes by responding to these” ones (Hutto 2012: 
179). 
ii) Prediction error minimization -namely strategies suitable to attune 
internal states of action-readiness with external dynamics- is actively 
performed in the rich landscape of affordances in virtue of an 
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affective anticipation of action, core relational themes are expressive 
of. 
iii) Prediction error minimization is supported by affective dynamics. 
Those ones characterize the very relation between an embodied 
agent and her environment in virtue of the affective structure of the 
landscape of affordances, in which some affordances stand out more 
than others because they are affectively attractive (namely they offer 
possibilities of action for the organism’s good). The attractiveness of 
those features of the environment drives the agent to act on these 
selected environmental features, which will fulfill the agent’s 
predictions, namely action-readiness patterns. 
 
What is crucial in this explanation –and this is what actually makes the 
difference between the enactive account of PP and Clark’s one in their project 
of extending PP– is the way affect and action are nested in anticipatory 
mechanisms.  
In Clark’s proposal, embodied action and externalities come into the 
explanation with the notions of representation, internal processing of 
information, and internal model. This makes the explanation closer to more 
classical models of Predictive Coding, because an epistemic primacy is given to 
internal cognitive resources and mechanisms. 
In the enactive account of PP, the controversial notion of internal 
representation (in particular that of AOR), which in Clark’s work is said to 
explain the anticipation of action, is replaced by the concept of affect. What is 
crucial is that affect is not thought to be a property of the brain (even if affect 
has something to do with neural dynamics, in particular in the “affective 
prediction hypothesis”) or a personal feeling-quality of the agent. Rather, it is 
considered to be “situated” in the relation between the whole organism and the 
environment, where this relation, in its being adaptive, is intrinsically active, 
since action is establishes the equilibrium between internal and external 
dynamics. Therefore, this approach to PP gives a more extensive account of 
the “predictive mind” than Clark’s one because it puts at the core of its 
explanatory framework a concept (affect) that, appropriately understood, 
explains the anticipatory underpinnings of action-perception loops as 
embodied and situated.  
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III.7 Concluding remarks.  
 
In this Chapter, I took into account the theory of Predictive Coding in three 
versions: Hohwy’s one, Clark’s Predictive Processing, and the reassessments of 
those proposals according to an enactive perspective.  
My discussion was aimed at understanding if Clark’s Action-Oriented 
Predictive Processing is able to declare peace between the enactive approach 
to cognition and his EMH (Clark 2015a). My exam of Clark’s proposal showed 
that peace cannot be declared yet. Indeed, Clark’s Action Oriented Predictive 
Processing still makes use of the notion of internal representation (AOR) to 
explain action-perception loops. In an enactive perspective, the use of this 
epistemic posit is unproductive: AORs do not explain action-perception loops, 
but, on the contrary, they conceal the very role of embodied, situated action. 
To develop a theory of the “situated, active and predictive mind”, the 
explanation has to focus on the very role of action, conceived as an external 
process that involves an embodied, skillful agent and her Umwelt, defined as a 
rich field affordances that triggers patterns of action.  
Crucially, this dynamics is thought to be affectively connoted. This point is 
particularly interesting because it not only gives a more multilayered account of 
cognitive process than Clark’s one does, in which the topic of affectivity is not 
discussed in detail, but it also offers the conceptual tools for an explanatory 
framework that does not rely on representations. At the same time, the enactive 
approach to PP does not state that cognitive process are just mere reactions to 
environmental conditions. 
This is a crucial point for the debate developed in cognitive sciences. 
Indeed, sometimes it has been objected that the enactive approach to cognition 
is a new form of behaviorism (Block 2001) because of the emphasis that this 
theory puts on the sensorimotor dimension of cognitive processes, which are 
said not being mediated by computations and representations. The lack of this 
representational mediation is said to entail that perceptual and active cognitive 
processes are conceived in terms of an input-output dynamics.  
The way the enactive approach to cognition accounts for action-perception 
loops is able to avoid this scenario (Bruineberg, Rietveld 2014), sometimes 
called “desert landscape scenario” (Clark 2013a) to emphasize how the 
enactive theory avoids internal representations and goals to explain action-
perception loops and anticipatory processes. Indeed, by situating affectivity in 
“the in-between” the agent and the environment, the enactive approach to 
cognition accounts for the relation between the two components of the coupled 
system in a mediated but non-representational way. Affect mediates between 
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the organism and the environment, and it does so in an active way, namely by 
triggering patterns of action that shape the agent’s states of action-readiness, 
crucial for anticipatory aspects of cognitive processes. 
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Conclusion and future work 
 
Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? This is the 
challenging question Clark and Chalmers’ revolutionary article the “Extended 
Mind” (Clark, Chalmers 1998) begins with.  
My work mostly dealt with this question. I started to consider the problem 
of the mind’s borders in my exam of some contemporary approaches to 
cognition (Cognitive Linguistics, Grounded Cognition, Embedded, Enacted 
and Extended Cognition). I pointed out how those theories try to extend the 
mind’s borders by rethinking of the cognitive role of the body, action, and the 
environment in cognitive practices.  
I claimed that, in the 4Es’ debate, the Extended Mind Hypothesis and the 
Enactive approach to cognition are the most interesting theories we should look 
at to conceive of the mind as “extended” or “extensive”. Indeed both endorse 
an ontological claim about the mind. According to the EMH, the mind is 
constituted by the manipulation of information embedded in the brain or in 
externalities (e.g. artifacts) distributed in the environment. Also according to 
the enactive approach to cognition the mind does not stop at the boundaries 
defined by the skull: the mind is embodied and enacted; it is a process that 
develops through the active and affective relation between the agent and her 
environment.  
Despite both theories endorse revolutionary claims about the nature of the 
mind, they do so by following different philosophical strategies. I claimed that 
this influences the success of these two philosophical projects.  
The EMH endorses an extended form of functionalism. Even if at first 
glance extended functionalism sounds like an appealing concept for the project 
of “mind-extension”, it does not actually succeed in radically reassessing the 
concept of mind. Indeed, this philosophical framework entails a locational 
claim about cognition, and it implicitly gives a cognitive primacy to internal 
cognitive resources, which are considered to be representational states. The 
EMH’s “extended mind” seems to still epistemically stop at the boundaries of 
the skull: representational states are the model Clark looks at in order to think 
of the cognitive role of the body and the world. Moreover, this explanation is 
not as active as it should be: the theory is grounded on the concept of mental 
state and, by explaining action through internal representations, it underplays 
the cognitive role of world-engaging embodied action.  
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On the contrary, the enactive approach to cognition gives a relational and 
more active account of cognitive processes, and then of the mind. Embodied, 
world-engaging action is central in this explanation, and crucially it is not 
considered to be dependent on or forerun by internal representational states. 
This makes the “extensive” account of the mind offered by the enactive 
approach to cognition stronger than Clark’s EMH. Indeed, the enactive 
approach to cognition gives a dynamical and processual explanation of 
cognitive processes. The emphasis the enactive approach to cognition puts on 
embodied action -conceived as the attunement between the agent and the 
environment- allows the explanation to overcome the problems the EMH’s 
locational and representational commitment entails.  Those problems are: i) a 
static account of the mind, which does not explain how the mind extends to 
externalities, ii) an internalistic prejudice, according to which there is a gap 
between the mind and the world that should be filled by representations.  
Even if the EMH tries to redefine the concept of representation in order to 
make it active and dynamical -and then suitable to account for the mind as an 
extended process- I claimed that this explanation is not successful at all. In fact, 
Clark’s AORs are philosophically unwarranted, because they do not fulfill 
representational criteria. Moreover, the way Clark defines those 
representations does not account for action. Like representations postulated by 
first-wave cognitive sciences, AORs are internal items that anticipate and 
control action, they are not endowed with intrinsic active features, others 
concepts of representation -such as Peirce’s signs- are endowed with.  
Therefore, I claimed that an “extensive” approach to cognition should not 
buy AORs: AORs do not play any interesting job in explaining cognitive 
processes (e.g. embodied and enacted selective responses to the environment, 
anticipation of action-perception loops) as active.  
That is why I endorsed an enactive perspective on cognition. This one 
avoids AORs, then it does not entail some of the problems the EMH suffers 
from. Moreover, even if the enactive approach to cognition rejects internal 
representations, it does not explain cognitive processes as mere reactions to 
inputs. Indeed, the enactive approach to cognition emphasizes the role of 
affects in cognitive processes a lot. Affect -which is considered to be embodied 
and situated- does the same job internal representations are supposed to do: it 
contributes to adaptive dynamics, selective responsiveness to stimuli and 
anticipation of action perception-loops are expressive of. Crucially, it does so 
avoiding rhetorical slips AORs-based explanations entail; furthermore, it does 
not give an epistemic primacy to internal cognitive resources.  
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This not only makes the enactive approach to cognition more suitable to 
think of the mind as a complex, extensive and enactive process, but it also 
makes the theory not liable to objections according to which non-
representational accounts of cognition are new forms of behaviorism (Aizawa 
2014; Block 2001; Carruthers 2015; Shapiro 2011, also cited in Gallagher 
2017: 132). Indeed, by means of affectively driven action, the enactive 
approach to cognition explains how cognitive practices build up the coupled 
cognitive system made of the cognitive agent and her Umwelt. In this system, 
the agent’s cognitive dynamics and the environmental ones are attuned the one 
with the other. There are not two different systems -the agent and the 
environment- and there is not one system (the agent or the organism) that takes 
the other system as its input. That is why the enactive approach to cognition 
cannot be considered to be a new form of behaviorism. Cognitive practices 
unfold through the relation between parts of the same system. This relation, as 
explained in Chapter III, is not thought to be a mere reaction to inputs, but it 
is said to develop in an affective way. Indeed, affects not only structure the 
coupled cognitive system, but also account for the interaction between parts of 
the system. This interaction, I claim, is more direct than the one described by 
representational approaches to cognition, which postulate a complex cognitive 
slice between the agent and the environment. Nevertheless, it entails a kind of 
affective mediation, affective and embodied tension is expressive of: this 
distinguishes mechanical behavior from cognitive experience.  
Given this theoretical importance of affect in the enactive approach to 
cognition -crucial to understand the relation between enactivism and other 
theories, such as minimal representational approaches to cognition like the 
EMH, and fundamental to defend enactivism from its critiques- it could be 
interesting to devote my future work to more detailed considerations about the 
role of affectivity in cognitive experience.  
This would also help me to make my current work more complete. Indeed, 
here I focused on specific kinds of cognitive processes, perception and action, 
and I always took into account an agent and her environment. A more accurate 
work on the affective dimension of cognition would help me to consider social 
cognition and collective action as well: the individual agent and the perceptual 
environment of this work would become a plural agent and an intersubjective 
environment.  
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